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This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of the political life of Latinos 
in the U.S., in specific local contexts and historical moments. To that end, I propose to 
reframe the understanding of politics and the political. Borrowing elements from political 
philosophy, I propose using the concept of politicization, which is primarily defined by 
the introduction of innovation in the public realm; the generation of consequences that 
affect not only those directly involved in a situation but others as well; and the 
intervention in a public domain that is not limited to state structures.  
To elaborate on this idea of politicization as well as to bring history, context, and 
in particular, temporality, to the center of this research, I look at two major  events that 
crystallized the most critical landmarks in the recent political history of Latinos in the 
Washington D.C. area: the Mount Pleasant Riots of 1991 and “La Marcha” of 2006. In 
order to disentangle the process of politicization in each of the events analyzed, I 
 
examine the interplay of context (including demographic, political, and organizational 
features of the local Latino community), episodes of contention, attribution of 
opportunities and threats, social and organizational appropriation, and innovation.  I then 
reconstruct these cases by inscribing them in their contexts and analyzing how, why, and 
when different consequential actions were performed.   
Both the Mount Pleasant riots and La Marcha involved the engagement of 
ordinary people in the Latino community in contentious public acts which led to the 
emergence of a transformed ethnically-centered political actor. I argue that this actor 
constitution was the result of the way in which ordinary people and various collective 
actors proceeded throughout the exceptional public performances, before, during, and 
after. My main argument is that the profile and structural location of leading 
organizations (e.g., dependency on government contracts, foundations’ grants, employers, 
or ordinary people) involved in the events had a decisive impact on the actions adopted 
by community leaders which, in turn, affected the direction of the political path that the 
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According to the U.S. Census Bureau, between the years 1990 and 2000 the 
proportion of foreign-born residents in the United States jumped from 7.9 percent to 11.1 
percent (from 19.8 million to 31.1 million). Among them, those who were not U.S. 
citizens increased by 58 percent in the same period. Latin Americans, specifically, made 
up 52 percent of the foreign-born in 2000. As immigration rates continue to grow, 
immigration has become a hot topic in the public agenda. In the last few years alone, the 
rising numbers became not only a pressing issue at all levels of government —namely, 
federal, state, and local—but also a central theme of debate in the media.  
Although limited when compared to the literature on economic, cultural, and 
social aspects of immigration, the academic interest in the political implications of 
immigration has registered a noticeable increase in recent years. When analyzing the 
political life of immigrants in the US in general, and of Latin American immigrants1 in 
particular, the literature has mainly focused on the following general concepts: political 
incorporation, political participation, and, to a lesser extent, political mobilization. 
Although useful in order to understand a variety of problems regarding legal 
membership, involvement, and organization of the group, these bodies of literature have 
left understudied some important aspects of the political life of Latino immigrants 
residing in U.S. territory. These limitations are not only reflected in the definition of what 
is being read as “political” in the activities or status of the group of interest, but also in 
how the political life of the group has been studied. 
                                                 




First, the relatively limited scope of many of these studies in capturing political 
features of the group is a reflection of the type of conceptualization on which these pieces 
are based. When the emphasis is placed on the process of becoming part of the polity or 
engaging in political activity through formalized means, the less obvious gaps through 
which politics almost exclusively operates for those not formally authorized through 
membership, remain invisible. In particular, given that a significant proportion of Latin 
American immigrants are noncitizens, and among them, the majority do not have legal 
documents that authorize them to live and work in this country, analyses focusing on 
“formal” politics and institutions of representation leave a meaningful portion of their 
political activities, as well as their implications, aside. This is the case for many of the 
studies centered on notions of political incorporation and political participation. Research 
on the political mobilization of Latin American immigrants, on the other hand, is more 
sensitive to political activities taking place at the margins of formal political institutions. 
However, these exemplars are to a great extent limited to organizational aspects of 
mobilization and centered in the examination of one sector only—usually, campaigns of 
organization in one particular industry or voters’ mobilization for an election. Overall, the 
literature on political mobilization signals a promising yet insufficiently developed line of 
research. 
Second, many of the studies on political activity of immigrants follow a linear 
conception in which the relations of causality are based on monolithic patterns—this is 
especially true for the works on political participation—rather than on a detailed 
examination of specific historical sequences. In other words, in most of these studies, 
rates of political activity (such as electoral participation, naturalization, or attendance at 
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rallies) are examined in relation to certain predicting variables. That is to say, the 
possession of a certain attribute or a combination of attributes is supposed to predict 
certain political behavior. Using Abbot’s terms, this line of research tends to “attribute 
causality to the variables—hypostatized social characteristics—rather than to agents; 
variables do things, not social actors. Stories disappear.” (Abbott 1992: 428) In addition, 
the units of analysis in these works are usually individuals—e.g., Latinos or Latino 
immigrants—rather than collective actors or categories. In contrast, I propose to look at 
the politicization of Latinos as a collective process in which collective actors occupy a 
central role rather than as the possession of certain attributes (e.g., citizenship) or the 
engagement in certain practices (e.g., voting) by individuals. Such study of politicization, 
therefore, should be historically grounded. This is particularly important considering that 
(1) the group’s politicization is contingent on Latino and non-Latino actors’ practices, the 
characteristics of the political setting, and prevailing cultural schemas (among other 
elements); and (2) through the entry into the public sphere, the group also affects those 
very same actors, practices, and structures. For those reasons, an isolated study of the 
characteristics of the group without careful consideration of the context would impede a 
holistic comprehension of the phenomenon under study. 
This dissertation aims to improve our understanding of the political life of Latin 
American immigrants in the U.S., in specific local contexts and historical moments. To 
that end, I propose to reframe the understanding of politics and the political. Borrowing 
elements from political philosophy, I propose using the concept of politicization, which is 
primarily defined by the introduction of innovation in the public realm; the generation of 
consequences that affect not only those directly involved in a situation but others as well; 
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and the intervention in a public domain that is not limited to state structures. In addition, 
as an attempt to bring history, context, and in particular, temporality, to the center of this 
research, I look at particular events; that is to say, sets of occurrences recognized as 
exceptional in the fact that they produce transformations in structures. Events as 
extraordinary moments are worth examining because they present openings for the group 
to constitute itself as an actor, because they prompt modifications in social relationships, 
and most importantly, because they have unexpected effects in the political process.2 
Critical political events are the sites in which there is a rupture from the ordinary, and, for 
that reason, the place par excellence to examine politics understood as the initiation of 
something different in the public realm. 
This research is centered on the study of two major events that crystallized the 
most critical landmarks in the recent political history of Latinos residing in the 
Washington D.C. area: the Mount Pleasant Riots of 1991 and “La Marcha” of April 10, 
2006 in Washington, D.C. Their relevance is, in turn, presumed by the presence of 
several elements, including the increase of public visibility of the Latino community3 
during their occurrence, and the understanding by different members of the community 
that these moments represented turning points in the community.  
 In the analysis of these cases, the questions that guided my research are as 
follows: Through what mechanisms do Latin American immigrants, regardless of their 
legal status, become politicized? To what extent does their entering into the public sphere 
lead to innovation? What combination of factors accounts for such innovation? In order 
to answer those questions I relied on varied types of evidence, primarily newspaper 
                                                 
2 On the importance of events in the transformation of structures I rely on Sewell (1996). 
3 This visibility is reflected in the substantial amount of media coverage they both received. 
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articles, and in-depth interviews with leaders of organizations, community organizers, 
public officials, journalists, and immigrant workers. I also used quantitative data, 
institutional documents, and direct observation. 
 In order to disentangle the process of politicization in each of the events analyzed 
herein I looked at the interplay of context (including demographic, political, and 
organizational features of the local Latino community), episodes of contention, 
attribution of opportunities and threats, social and organizational appropriation, and 
innovation (understood in terms of the formation or transformation of an identity-based 
political actor). Attention was paid not only to what type of occurrences took place, but 
also to when they happened.  
Both the Mount Pleasant riots and the immigration rally of April 10th 2006 
involved the engagement of ordinary people in the Latino community in contentious 
street performances which led to the emergence of a transformed ethnically-grounded 
political actor. This actor constitution was the result of the way in which ordinary people 
as well as different collective actors proceeded at different points during, before and after 
the exceptional public performances—that is, the violent riots in Mount Pleasant and the 
massive demonstrations in the Washington Monument. In this study, I reconstruct these 
cases by inscribing them in their contexts and analyzing how, why, and when different 
consequential actions were performed. The main argument I make in this dissertation is 
that the profile and structural location of leading organizations (e.g., dependency on 
government contracts, foundations grants and employers) involved in the events have a 
decisive impact on the actions adopted by community leaders which, in turn, affect the 
direction of the political path taken by the Latino community. 
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This study aims to foster a better understanding of the innovative contributions of 
the Latin American immigrant population in the public realm of the nation’s capital. Even 
if the Washington, D.C. area is among the top ten metropolitan areas attracting 
immigrants and that as the capital is a critical center of gravity, thus far the political life 
of the foreign-born population in general, and of Latinos in particular, has been scarcely 
studied in that locale. By providing a historical-sociological reconstruction of the recent 
political history of the Latino community, this dissertation tries to contribute to fill this 
gap. Although the study is based on two cases in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area, 
it uncovers implications of politicization that may apply well beyond this area. 
 
From a theoretical perspective, this dissertation offers more precise conceptual 
devices capable of capturing hidden aspects of the political life of immigrants that are 
consequential not only for immigrants themselves but also for the political setting where 
they intervene. In particular, the research offers important insights into both the formal 
and informal processes within the Latino social networks and community engagements. 
By developing a re-conceptualization of immigrants' political life, this study offers 
insight into the links between political opportunity frames, organizational patterns, 
events, and the politicization of a seemingly disempowered community. Traditional 
approaches on political incorporation (i.e. looking at voting patterns or proclivity towards 
supporting party politics) are insufficient for understanding the myriad ways in which 
marginalized ethnic communities, particularly a highly immigrant one engage the broader 
society. This study aims to provide a deeper understanding on how nontraditional modes 
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for political engagement can provide venues for effectively positioning seemingly 
disenfranchised groups within the larger U.S. political landscape. 
 This project looks to expand upon immigration literature in the U.S., with a 
particular goal of understanding how new immigrants and undocumented migrants insert 
themselves into the U.S. political landscape. Assumptions about low political 
participation among immigrant groups are challenged by focusing attention on political 
events that draw immigrants into riots and protest marches which, in turn, draw them into 
alternative political engagements. 
The research agenda executed in this study aims to engage a number of different 
audiences. In addition to opening dialogues with stakeholders in different subfields in 
sociology (such as social movements scholars, political sociologists, and race/ethnicity 
specialists) and political science, the study seeks to contribute to on-going discussions in 
the public arena. 
This dissertation encompasses five main sections. In the first chapter, I present a 
critical analysis of theoretically and substantively relevant literature on the political 
aspects of immigrants—in particular Latino immigrants—in the U.S. This review is 
organized around four main themes: political incorporation, political participation, the 
status of the undocumented, and political mobilization. In chapter two, I outline the main 
conceptual devices on which the proposed research will rely. In this regard, I first 
introduce the concept of politicization, then I justify the importance of looking at events, 
and finally, I summarize some theoretical devices borrowed from the contentious politics 
approach and the political process theory. Chapter 3 is devoted to the specification of the 
research design. In particular, I pose the research questions, describe the conceptual 
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model and operational definitions, and specify the evidence and types of analysis utilized. 
Chapters 4 and 5 are devoted to the analysis of the Mount Pleasant riots and La Marcha 





Chapter 1: Background 
 
1.1. Political incorporation of Latin American immigrants into the US political 
system 
What does it mean to become incorporated? Etymologically, the word 
incorporation comes from the Latin term incorporare, which can be translated as to 
embody, or in other words, to become part of the body. However, the extent to which this 
becoming part of the body takes place might vary according to different definitions. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, to incorporate means “to take in or include 
as part of a whole”; on the other hand, according to Merriam-Webster, the verb is 
conceptualized as “(a) to unite or work into something already existent so as to form an 
indistinguishable whole; (b) to blend or combine thoroughly”. Although these differences 
in semantics might seem slight, they express the varying intensity and scope that the act 
of becoming part of the whole might consist of. 
Distinct conceptions of incorporation are found in the literature on political 
incorporation of minorities; specifically, political incorporation of immigrants, and of 
Latino immigrants in particular (e.g., Browning et al. 1984; DeSipio and de la Garza 
1998; Hero 1992; Jones-Correa 1998, 2001, 2005; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Bloemraad 
2006). Although political incorporation is conceived of as the particular process through 
which a certain group becomes part of the polity or acquires a political life, differences 
arise when it comes to the precise conceptualization, operationalization, and/or 
explanation of that process. In that sense, the conceptualization of political incorporation 
can be organized around four main axes that coincide with where the focus of the 
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explanation is principally placed—namely, (1) the organizational and electoral capacity 
of the group, (2) the resources provided by the state, (3) the role of community-based 
organizations, and (4) the acquisition of citizenship.  
One widespread understanding of political incorporation of immigrants views 
political incorporation as a result of the minority group’s own capacity. Among studies 
on Latinos’ incorporation into the US political system, Browning et al. (1984) and Hero 
(1992) are good examples of this viewpoint. In these works, political incorporation is 
understood as equivalent to influence in policy making. Whereas Browning et al. (1984) 
suggest that an effective incorporation of minorities requires their major presence in 
coalitions that push forward their interests in the political arena, Hero’s (1992) concerns 
are focused on the absence of de facto pluralism—characterized as “two-tiered 
pluralism”—among Latinos who have the formal rights of citizens, but yet have a limited 
political and social influence.  
 These types of arguments have some caveats that are worth noting. First, their 
analyses particularly refer to the unequal and limited actual incorporation of Latino 
citizens into the U.S. political system. They do not specifically refer to the 
inclusion/marginalization of Latino noncitizens residing in the U.S. On the other hand, 
both accounts view politics exclusively in instrumental terms, that is, as a tool for 
minorities to gain impact on policy outcomes. 
 A second notion of political incorporation stresses the resources available from 
the state in the process of inclusion.  De Sipio and de la Garza (1998), in this line, 
conceptualize political incorporation in terms of settlement, suggesting that the 
availability of governmental resources—mainly, through beneficial policies—affects 
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immigrants’ transition into becoming “full members of the society”. With this in mind, 
they focus their analytical lens on the policies that benefit immigrants in the US, and that 
regulate the relationships between immigrants and U.S.-born populations. Additionally, 
in looking at the state mainly at the local level, Jones-Correa (2005; forthcoming) asserts 
that local bureaucracies play a critical role in incorporating new immigrants; and this 
bureaucratic incorporation, in turn, precedes electoral representation and lobbying. In this 
account, bureaucracies as the meeting points between citizens (and particularly, non-
citizens) and the state shape the process of political inclusion of minorities. Thus, 
addressing immigrant lobbying toward bureaucracies might operate as a more efficacious 
channel than focusing solely on electoral representation.  
The role of bureaucracies as active actors mobilizing for change is illustrated by 
the study of different policy issues in metropolitan Washington D.C., such as access to 
magnet schools, library purchasing policies, and zoning regulations (Jones Correa 2005); 
education policy (Jones Correa, forthcoming); or the location of day labor sites (Frasure 
and Jones-Correa 2005). In this last case, however, the argument underscores that the 
bureaucracy does not act alone over this policy issue, but in conjunction with community 
based organizations. 
Looking at the state apparatus at the different levels (federal, state, and local) is 
critical for accounting for the ways in which a minority group becomes part of the polity. 
Jones-Correa’s recent work as described above is particularly innovative in uncovering 
subtle processes through which bureaucracies incorporate immigrants. The theorization 
of how this incorporation is political, though, still needs further development.  
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Several scholarly articles have emphasized the role of community-based 
organizations, and especially immigrant and ethnic organizations, in the social, economic, 
and political incorporation of immigrants or ethnic minorities.4 Nonprofit organizations, 
in particular, have been depicted as playing a critical part in satisfying the needs and 
voicing the claims of these groups. The political roles of these organizations range from 
encouraging direct involvement of immigrants—for example, in campaigns, rallies or 
crafting bills—(Gordon 2000), to promoting immigrants’ citizenship acquisition, 
registration and voting (Garcia and de la Garza 1985), to acting on behalf of newcomers 
through lobbying or other public actions (Cordero-Guzmán 2005), to pushing issues into 
the public agenda (Abraham 1995), to preparing or supporting Latinos/as to run for 
political office (García and Márquez 2001, Koldewyn 1992), to educating them on 
political issues (Chung 2005). According to de Graauw (2007), immigrant nonprofits 
have the capacity to bridge the gap between the powerless immigrant community and the 
powerful political establishment by acting in two levels: the policy process (through 
agenda setting, access to decision making arenas, advocacy and lobbying), and the 
electoral process (through actions such as naturalization, voter education, and electoral 
mobilization).  
All in all, through their manifold actions, immigrant/ethnic community-based 
organizations have been depicted as critical mediators between immigrant or ethnic 
minorities and the political system. Organizations, in some ways, play the role of brokers 
between these two levels. This role has been especially important for noncitizens, who by 
definition are not entitled to participate in formal politics. 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Abraham (1995), Bloemraad (2005), Cordero-Guzman (2005), Cortes (1998), Garcia 
and de la Garza (1985), Hutcheson and Dominguez (1996), Koldewyn (1992), Minkoff (2002), Schrover 
and Vermeulen (2005), and Truelove (2000). 
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 Finally, citizenship acquisition has also been identified as a constitutive feature of 
political incorporation (Portes and Truelove 1987; Portes and Rumbaut 1996; Jones 
Correa 1998; Sierra et al. 2000; Bloemraad 2006). For many scholars, this is an inevitable 
first stage for any immigrant minority that aspires to make itself heard. In all the cited 
accounts, political incorporation is critical for a minority group because it is linked to a 
series of positive outcomes—including the ability to express their interests, achievement 
of substantial political equality, influence in policy decisions at the local level, increase 
of programs aiming at minorities, and so on.  
Acquiring American citizenship is, in principle, not an option open to all those 
who immigrate to the U.S. However, even for immigrants eligible for naturalization, 
there is often a hesitation about making that move.. In many cases, making the decision 
about becoming a naturalized citizen involves giving up membership in a particular 
political community (the nation of origin) in order to acquire a new one. As a state policy, 
the decision to naturalize relies on the will of the individuals (Jones Correa, 1998). In 
other words, once immigrants meet certain requirements, such as number of years of 
legal residency in the country, they have the option to naturalize and, through that 
process, fully participate in the political system in the new community . One element that 
previous studies have recognized, however, is that even when they have the option, Latin 
American immigrants show low rates of naturalization (Portes and Truelove 1987; Jones 
Correa 1998; Sierra et al. 2000). According to Jones Correa (1998), the reasons for 
immigrants’ hesitation with regards to naturalization are not purely of a socioeconomic 
character, nor are they related to bureaucratic impediments. They are, however, 
determined by a series of costs from within and without the American political system. In 
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the former sense, the costs are related to the need for mobilization in order to receive 
political party attention; in the latter, the political cost of giving up membership (and the 
associated benefits and duties attached to it) in their home countries as well as the 
psychological cost of renouncing to their previous citizenship are the primary reasons for 
immigrants’ hesitation. Other explanations emphasize the potential reversibility of 
migration as perceived by the subjects and fear of the U.S. Immigration and 
Naturalization Service5 (INS) as dissuasive factors hindering naturalization (Portes and 
Truelove 1987). 
In all the previous accounts, political incorporation is seen as critical for a 
minority group because it is linked to a series of positive outcomes. Browning et al. 
(1984) assert that the achievement of substantial political incorporation is associated with 
major political equality. A minority group that is sufficiently integrated has the ability to 
express and advance their interests. This is illustrated in their study by several policy 
changes at the local level, such as the employment of more minorities in commissions, 
increasing utilization of minority contractors, and the number of programs aiming at 
minorities. The exclusion of immigrant groups from political life, conversely, leads to 
their inadequate representation and, in turn, to an insufficiency in the satisfaction of their 
needs in education, housing, and health care, as well as an increase in their vulnerability 
to exploitation (Jones-Correa 1998). In addition, the political incorporation of noncitizens 
into the political system through voting constitutes a necessary source of legitimacy of 
democratic institutions (Garcia Bedolla 2006).  
                                                 
5 The Immigration and Naturalization Service ceased to exist on March 1, 2003. It current equivalent would 
be the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. 
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But, what happens to those who are not citizens and, according to the prevalent 
criteria in use, remain excluded? What does their formal exclusion from the political 
system mean in terms of their political status? Are there other means through which they 
can still impact the political process? If so, what are those means? Although some recent 
works have acknowledged the insufficiency of traditional linear approaches to political 
incorporation that focus almost exclusively on the formal political arena and have, in 
turn, recommended, looking at other ongoing and contingent processes through which 
immigrants gain a voice (see, for example, Lee et al. 2006, Martinez 2005, Leal 2002), 
not much empirical work has been done on this line. My assertion in this research is that 
the formal political incorporation into the American system is only one partial way in 
which the political status of immigrants can be analyzed. A more pertinent schema for 
analysis should be grounded on specific historical configurations and focus on those 
mechanisms through which the action of the undocumented immigrants becomes 
political. 
 
1.2. Political participation of Latinos 
 
 Closely related to the general conceptions of political incorporation reviewed 
above are the works on political participation. Political participation is one of the crucial 
concepts in political science. Although everyday discourse tend to employ the term 
political participation in reference to a wide variety of actions whose object is the public 
sphere, in mainstream political science, the notion of political participation is usually 
narrowed in accordance with certain conditions. In one of the most classical definitions, 
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Verba and Nie assert that “political participation refers to those activities by private 
citizens that are more or less directly aimed at influencing the selection of governmental 
personnel and/or actions they take” (1972: 2) 
 It should be noted that at least two important aspects follow from this definition. 
The first one has to do with the subjects of political participation understood in this way 
who are specified as “private citizens”. This demarcation presupposes, in consequence, 
that noncitizens’ activities, even if aimed at the public sphere or the orientation of 
political outcomes, are not covered by such a concept. The second aspect that is worth 
noting is that the object of political participation is limited to those activities oriented to 
affect the policy making process and the agents formally responsible for that process, that 
is, government officials. Along similar lines, Brady adds the condition that political 
participation “requires action by ordinary citizens directed toward influencing political 
outcomes” (1999: 737). In other words, an active involvement by authorized individuals, 
that is those who possess the status of citizenship, in the political process is necessary. 
This particular understanding of political participation underlies the bulk of the most 
relevant research on political participation of Latinos in the U.S. (i.e., Garcia and de la 
Garza 1985; Hero 1992; Hero et al. 2000; Jones-Correa 1998; Portes and Rumbaut 1996). 
The attention is mostly focused on the trends of the group in terms of naturalization, 
voting, being elected, and forming coalitions to impact the direction of political 
outcomes. 
 The literature on Latino politics has been especially concentrated in the 
explanation of rates and types of participation of Latino immigrants in U.S. politics. The 
effect of generations, gender, religion, ethnicity, level of association, length of presence 
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in the country, characteristics of their native countries, partisanship, and political 
ideology, in the potentiality and/or types of political participation of Latin American 
immigrants have been extensively researched. Whereas first-generation immigrants 
appear to be primarily concerned with old country-of-residence politics—at least in the 
beginning, given that the passing of time in the new country entails a gaining of interest 
in domestic matters—the second generation tends to adopt more radical political 
positions (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). Also, as tenure in the U.S. increases, Latinos tend 
to become more heterogeneous on policy issues (aside from ethnicity, immigration, or 
affirmative action issues) and more similar to native-born whites (Pearson and Citrin 
2006). Immigrant men tend to monopolize spaces in organizations oriented toward their 
home country whereas activist women have been predominantly oriented toward local 
political participation (Jones-Correa 1998). Religion, regardless of denominational 
differences, has been identified as powerful in explaining political participation 
regardless of denominational differences, especially because of the civic associational 
roles played by churches (Jones-Correa and Leal 2001). In fact, participation has been 
positively linked to level of association and capacity of organization. In some cases, 
however, organizations emerge as an alternative to formal participation in the political 
system (Portes and Truelove 1987). Nationality and ethnicity have also impacted the 
trajectories of new immigrants in American politics (Portes and Rumbaut 1996). 
Specifically, once Latino immigrants turn to domestic politics and vote, they tend to 
mobilize along national or ethnic lines. Also, mobilization drives targeting naturalized 
Latinos have been shown to positively affect their turnout rates (Barreto 2005). 
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 The features of Latino political participation are also tied to the structure of 
political parties in the U.S., and, in particular, how each hof the dominant parties have 
mobilized new constituencies (Jones-Correa 1998) or have responded to specific needs of 
this group (Hero et al. 2000). It has also been demonstrated that in spite of commonsense 
notions, ideology does not play in the expected way among Latino immigrants. In other 
words, Latinos do not necessarily identify themselves as liberals or conservatives, but, 
rather, they are ideologically diverse (Hero 1992). 
 In the literature on the Latino population in the U.S., political participation is 
usually regarded as a problem. In fact, two of the most salient questions that scholars 
have tried to answer is why political participation in this group is so low compared to that 
of other minorities and how it would be possible to increase the inclusion of this group 
into political institutions. Many scholars agree in the diagnosis that Latinos show low 
rates of naturalization (Garcia and de la Garza 1985; Hero et al. 2000; Jones-Correa 
1998). Given that in order to participate in the political system in the way that was 
referred to above, it is necessary to have formal membership in the state, that is, 
citizenship, the lack of this status constitutes a rigid barrier. Moreover, Latinos are 
depicted as having limited interest in the American political life (Garcia and de la Garza 
1985); low rates of organizational membership (DeSipio 2006); and low rates of voter 
registration and turnout (Hero et. al 2000).  
 Among the factors that have been pinpointed as hindering political participation, 
scholars have identified the following: insufficient group cohesion originated in diverging 
patterns of self-identification or cultural diversity (Hero 1992); high proportion of 
individuals in poverty; youthful characteristic of the group, lack of political resources, 
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absence of recruitment efforts by organizations (Hero et al. 2000); low levels of 
organizational involvement, low socioeconomic status, and attachment to traditional 
religious group that do not provide the appropriate context for confrontation of political 
views (Garcia and de la Garza 1985). In addition, the low citizenship rates of the group 
are also linked to a variety of causes. Jones-Correa (1998) explains this fact by referring 
to the costs involved in immigrants’ incorporation into the political arena, which stem 
from their communities of origin and from the new one. In order to become full members 
of the new community, in many cases immigrants must sacrifice their previous 
membership, and in the new community, they must mobilize before parties pay attention 
to them. These costs partially explain what Portes and Truelove (1987) refer to as a 
reluctance to shift national allegiances among immigrants. 
 Given that political participation of Latinos is low, and that this fact, in turn, 
reinforces the exclusion that this group suffers in other fields, students of Latino politics 
have prescribed different solutions in order to reverse this situation. Some of the solutions 
that have been prescribed are the “activation” or increase of strategies to integrate the 
group into political life (Garcia and de la Garza 1985). According to this account, these 
strategies should come from political parties or other organizations including religious 
ones. Another potential solution to reverse the low political participation of Latinos is 
associated with incentives provided by the state either as a desired or, even more likely, 
as an unexpected outcome of particular policies. One example of the state acting as a 
source of incentives for political organization and participation of Latinos in the U.S., 
was the increase of public debate on immigration during the 1990s that followed the 
multiple attempts at reforms of immigration law, which resulted in an increase of Latino 
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voters turning out in elections and the pursuit of citizenship through naturalization (Sierra 
et al. 2000). Some scholars explicitly prescribe the direct adoption of state policies in 
order to encourage immigrant political engagement (See Garcia Bedolla 2006). Allowing 
noncitizen voting at the local level and enhancing their opportunities of participation in 
community decision-making structures are examples of those types of recommendations. 
Overall, the literature on political participation of Latinos in the American 
political system has extensively covered issues regarding what is considered insufficient 
involvement in the political system and in civic life by the group. As seen above, the 
majority of the works aim to identify a general pattern of causation of such problems. 
Within this literature, the emphasis is mostly placed in the “normal”, institutionalized 
political process. Specifically, most of the works on political participation of Latinos in 
the US focus on the utilization of democratic institutions –mostly state institutions, and to 
a lesser extent civil society organizations—to advance some sort of influence in political 
outcomes, which, ultimately will be beneficial for the group. In particular, given the 
explicit or implicit definitions of political participation embedded in these works, politics 
through informal arenas and, especially, conflictive ones are left out of these types of 
analyses. 
 
 1.3. The “undocumented” status and its impact in politics 
 
 The term undocumented refers to those subjects who do not possess accepted 
documents to reside in the country. Specifically, it alludes to those individuals who 
entered the country without legal documents and have not legally “normalized” their 
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residence in this country since then. Undocumented Latino immigrants are worth 
studying not only because they possess very unique characteristics in terms of their 
political capacity and status, but also because they are quantitatively important. 
According to estimates by the Pew Hispanic Center, around 11.5 to 12 million of 
unauthorized immigrants were residing in the country as of March 2006. In addition, 
undocumented migrants accounted for 30% of the foreign-born population in 2005. In 
regard to national/regional origin, unauthorized immigrants from Latin America 
represented 78% of the unauthorized population in 2005 (see Passel 2006). Furthermore, 
the weight of Latin Americans among undocumented immigrants is greater than the share 
of Latin Americans among the total foreign-born population residing in the US (52 
percent, according to the 2000 U.S. Census). In the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area 
in the year 2000, foreign born Latinos represented 5.4 percent of the total population 
residing in the area and, among them, 75.3 percent were not U.S. citizens. 6   
 According to the literature and commonsense, undocumented immigrant workers 
tend to be marginalized in the labor market, culturally segregated, and politically 
excluded. In the labor market, they are heavily concentrated in the secondary sector 
(Delgado 1993), which is composed of low-pay, high turnover, and temporary jobs. That 
is to say, they tend to work in peripheral industries with little job security and reduced 
advancement opportunities. Furthermore, in these types of firms, the relationships 
between employees and employers are highly personalized, and therefore, discretional. 
 The presence and constant increase in the absolute number of immigrants in the 
U.S. has been associated with a response to the constant or increasing demand for 
immigrant workers by employers (Portes and Rumbaut, 1996) and in many cases backed 
                                                 
6 2000 U.S. Census Bureau 
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by the US state, for example through the launching of guest worker programs (Garcia 
Bedolla 2006). This specific demand for immigrant workers in certain industries, such as 
garment and small electronics firms, is explained by certain characteristics that are 
usually associated with immigrant workers, such as reliability, diligence, and above all, 
willingness to work hard for low pay. These features define a comparative advantage of 
immigrant workers as compared to their American counterparts. Whether this essentialist 
characterization of the group is accurate or not, it is illustrative insofar as it captures a 
widespread conviction that there is a need in the economy that is filled by the presence of 
this particular group. 
 With respect to their formal relationship with the political realm, even when they 
are neither citizens nor legal residents, immigrants have responsibilities and rights.  The 
responsibilities that noncitizens have with respect to the state include, for example, the 
obedience to the law of the land in which they reside, the payment of taxes, the 
registration for the draft, and the subjection to the same criminal and civil laws as citizens 
(see DeSipio and de la Garza 1998). 
 When it comes to rights, the literature tends to emphasize the sets of privileges 
that noncitizens are deprived of as an inherent feature of their status. The types of rights 
and privileges that are denied to undocumented immigrants are mainly electoral and 
occupational, plus access to federal government social welfare programs (DeSipio and de 
la Garza 1998). First, noncitizens cannot vote in any federal or state elections. In only a 
few jurisdictions, including Takoma Park, Maryland, can they participate in local 
elections. This current situation, however, is at odds with the majority of American 
history in which noncitizen voting was common at the local, state, and federal levels 
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(Garcia Bedolla 2006). Second, in terms of employment, the undocumented are subject to 
severe restrictions—especially after the approval of the 1986 Immigration Reform and 
Control Act, when the employment of undocumented immigrants became illegal. If this 
regulation were completely enforced, immigrants would lose their jobs and employers 
would be sanctioned as well. The purpose of this measure was to dissuade potential 
“illegal” immigrants from continuing to enter the country by taking away the 
employment incentive. Furthermore, noncitizens are denied access to federal social 
welfare programs, such as food stamps,  Temporary Aid to Needy Families, Medicaid, 
and Supplemental Security Income (DeSipio  and De la Garza 1998). 
Much of the debate around citizenship has been centered on the status of formally 
documented membership in a national society. In that sense, the possession of legal status 
is characterized as shaping immigrants’ identities, social networks, participation, and 
relationship with their home countries (Menjivar 2006). Conversely, the lack of 
“documents” implies risks and difficulties across a wide range of dimensions, including 
health outcomes, labor market opportunities, income, domestic violence, abuses by state 
agents, and so forth.  
 While the formal allocation of rights and responsibilities among noncitizens 
defines the initial conditions in which the political emergence, constitution, and operation 
of the group take place, it does not determine the political status of the group. In 
principle, the lack of citizenship does not prevent Latino immigrants from participating in 
other political non-electoral activities. As Leal states, “while voting is still not allowed 
for noncitizens, there is not prohibition against non-electoral participation”7 (2002: 355). 
Based on the 1989/90 Latino National Political Survey, however, works by Leal (2002) 
                                                 
7 As Leal (2002) notes, the only explicit prohibition is financial contributions for political campaigns. 
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and Martinez (2005) found that Latino noncitizens are less likely to participate in non-
electoral political activities and civic groups than Latino citizens. In any event, Leal 
(2002) also found that noncitizen Latino immigrants with a better understanding of 
politics, a strong ethnic identity, better English skills, and younger in age, were more 
likely to get involved. The activities range from displaying a sign, to signing a petition, to 
writing a letter to an elected official, to attending a public meeting or a political rally.  
In sum, the horizons of politicization of undocumented immigrants are not 
necessarily fixed ex-ante by legal prescriptions. Although the formal allocation of rights 
and responsibilities among noncitizens need to be seriously considered in any analysis of 
political activities among the “undocumented”, it should be conceived as a contextual 
condition within which politics is deployed. As mentioned earlier, it is an explicit 
intention of my research to uncover processes of political activity that occur through 
everyday practices at capillary levels, and that operate within the established schema of 
formal inclusion/exclusion yet are not necessarily and/or absolutely constrained by it. In 
particular, I will go beyond this demarcation, and focus instead on patterns of cultural and 
political contestation of policy decisions and norms.  
 
1.4. Expanding the lens to capture political activity: From participation to 
mobilization and organizing 
 
Mobilization is usually understood as the process by which individuals or groups 
become active and organized towards social change. Becoming active, then, goes beyond 
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the utilization of any particular tool, path, or institution. Thus, the concept of 
mobilization tends to be used to designate a broad range of different things.  
Literatures using the concepts of mobilization and organizing in relation to the 
Latino community (and in particular, the immigrant community) place a particular 
emphasis on the role of certain constituted groups (mainly political parties, unions, and 
community-based groups) in bringing people together to act on their common interests. 
Rather than emerging from below, then, organizing efforts tend to be led by the active 
effort of established organizations. In other words, political mobilization is usually 
conceived as operated over a group instead of emerging from the group. In addition, 
organizing experiences covered in these studies tend to take place through campaigns 
around a specific issue.  
Political mobilization of voters is a common strategy utilized by political parties 
and elites who want to court the Latino population in election times. Part of the literature 
on the political life of Latinos in the U.S. views mobilization as a political strategy 
utilized to increase and control the engagement of Latinos in political participation—i.e., 
registering and voting8. The idea is that “political participation depends significantly on 
political mobilization, that is, on which persons are targeted for political recruitment” 
(Hero et al. 2000: 530). This understanding of political mobilization usually refers to the 
strategies pursued by political parties. However, not only political parties engage in 
voters’ mobilization. As Marwell (2004) demonstrates, some organizations, which he 
calls machine politics community-based organizations (CBOs), also engage in electoral 
politics creating voting constituencies for local elected officials. The underlying rationale 
                                                 




is that CBOs generate greater contract revenues by adding electoral politics to their more 
traditional roles.  
 Labor unions appear as another key actor in the organization of immigrants. In 
fact, one of the big issues addressed by this literature is the organizability of immigrant 
workers. Contradicting the commonsense notion that Latino immigrant workers are less 
likely to organize because of their concentration in the secondary labor market and their 
status of extreme vulnerability with respect to immigration authorities, Delgado (1993) 
presents a case in which undocumented workers voted for union representation and 
signed a collective bargaining agreement with their employer. According to Delgado, the 
organizability of undocumented workers “depends less on citizenship status—which is 
singled out in most accounts—and more on labor market forces, the legal environment, 
organizational capacities, forms of labor control, migration and settlement patterns, and 
other such factors” (1993: 10-11). As a result, the difficulty of organizing undocumented 
immigrants does not differ much from the difficulty of organizing any group of workers. 
In the case studied, Delgado acknowledges passions and emotions as key factors utilized 
by unions in meetings, demonstrations and various group activities in order to foster 
mobilization.  
 Unionization of Latino immigrant workers has also been related to previous 
experiences by immigrants of unions in their home countries (Milkman 2000). Other 
factors that have been pinpointed as playing an important role in immigrant workers’ 
organization are availability of strong social networks among immigrants, hardships 
involved in the adaptation to the new home, and length of residence in the country 
(Milkman 2000). Unionization among this excluded sector of the population is also the 
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result of a change in policy among unions that moved away from focusing on citizenship 
toward a more inclusive strategy (Sierra et al. 2000). Among the most visible and 
successful immigrant workers’ campaigns that were carried out during the 1990s were the 
Justice for Janitors movement (Nissen 2003; Fisk et al. 2000; Gutierrez de Soldatenko 
2005)—oriented toward the improvement of working conditions for hotel and restaurant 
workers—and the campaigns in the agricultural and food-processing industries. 
  The organizing of Latino immigrants has also been successful in cases in which 
the claims are not addressed to the employers but to the state itself. In particular, this type 
of mobilization of Latino immigrants has also occurred as a reaction to the hardening of 
state policies—the most typical being immigration law. In this line, mobilization has been 
channeled through campaigns and demonstrations advocating a decrease of militarization 
and violence along the US-Mexico border, an improvement in opportunities for legal 
entry to the country, an increase in access to public services for immigrants, an 
improvement of the regulation of labor, health, and safety standards in workplaces, and 
access to public school boards for noncitizen parents (Sierra et al. 2000). This type of 
mobilization against state policies (or legislation proposals) is also illustrated in the case 
of the mobilizations against the adoption of English-only laws (Santoro 1999). 
The political mobilization of Latino immigrants, on the other hand, has been 
depicted as the effect of the diffusion of a model of political behavior of another minority 
group. During the 1960s, and following the example of African Americans, a number of 
Latino militant organizations proliferated throughout the country (Portes and Truelove 
1987). These organizations, whose more radical demands were never met, contributed to 
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the mobilization of the Latino population, in particular Mexican-Americans, as well as 
the creation of political leaders. 
On the other extreme of the spectrum, experiences of political mobilization of 
Latinos from the action of informal social networks (as opposed to resulting from efforts 
led by established organizations) are rare in the Latino political literature 
In sum, although there are excellent exemplars of studies on political mobilization 
of Latinos in the US, this literature has mainly focues on top-down efforts spearheaded 
by established organizations. In particular, these studies are usually concerned with 
mobilization efforts targeting a particular sector with workers in a particular industry, and 
voters being the most common.  In addition, both political scientists and sociologists have 
shown less interest in these patterns of political action among Latino immigrants than 
those defined by the concepts of political incorporation or political participation. There is, 
then, a need for theoretical specification and empirical analysis of one domain that 
appears to be increasingly important in the American political scenario and yet has 




Chapter 2: Theoretical tools 
 
2.1. A re-conceptualization of immigrants’ “politicization” 
 I will utilize the term “politicization” instead of political incorporation, 
participation, or mobilization so as to differentiate the understanding of politics and the 
political on which my research will be based from those that are prevalent in the 
literature on political inclusion of immigrants. For that task, I inform my 
conceptualization from some of the fruitful theorizations of politics of key political 
philosophers—namely, Hanna Arendt, John Dewey, and Jurgen Habermas. Specifically, 
elements of Arendt’s characterization of action and the political realm, Habermas’s 
theorization of the public sphere, and Dewey’s consequential approach to politics are 
blended into a multidimensional and complex view of political activity.  
My understanding of politicization or engagement of individuals in political life 
heavily relies on Arendt’s concept of action, a quintessentially political human activity. 
In “The Human Condition”, Arendt maintains that it is in the human condition to have a 
political life. To act, according to Arendt, means to take an initiative, to begin, to set 
something in motion. In other words, when men act, they engage in setting up and 
preserving political bodies which, in turn, create the conditions for remembrance. Action 
is intrinsically linked to the human condition of natality, of bringing something anew. 
This capacity of initiative is the central category of the political. In Arendt’s words, “the 
fact that man is capable of action means that the unexpected can be expected from him, 
that he is able to perform what is infinitely improbable.” (Arendt 1958: 178) 
 Action, and for that matter politics, is in this conceptualization singularized by 
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innovation. Unlike the other two activities that Arendt characterizes as constitutive of the 
human condition—labor and work—action is not imposed on us by necessity or utility. 
Through action and speech men insert themselves into the human world by beginning 
something new, which is a product of their own initiative. In addition, action and speech 
make possible the active distinction of men among themselves.  
 
Speech and action reveal this unique distinctness. Through them, men distinguish 
themselves instead of being merely distinct; they are the modes in which human 
beings appear to each other, not indeed as physical objects, but qua men. This 
appearance, as distinguished from mere bodily existence, rests on initiative, but it is an 
initiative from which no human being can refrain and still be human. This is true of no 
other activity in the vita activa. Men can very well live without laboring, they can 
force others to labor for them, and they can very well decide merely to use and enjoy 
the world of things without themselves adding a single useful object to it; the life of an 
exploiter or slave-holder and the live of a parasite may be unjust, but they certainly are 
human. A life without speech and without action, on the other hand […] is literally 
dead to the world... (Arendt 1958: 176) 
 
 In addition, through word and deed men establish differences with others and, by 
doing that, construct identities. Men are either engaged in action and speech or are 
condemned to live in the shadows. In other words, the deprivation of action and speech 
entails the lack of humanity itself. In the context of my proposed research, this idea 
implies that the group of interest—Latin American immigrants—would become political 
by their engagement in action and speech in the public realm (and not before). 
 The concept of action is also closely linked to Arendt’s concept of public realm. 
First, the public is conceptualized in terms of appearance. In that sense, only something 
that can be seen and heard by others and ourselves is constitutive of reality. Unless 
activities become susceptible to being seen and heard, or, in other words, until they 
become transformed, deprivatized and deindividualized, they entail an unclear and 
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uncertain existence. Second, the public realm refers to what is “common” to all of us and 
different from a privately owned place in it. 
 In sum, for my conceptualization of politicization I will share Arendt’s 
understanding of action and speech as constitutive of political life, emphasizing the fact 
that to act is to become a source of innovation in the public realm. In addition, my work 
will draw on the conception that underscores the crucial role of action as a source of 
differentiation. Furthermore, my analysis will employ the vision of the public realm as 
the site of the “common to all”, where actors are seen and heard by others. 
 Although Arendt’s work is extremely useful in clarifying the notion of political 
action and distinguishing it from other types of human activity, her definition of the 
public realm seems to require better specification—at least, for the purpose of my work. 
In this sense, both Dewey’s portrayal of the public, and Habermas’ conception of the 
public sphere are able to provide further clarification of this concept. 
 Following Dewey’s argument, it is important to shed light on the fact that our 
actions entail different types of consequences. With that in mind, becoming public or 
entering into the public realm also implies that the consequences of our actions affect 
others—beyond those who are directly engaged in a transaction (Dewey 1991). In this 
perspective, public acts are not necessarily socially useful. For my understanding of 
politicization as I conceive it in this research, I borrow from Dewey the assertion that in 
order to understand political phenomena it is necessary to look at the consequences of 
political action. With that said, looking at the public realm requires paying particular 
attention to whom is affected by the consequences of the actions of our subjects of 
interest.   
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Although grounded on a different perspective, Habermas’ notion of the public 
sphere has some similarities with Arendt’s notion of the public realm; as well as some 
distinct features that appear as complementary to Arendt’s and, for that reason, useful for 
my own specification of the concept of public and political in this research.  
For Habermas, the public sphere is defined as “a realm of our social life in which 
something approaching public opinion can be formed.” (Habermas 1974: 49). The term 
denotes both a social space and a rational discourse that composes free and open 
democratic opinion (Somers 1995). In addition, Habermas maintains that “citizens 
behave as a public body when they confer in an unrestricted fashion […] about matters of 
general interest” (1974, 49). Like Arendt’s second conception of public realm, Habermas’ 
maintains that the concern for what is common or shared by the members of the civil 
society is a definitional attribute of the public.  
However, Habermas goes beyond this point and contends that the public sphere is 
located in a quasi-institutional structure (see Somers 1995). Specifically, his historical 
reconstruction of the emergence of the public sphere in contemporary societies is based 
on material expressions of public opinions, such as newspapers, public coffeehouses, and 
theaters, rather than something that is subjective or integrated by people’s beliefs or 
ideas. In other words, the public sphere is embodied in a series of institutions and 
discursive networks. 
The public sphere, in this perspective, is different from state institutions and 
public authority. But it is different from the market as well. In fact, it occupies a third 
space, an interstitial zone, between the public/political (meaning by this the state 
bureaucracies) and the private. This distinction between public sphere and state sphere is 
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key to comprehending a vast series of activities that cannot be framed within the orbit of 
the state and yet are public and political. This is clear when Habermas states that 
“sometimes the public appears simply as the sector of public opinion that happens to be 
opposed to the authorities” (1989[1962]: 2). “Political public sphere” designates the 
public discussion centered on issues related to the activity of the state. In that sense, it 
refers to a civic life oriented toward political issues and public life but occurring beyond 
the mechanisms of control of the official state. One example that is usually bought up in 
order to illustrate the political public sphere is the case of political activism that occurred 
in Eastern European countries during the eighties and that ended up overthrowing 
sociopolitical regimes. There is, in this sense, a parallel between the questioning of 
authority in Eastern European countries in the eighties with the political activities of non-
officially recognized members of a polity, such as undocumented immigrants in 
numerous countries today.  
 The recognition of the existence of a public sphere separate from the state opens a 
gap for the development of a series of political activities even for those who are not 
formally authorized to be part of conventional politics. In this sense, even if Habermas 
talks of “citizens” when referring to the constituents of the public sphere, given that this 
social space is political beyond the state, I argue that formal membership does not really 
matter as a requirement for inclusion and even those who are not recognized members 
can find or construct a space in this arena. 
 The public sphere is, then, characterized as a space of contestation in which the 
control of public authority might be challenged by “the critical reasoning of private 
persons on political issues” (Habermas 1989 [1962]: 29). The primary civic task of a 
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society, in this modern public sphere, is the involvement in critical public debate. 
 On this point there is also a difference with Arendt’s approach. Whereas Arendt 
sees “the political” essentially referring to human action oriented toward creativity, the 
beginning of something new, for Habermas “the political” is directly or indirectly 
referred to state action. In other words, for Habermas, the political relates to either the 
activity of the state itself—including its bureaucratic apparatus—or the discussion of 
matters related to state activity by the public. In any case, these diverging interpretations 
of the concept of “political” are not inherently contradictory. On the contrary, they just 
express different foci. For that reason, both will be treated as complementary in the 
conceptual approach I will utilize in the proposed research.  
 The private sphere, composed of the domain of the market economy and the 
intimate sphere of the conjugal family, also occupies a central role in Habermas’s account 
of the public sphere, given that it is in that site that political identities are formed and 
commitment to values is developed. (Sommers 1995).  
 
The representation of the interests of the privatized domain of a market economy was 
interpreted with the aid of ideas grown in the soil of the intimate sphere of the 
conjugal family. The latter and not the public sphere itself (as the Greek model would 
have it) was humanity’s genuine site (Habermas 1989 [1962]: 51-2) 
 
 In other words, private individuals communicate in the public sphere through 
rational-critical debates based on their character as human beings and the experiences of 
their subjectivity, or in their character of owner of goods about regulation of their private 
sphere. 
This idea is radically opposed to Arendt’s conception of political identities. As I 
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stated above, for Arendt it is in the public realm, through speech and action, that men 
construct their identities and distinguish themselves from others.  Regarding this point, I 
will argue that this mutually exclusive dichotomy is not theoretically productive. In 
practice, identities are both nourished from interactions in the private sphere and 
developed in the actual engagement in political activities. On the other hand, I adhere to 
the notion that “historical actors’ practices, activities, and political ideas must be viewed 
as symbolic systems with their own histories and logics; and second that these symbolic 
logics themselves are modalities of politics and power” (Somers 1995: 127). With that 
said, I will discard any relationship of determination of culture and identities by some 
exogenous source—such as the market, or the state. However, I will visualize these 
different spheres as interacting in multiple and complex fashions, which can only be 
disentangled in empirical studies. 
 To review, the concept of politicization upon which the proposed research will be 
based is defined by the adoption of actions that lead to the beginning of something new; 
that is, that bring about innovation in the public realm. Those actions are also 
distinguished by the fact that their consequences affect not only those directly involved in 
a situation but others as well. In addition, they take place in an arena that is public—
understood in this case as a realm that is shared by all of us, which in turn means that the 
actions occurring within it can be seen and heard by others. Furthermore, this public 
sphere or realm is also the site where the discussion of matters regarding general interest, 
and in particular, the activities of the state, takes place, and where contestation of public 




2.2. Making events the privileged site of explanation of immigrants’ “politicization” 
 
A core component of the conceptual apparatus that will guide this research is the 
understanding of events as privileged sites of examination. The rationale in this respect is 
that in order to capture how and why Latino immigrants, regardless of their citizenship 
status, become political in the way that was signaled in the previous section of this piece, 
it is appropriate to focus analytical attention on particular events. This 
theoretical/methodological decision is also aligned with Lee et al.’s (2006) 
recommendation for further research on political incorporation of immigrants, in which 
they suggest looking at processes of political incorporation in “local context and 
historical moments” (2006). 
 The centrality of events in historical comparative and political sociology has been 
underscored by examples of excellent scholarship (see, for instance, Nora 1974, Griffin 
1992; Griffin 1993; Abbott 1992; Aminzade 1992; and Sewell 1996). After decades of 
denial of the critical role played by events and short duration in explaining what was 
considered to be relevant outcomes and transformations—those occurring or originated at 
structural levels of society—there has been increasing recognition of events as privileged 
sites to observe more structural and fundamental social transformations. But, what is an 
event? And how do we, as researchers, recognize them? In general, events are sets of 
occurrences whose presence makes a difference in the historical/political process of a 
social setting. As opposed to “simple facts”, events have the property of being carriers of 
innovative messages (Nora 1974). In addition, following Nora’s conception, events make 
the invisible visible, they echo and mirror society. Furthermore, they reveal and trigger a 
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series of social phenomena from a depth that, without the event, would keep them buried. 
 On the other hand, according to Sewell’s account, events are defined as historical 
when they have momentous consequences that reshape history. A historical event, in this 
perspective, is “(1) a ramified sequence of occurrences that (2) is recognized as notable 
by contemporaries, and that (3) results in a durable transformation of structures” (Sewell 
1996: 844). In Sewell’s view, the role of events is portrayed as essentially linked to the 
concept of structures, defining the latter as cultural schemas, distributions of resources, 
and modes of power, combined in a mutually sustaining manner that allows for the 
reproduction of regular patterns of social practice. In that sense, most social practices 
have a tendency to be steadily reproduced over long periods of time, and changes tend to 
take place in the form of intense bursts. These moments of intensified transformations, 
following this argument, are initiated by historical events. The critical role of historical 
events, then, is explained by their capacity to rearticulate structures and their introduction 
of cultural transformations. 
 Placing the study of events at the core of my research implies, in turn, giving an 
explicit and intentional recognition to the importance of temporality in social and 
political analyses. In this sense, my analysis will be historical insofar as it will utilize a 
narrative approach (see Stone 1979; Abbott 1992; Griffin 1992; Aminzade 1992) to 
capture the temporality of selected historical events. By narrative, I understand “the 
portrayal of social phenomena as temporally ordered, sequential, unfolding, and open-
ended ‘stories’ fraught with conjunctures and contingency” (Griffin 1992: 405). These 
stories will compose an indispensable first step of the explanation of the politicization of 
Latin American immigrants. Specifically, the sequence, order and contingency of 
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occurrences that establish the way in which events unfold will shape the explanation of 
the events themselves, and through them, of the phenomenon of politicization of the 
group. However, it is important to note that the temporality of the events themselves will 
be one element and not the exclusive or determinant causative factor in the explanation of 
my outcome of interest. The explanation of the type of political status achieved cannot be 
determined ex ante, but only after examining the empirical evidence. 
 In order to reconstruct the unfolding of the events, a detailed identification of the 
facts and actions that are relevant components of the event, their sequence and order is 
required. This “ordering” of the event, as well as its delimitation, will necessarily require 
what Sewell calls an act of judgment. In other words, the decision of which actions or 
facts are relevant components for the unfolding of the event will require an interpretive 
contextual approach. This putting together of elements—actions and happenings—that 
might otherwise seem discrete or disparate into a coherent whole is what Griffin (1992) 
refers to as “colligation.” This concept, in turn, emphasizes the interdependent 
characteristic of sequential, unfolding actions that constitute the central theme that ties 
the event together. The idea underlying this type of narrative explanation is that the event 
needs to be examined and interrogated through its internal temporality—which is also 
referred to as “unpacked”—and then re-composed as an explanation. Further, through the 
construction of narratives, the analyst not only attributes causality to the connections 
among historical particulars, but also assigns meaning to those internal relations (see 
Aminzade 1992). 
 Although temporality of the event can be of enormous help for an explanatory 
comprehension of the event itself and the process that is triggered by it, there are some 
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precautions that must be taken. First, in historical events there is usually more than one 
trajectory of change or sequence of happenings to be disentangled (Aminzade 1992, 
Sewell 1996). That means that the map of occurrences that constitute an event is usually 
complex and far from a single master process. In other words, events are embedded in 
overlapping and intersecting trajectories. Second, sequence of occurrences is not 
sufficient for accounting for causation. As Griffin (1993) states, chronological order does 
not necessarily imply historical or causal significance. This, in turn, entails that in order 
to attribute causation and develop an explanation “events and their contexts [should] be 
openly theorized, factual material abstracted and generalized, and the causal connections 
among narrative sequences established in a way that can be explicitly replicated and 
criticized.” (Griffin 1993: 1100) 
 An explanatory study of an event requires a conscious theoretical interrogation of 
the connections that tie the occurrences together. With that in mind, the utilization of 
available explanatory frameworks (basically the political process approach) and 
knowledge about the historical background will constitute invaluable pieces for that task. 
For this project, I selected two episodes that are significant for the type of 
phenomenon analyzed in the present study—namely, the politicization of Latin American 
immigrants—because of the transformations generated in structures or prevailing cultural 
frameworks. The close examination of each of these events aimed to identify and uncover 
the mechanisms that connect causes and effects in each of the cases (see Mahoney 2004). 
By comparatively examining the relevant linkages between relevant occurrences in these 
cases, I expect to infer typical patterns of causation of immigrant access to the public 
sphere as well as their outcomes. 
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2.3. Borrowing tools from the Contentious Politics and the Political Process 
Approaches 
 
The events analyzed in this research will be viewed as episodes of contentious 
politics. Following Tilly and Tarrow, “contentious politics involves interactions in which 
actors make claims bearing on someone else’s interests, leading to coordinated efforts on 
behalf of shared interests or programs, in which governments are involved as targets, 
initiators of claims, or third parties.” (2007: 5) 
In other words, in this perspective contentious politics resides at the intersection 
of three attributes present in social life—namely, contention, collective action, and 
politics. Both events analyzed in this research constitute cases of collective claim making 
in which the government (in one case, the local government and in the other the federal 
government) appears as an object of claims. 
One question I had to clarify in the effort to piece together my conceptual 
framework for this research was whether to conceive of the processes of politicization 
examined in my research as social movements. To that end, I examined how social 
movement scholars—specifically, those aligned in the political process approach 
(PPA)—define and look at social movements. One definition that synthesizes the way in 
which PPA scholars define social movements is the one that conceives of them as “a 
sustained and self-conscious challenge to authorities or cultural codes by a field of actors 
(organizations and advocacy networks), some of whom employ extrainstitutional means 
of influence” (Gamson and Meyer 1996: 283). To this definition, McAdam and Snow 
(1997) add some specification to the purpose to which they are oriented, whether it be the 
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promotion or resistance to change in the group, society or the world order. Perhaps one of 
the central questions that PPA poses with regard to social movements is how people 
mobilize and engage in collective action, which is also the case in the research I am 
proposing herein. To answer this broad question, the focus is placed on the different 
stimuli to and intrinsic features of the conformation of collective vehicles that are aimed 
at generating social change—with the most important factors being the structure of 
political opportunities and constraints, the forms of organization available to insurgents, 
and the processes of interpretation, attribution and social construction that mediate 
between opportunity and action (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 2). 
The question then becomes, given the cited definition of social movements, can 
we talk of a social movement when referring to the politicization of the Latin American 
immigrants in our study? I maintain that the forms of contention analyzed in this research 
are not cases of social movements. First and foremost, we could hardly find a “sustained 
and self-conscious challenge” but, instead, bursts of mobilization and involvement in the 
political process. In addition, although social movements are sustained campaigns of 
claim making, those claims do not necessarily happen in the political arena.  
Thus, given the specific focus that the contentious politics approach places on 
episodic rather than continuous politics (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 5), and the 
particular attention this approach places on claim-making interactions that take place with 
relation to the realm of politics (specifically, with agents of government), this approach 
seems to be indeed pertinent to disentangling the objects of my analysis. 
Those clarifications being made, the explanatory apparatus provided by the PPA 
constitutes an invaluable tool to help explain some of the factors that shape the 
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emergence and development of Latin American immigrants as a relevant actor in the 
political process. In fact, there are overlaps in some of the analytic categories present in 
both scholarships—namely, PPA and CPA. Scholars who theorized the dynamics present 
in contentious politics have been the main contributors to the study of social movements 
under the political process perspective. For that reason, some of the concepts used in this 
research are borrowed from the political process line of research on social movements.   
How do I utilize the contentious politics approach in my analysis? Following Tilly 
and Tarrow (2007), the explanation of the process of politicization of Latinos in this 
research will include the following steps: (1) description of the process, (2) breakdown of 
the process into its basic causes, (3) reassembly of those causes into a general account. 
 In the explanation I look at specific mechanisms, understood as events that 
produce immediate effects over a wide range of circumstances, and processes, conceived 
as sequences and combinations of mechanisms that lead to larger scale effects. In 
particular, I will look at how political attributions of opportunities and 
social/organizational appropriation occurring at different times lead to a particular type of 
actor constitution. Specifically, the main process under analysis is the constitution of a 
political actor—understood as the “emergence of a new or transformed political actor—a 
recognizable set of people who carry on collective action, making and/or receiving 
contentious claims” (Tilly and Tarrow 2007). This actor constitution, in turn will emerge 
from two main mechanisms—namely, attribution of political opportunities and social 
appropriation. 
 Because the contentious politics approach does not elaborate much on political 
opportunities, I will review first how this concept is defined by several social movement 
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students. State structures constitute one of the critical components of the analytical 
approach advanced by the PPA. In particular, state structures matter insofar as they 
provide political opportunities and constraints. But what are these opportunities and 
constraints? One of the main critiques that PPA has received is that the concept of 
political opportunity structure, which is central to the account, is not clearly defined (see, 
for example, Goodwin and Jasper 1999 and Meyer 2004). To illustrate, Gamson and 
Meyer refer to political opportunity in relation to “the opening and closing of political 
space and its institutional and substantive location” (1996: 277); and Tarrow defines 
political opportunity structure as “consistent—but not necessarily formal, permanent, or 
national—signals to social or political actors which either encourage or discourage them 
to use their internal resources to form social movements” (1996: 54). To sum, political 
opportunities are associated with the space opening that potential insurgents register 
through signals, and which push them to act collectively. 
 In the specification of the spectrum of signals there is some dissent among PPA 
scholars. McAdam et al., for example, clearly pinpoint four major dimensions of political 
opportunity structures—namely, the openness or closure of the institutionalized political 
system, the stability of elite alignments, the presence of elite allies, and the state capacity 
for repression (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 10). 
 Whereas some of these opportunities appear as more stable, others are mostly 
fluid. What is important to highlight is that political opportunities encompass not only 
state institutions and other formal structures, but also the conflict and alliance between 
different forces (Tarrow 1996: 54). Along the same lines, Gamson and Meyer distinguish 
between society and state sources of opportunities. Located in the first group are cultural 
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themes, belief systems, world views and class consciousness, among others. In the latter 
are strength of political parties, judicial and legislative capacity, centralization of political 
institutions, strength of social cleavages, shifts in political alliances, and so forth (1996: 
281). This complex multidimensional matrix is supposed to back the argument that 
opportunities are effective only if they are recognized as such by potential (or actual) 
collective actors. The enumeration of dimensions in the political opportunity structure, 
however, appears as all-embracing and, in consequence, not conceptually clear. In some 
ways, it seems like everything and nothing could count as political opportunity. 
 Although they are crucial, at least in some of the PPA exemplars, there is an 
explicit effort to emphasize the fact that political opportunities are not determining but 
necessary in the emergence of collective action. The expansion of political space for 
action should be complemented by an adequate organization of resources—formal or 
informal—and the effective operation of frames—systems of meanings shared by 
adherents (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996: 8) 
 In the version of PPA I am analyzing herein, the directionality of the relationship 
between political opportunities structure and social movements is twofold: opportunities 
mold and restrain movements, but movements might also generate opportunities 
(Gamson and Meyer 1996: 276). The recognition of the latter direction of the relationship 
denotes an acknowledgment of the importance of agency and, in particular, of the claims 
of resource mobilization theory.   
 Moving away from what is considered a static definition of political opportunities, 
McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly (2001) propose to look at opportunities and threats not as 
objective categories but as subject to “the kind of collective attribution that the classical 
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agenda limited to framing of movement goals.” (2001: 45) In addition, this attribution is 
not only performed by social movement organizations, but also by other groups such as 
non-constituted political actors and members of the polity. Attribution, in this account 
encompasses a range of actions oriented at making opportunities and threats visible and 
perceived as such by potential challengers.  
 Following the tenets of the contentious politics approach, this dissertation does 
not look at framing as a distinct component of a ‘mobilization structure’. This does not 
mean underestimating the importance of shared meanings and definitions that people 
bring to their situation. On the contrary, the view of framing, as used in this research, 
involves “the interactive construction of disputes among challengers, their opponents, 
elements of the state, third parties, and the media.” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 
44). In other words, framing is not viewed as a different stage but appears mediating both 
the attribution of threats and opportunities and the processes of social and organizational 
appropriation.   
Finally, social/organizational appropriation, in the contentious politics agenda, 
refers to a challenger’s capacity to gather sufficient numbers and organization for 
mobilization. In particular, Tilly and Tarrow define social appropriation as the utilization 
of organizational and institutional bases to launch movement campaigns. In my research, 
however, I expand this concept by including the series of actions adopted by a challenger 
group, ordinary people, and constituted political actors in the community in order to take 
advantage of the political space that has opened up. In other words, I do not look at 
social/organizational appropriation only as a mechanism preceding a public performance 
but also as a mechanism that follows the performance and is oriented to the formation or 
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transformation of a political actor. 
In sum, this dissertation will draw on three main processes as conceived by the 
contentious politics approach—namely, the attribution of opportunities and threats, the 
social/organizational appropriation, and actor constitution. The first two will be regarded 
as mechanisms that will help us understand the latter one. 
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Chapter 3: Research design, data and methodology  
   
3.1. Specification of the cases  
 
 Given the theoretical understanding of politicization advanced earlier in this 
dissertation, the analytical strategy pursued herein entails looking at significant historical 
events in the political history of the Latino community in the area. The underlying idea is 
that by looking at these critical moments it is possible to capture the formation and/or re-
definition of the Latino community as a political actor. The two cases that were selected 
for this study are events that crystallized the two most critical political moments for 
Latinos residing in the D.C. area (in particular, for Latino immigrants). Their relevance 
is, in turn, presumed by the presence of several elements, including the increase in public 
visibility of the Latino community during their occurrence, and the understanding by 
different members of the community that these moments represented turning points in the 
community. The two cases that will be the focus of analysis in this research are as 
follows: the Mount Pleasant Riots of 1991 and “La Marcha” of April 10, 2006 in 
Washington, D.C. On the surface, these two cases appear to be very different, considering 
the level of reach of the problems with which they are associated, the factors that 
triggered them, their trajectories, and the type of outcomes to which they directly or 
indirectly led. However, they are both hypothetically connected to the production of 





The Mount Pleasant Riots of 1991 
 
 In early May 1991, a series of violent events including uprisings and looting 
occurred in the neighborhood of Mount Pleasant, Washington, D.C., following a rumor 
that spread quickly through the community that a Latino resident had been killed by the 
police. The neighborhood concentrates the majority of Latino residents living in the 
District.  
 The events of May 1991 in Mount Pleasant reflected long term tensions between 
Latino residents (the majority of whom were undocumented immigrants), the police and 
other local state officials. Although the incidents lasted only a few days, they synthesized 
a dense plot of co-existing conflicts. The different interpretations of the conflict by the 
actors or subjects affected—namely, the police, the city mayor, the Latino organizations, 
neighbors, and the media—led to a configuration of forces that affected the trajectory of 
the problem. The chronology of events, interpretations, and negotiations, appears to have 
a direct relation to the way in which the problem was “resolved”. 
 Latinos were at the center of the local political scene, attracting the attention of 
the media for several months after the incident. By any account, through their 
involvement in the facts of Mount Pleasant, they were able to push a series of issues into 
the local political agenda. 
 Violence is central to this event. This is not insignificant since the urgency and 
degree of involvement of public authorities and other actors stems directly from and their 
actions are often justified by the violent nature of these events. Public officials engaged 
in giving responses in both the short and the long term, such as pacifying the 
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neighborhood (through the implementation of a curfew, for example) and guaranteeing 
some benefits to the Latino community residing in the city. 
 
La Marcha: the rally of April 2006 
 
 On April 10, 2006 a rally for immigrant rights at the Washington Monument 
constituted one of the most important massive public, political manifestations of the 
Latino community of the D.C. area. This political mobilization, known among Latinos by 
the Spanish term “La Marcha”, was organized in opposition to the Sensenbrenner Bill, 
more formally known as the “Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration 
Control Act of 2005" (HR4437), which was a project to reform immigration law which 
had already been passed by the House of Representatives in December 2005. Although 
the April 10th march, which was the largest single event in a country-wide network of 
rallies, was broadly read as a response to a threat from the state, there was a significant 
time gap between the date in which the Sensenbrenner Bill passed the House of 
Representatives and the date of La Marcha. Understanding what happened in this five-
month-period is crucial in terms of how resources were mobilized, efforts coordinated, 
and a lexicon of slogans was crystallized.  
 Regardless of the actual effects in terms of influence in policy outcomes (the bill 
has not been passed by the Senate), the rally in April, was followed by a series of protests 
throughout that year. The events infused a new dynamism to the Latino community 
initially, but in the end, the political excitement from these events evaporated. Despite the 
fact that the political momentum was not sustained, the importance of La Marcha was its 
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capacity to trigger subsequent events.  
 The rally was characterized as a moment of intensified emotions, and was 
embedded in a linguistic debate nourished in the terminology of criminology (such as 
felony, illegality, and so forth) associated with the politics of names embedded in the 
proposed act. 
 
3.2. Research questions and strategies of inquiry 
 
 Historical events can only be fully understood if they are placed in their contexts 
(Abbott 1995). In other words, demographic, political, and organizational9 patterns define 
the initial conditions of mobilization. Those initial conditions contribute to the 
explanation of how and why a relatively non-politicized group got into the center of the 
public sphere. Following the contentious politics approach, unorganized ordinary people, 
organized actors in the community (some with and some without access to government 
agents), government agents, and other groups engaged in a series of interpretations and 
actions contributing to (a) the production of the historical event, and (b) the shaping of 
the political path opened by it.  
 On the surface, there are clear differences between the two cases under study. 
Whereas the Mount Pleasant Riots started immediately after a Latino worker was shot by 
a police officer, La Marcha took nearly five months of organization and planning. In 
other words, the first one started as a spontaneous social protest; the second one was 
planned. 
                                                 
9 On the importance of organizational context for collective action see, for example, McAdam (1982). 
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The role of spontaneity, although central to many episodes of contention, has 
scarcely been studied in collective action, social movements, and contentious politics 
literatures. Moreover, in the few studies that do look at spontaneity in collective action 
episodes, the attention is centered on the causal processes that produce spontaneous 
social protest. (e.g., Killian 1984, Gemici 2003) Little attention is placed on the eventual 
consequences of such “spontaneous” episodes. Thus, when we confront the implications 
of that spontaneity (or the lack of it) in the political process, particularly when the 
spontaneity provides a previously marginalized group with a sudden entry in the public 
sphere, we find a puzzle. 
 But, what is spontaneity? Following Killian’s definition, spontaneity is 
characterized by “on-the-spot decisions which are not part of a plan for continuous action 
and whose consequences are unanticipated.” (1984: 779) According to Killian, 
spontaneity is especially important in early stages of social movements or during 
transitions from one type of action to another. Even though pre-existing structures such as 
networks and organizations have a critical influence on the development of social 
movements, it is important to look at spontaneous actions because they bring about 
novelty. 
In order to achieve a holistic comprehension of spontaneous actions, it is 
necessary to take into consideration both pre-existing structures or context and 
improvised, short-lived collective actions. Based on this assumption, I organized the 
examination of the two cases around the following questions: What configuration of 
political and organizational patterns made it possible for the Latino community to 
 
 52 
suddenly enter in the public sphere10? What critical occurrences shaped the direction that 
the political path started by the public performance? How did the type of entry in the 
public sphere affect the scope of innovation achieved in the political process? What effect 
did the timing of the event have: whether the reaction to the threat was spontaneous and 
occurred immediately after the triggering event or the product of planned organization 
and mobilization? Did the apparent spontaneity in the deployment of the mobilization 
give the community (ordinary people) more control over the course of the event and its 
outcomes? 
My first assertion is that the organizational and political profile of the Latino 
communities at the moment of the two major contentious episodes examined in this 
dissertation greatly shaped how the communities entered the public sphere. In particular, 
I argue that the structural location of leading organizations, that is their dependency on 
government contracts, foundations’ grants and employers, or the Latino community, had 
a decisive impact on the type of actions adopted by community leaders which, in turn, 
affected the direction of the political path taken. In other words, the network of the 
leading organization’s power strongly influences how the community mobilizes. In the 
Mount Pleasant Riots, for example, the organizations occupying the political center stage 
had strong links with governments, foundations, and other private actors, whereas the 
organizations leading La Marcha tended to depend on the Latino community for the base 
of support.  
Secondly, rather than characterizing each of the two events as either spontaneous 
or planned, I contend that it is more accurate to suggest the presence of spontaneous 
                                                 
10 The entry in the public sphere is understood here as being seen and heard as a distinct socio-cultural 
formation and/or political actor. 
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elements, with different degrees of impact in both cases. That is to say, each of the 
historical events analyzed contains a mix of planned and spontaneous actions. In the riots, 
for example, the impromptu protest initiated right after the shooting of a Latino man took 
no time and was the product of various community networks—in particular based on 
spatial proximity and neighborhood links—; however, the leadership took advantage of 
this ‘unplanned’ opening and coordinated actions thereafter. “La Marcha”, on the other 
hand, was the product of intense planning and organizing, which led to an event that 
exceeded by far the expectations of the planners. The politicization, in this case, was 
initially activated by this highly planned event and several unplanned protests followed in 
different localities right after.  
My final assertion is that the spontaneous or planned character of the central 
public performance—namely, the Mount Pleasant Riots and La Marcha—had no direct 
impact on the degree of control that ordinary people in the Latino community had over 
the political path adopted and, therefore, to the level of innovation achieved in the 
political process. The type of subjects or actors that became central in the immediate 
aftermath of the public performances, and the type of decisions they made determined the 
political path taken and the political innovation achieved. 
 In the next section, I describe the conceptual models utilized to scrutinize the two 
cases. 
 
3.3. Conceptual model 
 
The models I utilize to analyze each event consider the interplay of the following 
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analytic categories: context, social and organizational appropriation, attribution of 
opportunities and threats, historical events, and innovation (see Figures 1 and 2). Instead 
of examining these categories in a static way, the perspective I utilized entails looking at 
the processes (sequence of events and actions) that form the relationships between these 
categories. For example, instead of showing how context A corresponds to a type of 
innovation B, I aim to uncover the mechanisms and processes that link those two 
variables. Specifically, I show how actors involved in each historical event understood 
the circumstances they found themselves in, how and why they chose the strategies they 
did from a range of options, as well as the ways in which they sought out, defined, and 
were constrained by other present actors, and so forth.  
The underlying idea in this model is that contextual conditions constrain and 
encourage, though not necessarily determine the type of political path adopted by the 
community as a cultural formation and as a political actor. Being acquainted with 
demographic, organizational, and political trends in the community aids in understanding 
the positions adopted by different categories of actors during, before, and after the 
primary event. In reconstructing the different dimensions of each context, I relied on both 
secondary sources—such as newspapers, statistical information, surveys, institutional 
documents and primary sources—namely, transcripts of in-depth interviews that I 
conducted with key informants. 
 In unpacking the historical processes of these two events, I needed to reconstruct 
the events and then identify the patterns. The first step consisted of reconstructing the 
historical sequence of each of the events, distinguishing central from peripheral 
occurrences, and inquiring about the necessity and sufficiency of certain conditions in the 
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production of subsequent phenomena. In particular, for the reconstruction of these 
narratives I relied on both newspaper stories and interviews. The second task comprised 
the elucidation of patterns within the story–namely, how to put arguments together. In 
order to maintain the contextual reasoning, I relied on the interpretations provided by the 
participants themselves. In other words, the actions and occurrences contained in each the 
Mount Pleasant Riots and La Marcha, their interconnections, and outcomes were closely 
examined to determine their meaning—particularly the meaning that different categories 
of participants attributed to them—, and  understood in their context of occurrence.  
Given that each of the cases analyzed present singularities in terms of the 
sequence of crucial moments, two different conceptual models are used to illustrate the 
main categories and their relationships. The most salient difference is in the level of 
spontaneity: the Mount Pleasant riots were instant uprisings, whereas La Marcha was the 
result of intense planning and coordination.  
It is important to note here that given the nature of this research, reconstructing 
historical sequences and attributing importance to organizational context and 
organizational appropriation to two distinct historical events, the models utilized in the 
research were semi-structured and fluid. At the start of the research, although I had a 
tentative model of concepts, dimensions, and indicators, the research process itself was 
oriented to the finding of signs that ended up transforming and enriching the model 
originally drafted. In the end, the model was enhanced with indicators or signs that were 
not originally anticipated. 






As mentioned earlier, I based this research on Sewell’s concept of “historical 
event”, understood as a sequence of occurrences recognized as extraordinary by 
contemporaries and leading to an enduring transformation of structures (Sewell 1996: 
844). In this study, I focused on the two single most important events in the recent 
political history of the Latino community in the Washington, D.C. region: the Mount 
Pleasant Riots of 1991 and La Marcha, the Immigration rallies of 2006. Although both 
events are constituted by a ramified series of occurrences that lasted well beyond their 
peaks when I speak of the events in these conceptual models, I refer to two pivotal 
moments—namely, the episodes of violence, looting, and disturbances in Mount Pleasant 
on May 5th and 6th 1991, and the massive immigration rally at the Mall in Washington, 
D.C. on April 10th 2006 respectively.  
 
Context 
Context is defined as the phenomena surrounding each case. In other words, 
context in this research denotes “the network of other cases and prior times” (Abbott, 
1995: 94). Specifically, I will look at three contextual dimensions in each case—namely, 
the demographic profile of the local Latino community, the organizational landscape, and 
the political landscape. The demographic profile denotes the major trends in population 
composition, usually closely related to immigration flows and characteristics. The 
organizational landscape alludes to the map of organizations that work with and/or speak 
for the Latino community with specific attention to issues of leadership. The political 
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landscape dimension refers to patterns of community engagement in politics and the 
state, including trends of political representation, participation in government structures, 
and collective actions experiences. 
 
Public performance 
 Public performances are understood as modes of appearance of ordinary people in 
the public space in order to advertise their claims. In the case of the Mount Pleasant 
Riots, the public performance was the taking over of the streets combined with episodes 
of violence, and in the case of La Marcha, it was the engagement in a massive pacific 
demonstration. 
 
Attribution of opportunities and threats 
Following McAdam et al (2001), I define opportunities and threats as subject to 
attribution. Under attribution of threats and opportunities, I included the series of 
concurrent or divergent readings of particular episodes—namely, the shooting of a Latino 
immigrant worker in Mount Pleasant in 1991 and the approval of the Sensenbrenner bill 
by the House of Representatives in December 2005—by unorganized persons or groups, 
constituted political actors with or without routine access to government resources, and 
agents of government about the need of engaging in collective action. In particular, I 
analyze how and when each of these categories perceived the moment that encouraged 
them to mobilize. 
 
Social and organizational appropriation 
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By social and organizational appropriation, I refer to the actions that contributed 
to or hindered the process through which Latinos mobilized or were mobilized. In other 
words, I look at how they constituted themselves as a challenger group. These processes 
took place through both the intervention of existing organizations and the creation of new 
ones. Some of the processes looked at include performances by ordinary people and other 
relevant actors—such as service-providing agencies, community-based organizations, 
community leaders, churches, unions, and the media.  
 
Innovation 
As mentioned earlier in this work, the notion of innovation used in this research 
can be broadly defined as the introduction of something new into the political sphere. 
More precisely, the concept of innovative action as used here refers to a type of collective 
action that “incorporates claims, selects objects of claims, includes collective self-
representations, and/or adopts means that are either unprecedented or forbidden within 
the regime in question.” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 7) Although the innovations 
achieved by the sudden entry of Latinos into the public sphere can be analyzed at a 
number of levels—ranging from innovations in public policies, to re-accommodations by 
or reactions from other actors—this research focused specifically on examining the 
formation of a new identity-based political actor within the Latino community as a result 
of the collective interactions launched during, before, and after the two major events 
analyzed. Among the phenomena included in this category are changes and continuities 
in terms of Latino leadership, community organization and empowerment, political 
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3.4. Empirical evidence and analysis 
 The sources of information relevant to this research are multiple. My primary 
data consisted of news stories from local newspapers and in-depth interviews 
conducted with leaders of social organizations, community organizers, domestic 
workers, public officials, and journalists. Other evidence was drawn from the 
National Center for Charitable Statistics, the U.S. Census Bureau, several institutional 
documents, legislative texts, and direct observation. 
 
News Stories 
 Reconstructing each of the two events required a detailed study of the 
occurrences and the sequence in which those occurrences took place. Newspaper 
articles provided an invaluable source of information, especially, given the 
assumption underlying this work that media recognition is a condition of existence of 
events. Following Nora’s assertion, events need to be known in order to exist, and in 
this matter, the press, radio, and images not only operate as means through which 
events become relatively independent, but they are also constitutive of the events 
themselves (Nora 1974: 212). 
 The news stories were surveyed from the two main newspapers in the DC 
area, the Washington Post and the Washington Times. I first conducted a preliminary 
survey of news stories that allowed me to familiarize myself with a wide array of 
issues regarding the Latino community in the area. This first survey covered the years 
2005 and 2006, plus the year 1991, which comprised the time periods of each of the 
two events. The preliminary selection of news stories utilized a broad criterion, 
 
 62 
consisting of collecting all the pieces of news that had Latinos or Hispanics in the title 
or body of the news. After a detailed examination of the contents of each article, only 
those related to political issues in any aspect were kept. As a result of this preliminary 
analysis I selected 122 news stories published between May and December of 1991 
for the Mount Pleasant Riots case, and 51 articles published between December 2005 
and September 2006 for La Marcha case.  
The matrix used to register and, thereafter, analyze each of the articles 
included the following basic items: identification of the news (entry #, date, 
newspaper), headline, description of occurrence, actors involved, and newspaper 
perspective. 
 This analysis of the information made it possible to construct a useful map to 
systematize the information and signal the place to locate the particular occurrences 
in the narrative. In other words, it allowed me to create a chronology of the historical 
particulars that compose each event. It also allowed me to identify gaps in 
information to fill in using other sources. One clear example is the case of the 
Immigration Rallies of 2006. The organizing efforts that followed the approval of the 
Sensenbrenner bill by the House of Representatives in December 2005 and preceded 
the first mass rally that took place in March 2006 were not covered by the main local 
newspapers.  
 
In-depth interviews  
 The in-depth interviews offered additional insight into the two events in three 
specific ways: (1) to gather factual information about occurrences relevant in the 
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development of the events of interest and yet missing in other sources and (2) to 
reconstruct the mechanisms (sequences of events)—which were not accessible in the 
written press—that account for how the community moved from point A to point B; 
and (3) to inquire about the meaning that different aspects linked to politics have for 
distinct categories of subjects.  
 Forty in-depth interviews were conducted with five groups of subjects, 
including leaders of social organizations, community organizers, immigrant workers, 
public officials, and journalists. Of the 40 total interviews, Of the 40 total interviews, 
18 were conducted with Latino community leaders, 6 with public officials, 6 with 
immigrant workers, 4 with community organizers, and 3 with journalists, 3 with other 
community leaders. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes and one hour, and 
most were conducted between May and December of 2007. A few of these subjects 
were re-interviewed in July 2008. While the content of the interviews varied with 
respect to each informant, the following common topics reappeared: the identification 
of key moments in the history of the Latino community in the area; the types and 
roles of organizations working with the Latino community; experiences of political 
participation and mobilization of Latino immigrants in the area; participation of 
Latinos in state structures; description and significance of each event for the 
community; gains and setbacks in each episode. Public officials, leaders of 
organizations or community organizers were also asked about their own experiences 
during the events and about the role and history of the organizations they lead/work 
for. 
 The subjects were recruited mainly through snowball sampling, which is the 
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process of recruiting new subjects through referrals from current subjects, and 
directly through phone calls. In addition, the selection of interviewees was based on 
their capacity as key informants regarding the specific events studied. All of my 
interviewees participated in this project voluntarily, none received any compensation. 
The majority of the interviews were conducted in Spanish, which I personally 
transcribed. In addition, I personally translated to English all direct quotations from 
the fieldwork. Names and identifying information have been changed or suppressed 
to protect the anonymity of all interviewees. Most of these interviews took place at 
either the informants’ workplaces or at a mutually agreed on public place.  
The analysis of the interviews was done using a qualitative analysis software 
package, Nvivo 7. The process of analysis included the identification of general 
themes and sub-themes, the assignment of codes to each of them, the grouping of 
fragments of text linked to each of the codes, and the separate analysis for each of the 
thematic modules; the production of findings and uncovering of significant relations; 
and the elaboration of partial reports.  
The information was then organized around the conceptual models developed 
to analyze each case (see Figures 1 and 2). Dimensions of analysis in the model were 
changed or added throughout the research process. 
 
Other sources  
Throughout the research process, I gathered information from other sources to 
understand and strengthen particular aspects of analysis. For example, I utilized data 
from the Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), a 
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national repository of 501(c)(3) organizations that file with the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service, to examine the composition and profile of the Latino nonprofit sector. 
I also relied on data from the U.S. Census Bureau in order to establish basic 
characteristics of the profile of the Latino population in the area at different points in 
time. In addition, I utilized data from the Current Population Survey in order to 
describe variations in registration and voting among Latinos. 
Institutional documents were consulted as a way to understand some formal 
missions and work of organizations, to reconstruct political initiatives, and grasp 
tactics of mobilization. Some of these institutional documents included brochures, 
strategic plans, and flyers. 
The analysis of legislative texts was critical to the understanding of the 
contents and implications of immigration reform proposals. In particular, I contrasted 
the text of legislative proposal with the way in which it was summarized and 
interpreted for the mass public by planners and organizers. 
Finally, I engaged in direct observation by being present in the sites where the 
events I am analyzing occurred. I had the unique experience of being present at La 
Marcha, the April 10th immigration rally at the Washington Monument. Specifically, I 
visited the premises of one of the organizations involved in organizing the rally, and 
then went to the demonstration site a few hours before the bulk of people arrived. I 
also explored the Mount Pleasant neighborhood, where the riots occurred in 1991. I 
visited the neighborhood several times, and got familiar with some of the main 
organizations that work with the community. During the interviews I had the 
opportunity to take a look at the buildings of several community organizations, public 
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offices, and neighborhood meeting places such as coffee shops. I also had the 
opportunity to be taken on a guided tour around the Mount Pleasant neighborhood. 
These onsite visits gave me a different perspective on how and where things 
happened. I experienced first-hand how close the incidents were from where people 
lived, and how magnificent or humble some of the buildings where nonprofits operate 
are. I could also observe how many “barriers of protection,” including, secretaries, 
doors, etc., some of my interviewees had, which revealed the accessibility or 
inaccessibility that some of my interviewees have in the community. Being physically 
present and getting this first hand exposure to the sites helped me make sense of some 
of my informants’ narrations during the interviews, as well as have a different 
personal connection with the research process. 
 
3.5. The analysis of the evidence 
 
For this dissertation I used a triangulated approach both with respect to sources and 
with respect to methods. The combined analysis of these different types of evidence 
was aimed at (1) the reconstruction of narratives and (2) the identification of drivers 
and mechanisms in those accounts. 
 
The reconstruction of narratives 
 
The first general effort in the analysis concerned the reconstruction of 
narratives for each of the contentious episodes, their contexts, and selected 
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consequences. As mentioned earlier, I understand narrative to be “the portrayal of 
social phenomena as temporally ordered, sequential, unfolding, and open-ended 
“stories” fraught with conjunctures and contingency” (Griffin 1992: 405). The 
sequence, order and contingency of occurrences that establish the way in which 
events unfolded shaped the explanation of the events themselves, and through them, 
of the phenomenon of politicization of Latinos.  
 In order to reconstruct the unfolding events, I began with a detailed 
identification of the facts and actions that were relevant components of each event, 
their sequence and order. This “ordering” of the event, as well as its delimitation 
required what Sewell calls an act of judgment. In other words, the decision of which 
actions or facts were relevant components for the unfolding of the event required an 
interpretive contextual approach. This assemblage of elements—actions and 
happenings—that might otherwise seem discrete or disparate into a coherent whole is 
what Griffin (1992) refers to as “colligation”. The idea underlying this type of 
narrative explanation is that the event needs to be examined and interrogated through 
its internal temporality—which is also referred to as “unpacked”—and then re-
composed as an explanation. Through this construction of narratives, it should be 
underscored, the analyst not only attributes causality to the connections among 
historical particulars, but also assigns meaning to those internal relations (see 
Aminzade 1992). 
My effort to identify and order actions and events into a narrative faced 
several challenges. For example, by gathering different stories from different 
informants and sources (e.g., interviews and newspapers) I encountered points of 
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convergence, tension, or open contradiction between different accounts. So although 
there is a general timeline of events that was uncontested, some details about the 
meaning and importance of certain elements varied across different sources. When 
those points of divergence on specific issues appeared, I made them explicit in the 
text.  
In terms of actual research tasks, the first stage in the reconstruction of the 
narratives for each event was the identification and analysis of newspaper stories 
from major newspapers in the area. This analysis allowed me to identify major 
turning points in the events, and examine the way in which the occurrences had been 
made public. This exploration also enabled me to identify gaps of information that 
needed to be filled by other sources. The examination of news stories provided me 
with a valuable point of entry into the theme, which proved crucial to informing the 
way in which I conducted the interviews. The primary question that guided my 
inquiry of newspapers was what happened immediately before, during, and after each 
of the episodes under analysis.  
The interviews with different key informants, on the other hand, were used to 
reconstruct the missing elements in each puzzle, but also, and most importantly, 
served me to identify interpretations and the weight that each of the occurrences had 
for different actors. The most important rationale behind the conduction of interviews 
was the identification of arguments as to why the riots and la Marcha occurred the 
way they did, and what impact it had in the eyes of different community stakeholders. 




Attribution of historical significance  
 
 Following the theoretical perspective depicted earlier in this dissertation, some 
precautions warranted consideration when developing an explanatory comprehension 
of a historical event. First, there are usually several trajectories of change and 
sequence of happenings to be disentangled (Aminzade 1992, Sewell 1996). That 
means that the map of occurrences that constitute an event is usually complex and far 
from a single master process. Second, sequence of occurrences is not sufficient for 
accounting for causation. As Griffin (1993) states, chronological order does not 
necessarily imply historical or causal significance. This, in turn, means that in order 
to attribute causation and develop an explanation “events and their contexts [should] 
be openly theorized, factual material abstracted and generalized, and the causal 
connections among narrative sequences established in a way that can be explicitly 
replicated and criticized.” (Griffin 1993: 1100) 
 Thus, the explanatory study of the events relied on a conscious theoretical 
interrogation of the connections that tied the occurrences together. With that in mind, 
the utilization of available explanatory frameworks (the contentious politics and 
political process approaches) and knowledge about the historical background 
constituted invaluable pieces for that task. 
After describing the set of historical particulars that constituted each event, I 
started inquiring theoretically as to what those connections meant, how they related to 
previous organizational and political contexts, what roles actors played and why, and 
what changes occurred in the community as an evolving political actor. In both cases, 
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I used interviews with key informants to understand the political and organizational 
background of the community at each point in time. Given the lack of formalized and 
systematized knowledge on the political history of the Latino community in the 
Washington, D.C. area, the information provided by key informants was critical. The 
plurality of voices allowed me to capture points of tension and disagreement with the 
community, as well as consensus on patterns of development within the community. 
The information gathered through in-depth interviews was analyzed, as 
mentioned earlier, using a qualitative analysis software package. The examination of 
the evidence, which took the bulk of the time, had two main stages. First, I pinpointed 
new themes or subthemes to be included in the analysis of each case; and second, I 
examined each of those themes across different informants. Through this integrated 
analysis I was able to grasp more thoroughly patterns and tensions that shaped the 
narratives. 
When possible, other available information was also analyzed to make or 
strengthen some points encountered in the interviews. For example, quantitative 
information on Latino nonprofit organizations was utilized to describe the context and 
impact of the riots in terms of organizational strengthening of the community (a topic 
that is widely present in the interviews). The Census’ information on the composition 
of the community was also utilized to show the demographic characteristics of the 
community (mainly in terms of nationality) in order to evaluate the presence or 
absence of nationality claims in the political events and their aftermath. In addition, 
data on voter registration and participation in elections was used to illustrate a claim 
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found in the interviews that stated that the immigration rallies and the actions that 
followed them had an impact in Latinos’ electoral participation. 
Each of the analyzed cases is unique and the focus of this analysis was on the 
understanding of each of them separately, by pinpointing logics underlying the 
sequence of actions and occurrences taking place before, during, and after the 
political performances in question. However, comparison is utilized to pinpoint 
similarities and differences in mechanisms underlying Latinos’ sudden appearance in 
the public sphere and the ensemble of actors and actions that preceded and succeeded 
the appearance. In the last section of this dissertation, I examine how the different 
political and organizational contexts helped to explain the different trajectories of the 
political processes opened by the riots and the march, as well as the dissimilar impact 
that each of the event ultimately had in the emergence or transformation of a Latino 






Chapter 4: The Mount Pleasant Riots of May 1991  
 
 In early May, 1991 the neighborhood of Mount Pleasant, Washington, D.C. 
experienced a great shock. Following a shooting of a Latino worker by a black police 
officer, the community exploded in a series of riots. These occurrences took place in 
early May 1991 in the neighborhood that concentrated the majority of Latino 
residents living in the District.  
 The events of May 1991 in Mount Pleasant reflected long term tensions 
existing between Hispanic residents (the majority of whom were undocumented 
immigrants) and the police and other local state officials. Although the incidents 
lasted a few days they synthesized a dense plot of co-existing conflicts. The different 
interpretations of the conflict by the actors or subjects affected—namely, the police, 
the city Mayor, the Hispanic organizations, neighbors, and the media—led to a 
configuration of forces that affected the trajectory of the problem. Because of the 
riots, Latinos found themselves at the center of the local political scene, concentrating 
the attention of the media for several months after the incident. Under any account, 
through their involvement in the facts of Mount Pleasant, they were able to push a 
series of issues into the local political agenda. 
This chapter is devoted to the examination of the contextual factors that made 
the occurrence of the riots possible, the direction of the political process opened for 
the Latino community by the riots; and the impact the riots had in terms of the 
process of emergence of a transformed political actor within the Latino community. 
First, I reconstruct the chronology of the event and the aftermath. Following, I 
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analyze some prominent contextual features that surrounded the 1991 riots—I 
specifically look at demographic, organizational, and political aspects. I also examine 
the ways in which different sectors read the threat and opportunity created, as well as 
the ways in which the opening produced was taken advantage of. Finally, I review 
some of the innovative features that Latinos acquired as a political actor. 
  
4.1. A chronology of the event and the aftermath 
 
In this section I describe the main stages of the Mount Pleasant Riots, as 
depicted in mainstream newspapers11 in the district. Given the extensive and detailed 
coverage that the event and the “Latino problem” received in the local media during 
and after the riots, news stories constitute invaluable resources for the analysis of this 
case. The chronology of happenings, interpretations, negotiations, and actions appears 
to have a direct relation with the way in which the problem was addressed. This 
examination of the “historical particulars” that composed the event and the aftermath 
has two goals: (1) to reconstruct the “public side” of the political process opened by 
the riots and (2) to identify those gaps that could not be filled using this source.  
 
The main stages identified include the shooting of a Latino worker, the 
diffusion of the rumor, the eruption of violence, and the pacification. In addition to 
the immediate reactions to the shooting, I also singled out some lasting effects, 
                                                 
11 The deliberate decision of utilizing mainstream media outlets instead of “ethnic” newspapers 
responds to an attempt to look at how the event impacted the public agenda. 
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including organizational impacts, healing efforts, investigation, effect in the local 
government, diffusion to other locales, and reaction of other minorities. 
 
4.1.1. The trigger and immediate reactions 
 
Triggering occurrence: Shooting of a Latino worker 
 In the evening of May 5th, 1991, a Latino man was shot by a police officer in 
the Mount Pleasant neighborhood in Washington, D.C. This much of the story is 
agreed on. However, the events surrounding the incident are subject to debate.  
 According to the police officers’ official account, backed by the District’s 
Police Department the incident began when a female police officer confronted three 
Latino men, who were supposedly drinking. The police officer ordered them to put 
away what they were drinking, but the three men refused., The three men became 
disorderly, so the officer attempted to put them under arrest. In an attempt to resist the 
female officer’s order, one of the men pulled a knife and started pointing it in the 
direction of the officer. In return, the officer drew her service revolver, and ordered 
the man several times to drop the knife.  When the man did not obey the officer’s 
order, the officer shot.  
 This story of the occurrences, however, completely contradicts the version 
told by several witnesses and believed by the majority of the Mount Pleasant 
community. According to the witnesses’ account, Daniel Enrique Gomez, a 30-year-
old Salvadoran resident, was handcuffed and unarmed at the time of the shooting. 
Gomez, who was not initially involved in the discussion taking place between two 
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Latino men and police officers, joined the struggle when the police was trying to 
arrest one of his friends. The fight, then, involved three officers, Gomez and his two 
friends, and two people that until then had been bystanders. As the police officer took 
a few steps backward and shouted “freeze”. In this account, Gomez had both hands 
cuffed behind his back and approached the officer who had drawn her revolver. When 
Gomez was about a foot away from the female officer, she fired a single shot into his 
chest.  
 
Rumor swept throughout the community 
 While the details and order of events are in dispute, the fact remains that a 
Latino man was shot by a police officer. No sooner had the event occurred when the 
story spread throughout Mount Pleasant.. The version that was passed along from 
neighbor to neighbor was short, simple and powerful: “The police shot and killed a 
handcuffed man.” 
  
Eruption of violence and immediate effects on the public sphere 
 The circulation of the story throughout the community led to an immediate 
eruption of violence on the streets of Mount Pleasant. Hundreds of irate youths began 
confronting the police, throwing rocks and bottles, setting several cars afire and 
wounding several officers. During the riot, many store windows were smashed, and 
two shops were looted. As the riot continued, two to three hundred police officers 
were called to the area from other districts as reinforcement, with Spanish-speaking 
police officers specifically requested. In an attempt to control the riot, he police 
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utilized tear gas. All in all, the Mount Pleasant riots on the night of May 5th lasted 6 
hours.  
 As the Mount Pleasant community erupted, DC Mayor Sharon Pratt Dixon 
opted to monitor the unfolding events from her home, following the  advice from her 
top aides that evening. It was not until the next day that she walked the streets in the 
neighborhood to assess the damage. On the morning of Monday, May 6th, she 
gathered the DC Council members to develop alternative strategies to decrease 
tensions in the short run, and to reduce the cultural chasm between the Spanish-
speaking community and the English-speaking majority. Mayor Dixon’s Monday also 
included a meeting with a dozen clergymen from the Mount Pleasant community. The 
fact that the Mayor chose to meet with a small group of clergymen rather than with a 
bunch of community groups that had been requesting an urgent meeting with her was 
interpreted by one of the clergymen present at the meeting as an attempt to evade the 
advancement of political agendas so soon after the disturbances. 
 On the night of May 6th, for a second consecutive night, Latino and non-
Latino youths and police officers clashed in the streets of Mount Pleasant. This time, 
the uproar spread to the neighborhoods of Adams Morgan and Columbia Heights and 
blacks joined in on what had primarily been a Latino struggle the first night. As had 
happened the previous night, hundreds of youths fought with the police, throwing 
bottles and bricks and shouting at the officers. The violence expanded to include the 
destruction of a Metro bus populated with passengers, the looting of a fast food 
restaurant and the burning of a public dumpster. The police again utilized tear gas in 





 To regain control of the communities on fire, D.C. Mayor Sharon Dixon 
imposed a curfew in the Mount Pleasant and Adams Morgan neighborhood from 
midnight of May 6th to 5:00 am May 7th. This decision represented a reversal of 
strategy; from a lenient approach aiming at dispersing crowds and minimizing arrests, 
the government tactic now was to start rounding up youths. Once the curfew was in 
effect, peace returned to the neighborhoods. 
 
4.1.2. Lasting effects 
 Although the violent events of Mount Pleasant lasted fewer than 48 hours, as 
briefly depicted above, the consequences of these events for the community, the local 
state, the plans of the public leaders, and the public agenda in the District’s politics, 
as well as cultural schemas developed in the understanding of immigrants’ issues, 
continued for a significant time afterwards. The identification of substantive 
consequences affecting both Latino immigrants as a group as well as the political 
scenario of Washington, D.C. presented in this section is a synthesis of a detailed 
identification and interpretation of 54 momentous occurrences that took place from 
the beginning of the riots to the articulation of demands of the group four months 
later.  
 Through research conducted on this case, I found that the shooting of a Latino 
worker and, most importantly, the discursive appropriation of the event by the Latin 
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American residents in the Mount Pleasant area had a significant impact in the way the 
political process was deployed.  
 
Organization 
 Although the map of Latino immigrants’ organizations operating in the 
Washington, D.C. area was vast and varied even before the shooting, the sequence of 
events that followed the riots show a convergence of agendas and efforts and the 
emergence of a new leadership in the group. On May 7th, soon after the disturbances, 
D.C. Mayor Dixon met with several leaders of the Latino community and proposed 
the formation of a multicultural task force directed towards the improved relations 
between the city government and Latino residents. This task force, however, was 
intended to function “at the mayor’s pleasure”. As a response to this attempt, and in 
an effort to maintain autonomy with respect to local authorities, a second group with 
the same membership was constituted: the D.C. Latino Civil Rights Task Force (D.C. 
Latino). Throughout the following months, the D.C. Latino emerged as the unified 
voice of the Latino immigrant community, constituting itself as the privileged 
interlocutor of the government officials and responsible for the advancement of a 
policy agenda. 
 Conscious of this evolving status of the task force, Pedro Aviles, leader of the 
D.C. Latino task force, took a step toward legitimating themselves by asking the 






 After civil order returned to the city, mainly through the curfews imposed by 
the local government, the community of Mount Pleasant adopted several initiatives 
attempting to “clean the name” of the neighborhood and reinstate pride into the 
community. These initiatives included an immediate scheduling of an outdoor 
celebration on Mount Pleasant Street, including Mariachi music and the installation of 
banners with the slogan written in both English and Spanish: “Mount Pleasant 
Invincible/Invencible”. Stores also sold posters and T-shirts bearing the same logo. In 
addition to the new community motto and celebration, there were a number of 
community clean-up campaigns and several meetings in the neighborhood to address 
what were considered “neighborhood needs”. Furthermore, soon after calm was 
restored in the area, D.C. Mayor Dixon, city officials and religious leaders from 
Mount Pleasant gathered at the Shrine of the Sacred Heart Church proclaiming a “day 
of reconciliation”. 
 The incidents in Mount Pleasant undoubtedly gave visibility not only to the 
neighborhood, but more importantly to the Latino community and its long standing 
problems. The Mount Pleasant riots represented both a serious rupture in the 




 Given the conflicting accounts of what had happened in Mount Pleasant and 
the dissatisfaction of multiple parties with what had happened and what was implied 
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in the disturbances of May 5th and 6th, the city’s Civilian Review Complaint Board 
(CRCB), which is responsible for investigating complaints regarding police 
misconduct, held a forum for residents of Adams Morgan and Mount Pleasant. The 
forum was meant to be a space to discuss concerns regarding police conduct during 
the disturbances as well as to make community residents aware that there is a 
mechanism available for reporting complaints against the police. More than 100 
people attended the meeting to voice their concerns. Youths living in Mount Pleasant 
attributed the anger that erupted in the rioting to ongoing police discrimination and 
harassment. In addition, students provided multiple examples of job and housing 
discrimination. It became clear that residents had long been feeling discriminated 
against It was during this meeting with the CRCB that Pedro Aviles, chairman of 
D.C. Latino, asked for a commission to conduct intensive hearings on the city’s 
treatment of Latinos. Due to that initial request, the US CRCB reviewed numerous 
complaints that police had regularly harassed and physically abused Latinos and that 
the city had ignored Latinos and Latino interests in hiring and budgeting.  
Two weeks later, on May 28th, the CRCB announced that it would be 
investigating the economic and social status of Latinos in the District. This decision 
was based on the claims of abuse that emerged after the shooting. The CRCB would 
be gathering testimony about opportunities available for Latinos in a variety of areas 
including employment, training, education, and city services. Although the 
commission had no enforcement power, this investigation was significant in that it 
would give the commission the authority to subpoena witnesses and issue a report to 
Congress about the situation of Latinos in the District. From the perspective of the 
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Latino residents in D.C. this investigation meant an opportunity to to include not only 
the particulars of what happened during the riots but, more importantly, a broad range 
of long-standing issues of discrimination in the community. 
 
Impact in the local government 
 The incidents in Mount Pleasant had direct repercussions on the District’s 
government. Most of the parties involved read the conflict as one regarding local 
politics, which explains why the nonappearance of the mayor in the scene of the 
disturbances during the first night was severely criticized by neighbors and Latino 
leaders. Furthermore, in the first explanations that circulated just after the riots, 
various statements tended to point to the insufficient attention that the city 
government had paid to the Latino population in the District. 
 The city’s Office on Latino Affairs (OLA), created to communicate Latino 
concerns to the mayor office, was one of the prime targets of criticisms after the riots 
in Mount Pleasant. Many complained that although OLA had been created to focus 
attention on Latino needs, its creation had actually released other agencies from their 
obligations to the Latino community. According to critical voices, OLA had been 
generally ignored by Mayor Dixon—who had not appointed a permanent director 
since she took office—and could not provide any warning on the latent troubles 
present at the heart of the D.C. Latino community. 
 Three weeks after the riots, feeling pressured by the new political landscape   
Mayor Dixon appointed an acting Latino Affairs Chief. At the same time, the mayor 
also promised Latino leaders that she would consider three previously rejected 
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nominees for the position—the director of OLA was the only Cabinet-level position 
for which mayor was required to choose from nominees made by an advisory 
commission. 
 The figure of the D.C. mayor appeared as a central character in the months 
after the riots. After securing the pacification of the area, Mayor Dixon committed to 
a series of meetings with neighborhood leaders, Latino organizations, police officers, 
and other appointed and elected officials, and businessmen, attempting to negotiate an 
array of policy changes to address short-term and long-term issues that had been 




 The fact that the incidents occurred in the heart of the nation’s capital, the 
event resonated in other locales as well. This was particularly the case in neighboring 
suburban districts. A couple of incidents in Montgomery County, Maryland and 
Arlington, Virginia, occurring a few weeks after the Mount Pleasant riots, are good 
illustrations of this point. With respect to the former, a Governor’s commission in the 
State of Maryland recommended that the Montgomery County police force improve 
its training, hire more Latino officers and increase its sensitivity to the county's 
rapidly growing Latino community, as a necessary step to avoid incidents like the 
ones that took place in Mount Pleasant. In regard to the second one, Arlington County 
community leaders warned that unless the county provided more jobs, and housing 
incidents could “explode” like it did in Mount Pleasants in early May. 
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Construction and advancement of a policy agenda 
 Materially, the transformations achieved by the Latino community residing in 
D.C. were also noteworthy. Several measures were adopted by the city government, 
many including businesses of the area as well as community leaders. The demands 
from different community groups and, in particular, those coming from the D.C. 
Latino task force, were mostly –though not exclusively—addressed to the city 
government. The formalization of the agenda took a few months of negotiations 
within the task force and with other actors. On September 11th 1991, four months 
after the riots, the D.C. Latino Task Force sent a report to Mayor Dixon requesting 
parity in jobs, city services, city contracts and education. As a result, one of the first 
policies adopted by the city was the creation of job opportunities for teenagers—
particularly important considering a recent budget cuts in the city that had affected 
jobs programs for youths. The remaining demands pertained to the spheres of police 
relations, housing, human rights, employment, education, economic development, 
recreation and human services. In particular, the Latino community requested the 
appointment of a Latino deputy chief of police and cultural sensitivity training for 
police officers  
Although Mayor Dixon did not specify how those goals would be addressed, 
she agreed that the percentage of Latinos in the District’s government could be 
increased. In addition, Mayor Dixon agreed to implement some of the easier, no-cost 
reforms immediately. For example, signs in Spanish would be installed in police 




 Together with the presentation of the report to the Mayor, Pedro Aviles from 
the D.C. Latino Task Force warned that in the event the mayor and other city officials 
refuse to execute a policy of parity, Latinos would mobilize and show that 
quantitative strength can offset a lack of economic or voting strength. Aviles asserted 
that “We [Latinos] are 10% of the population. We should be receiving 10% of the 
services”. In addition, Aviles announced that community leaders were planning to 
take their battle for equality to the suburbs soon, and he was critical of Mayor 
Dixon’s administration's response to their petitions so far. Furthermore, Aviles 
connected the new Latino community claims to what African Americans had 
requested for their own community in the 1960s and warned that the Latino 
community could use nonviolent actions similar to those utilized by the black 
community four decades earlier in their own struggle for equity and equality. 
 . 
Reaction of other minorities 
 The riot of Mount Pleasant revealed a multiplicity of latent racial/ethnic 
tensions. The fact that the police officer who shot Gomez, a Latino man, was African 
American was interpreted by many Latino neighbors and community leaders as a 
reflection of the resentment that blacks have towards Latinos. Testimonies gathered 
soon after the shooting are evocative in this respect: “They [black police offices] 
don’t treat us [Latino community members] as well as they treat blacks”; or “There is 
racism by the black community against Latinos” (Aviles, D.C. Latino). Along the 
same lines, Sonia Gutierrez, principal of the Gordon Adult Education Center, stated 
“We don’t hate blacks, but blacks discriminate against us. What have we done? In 
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some cases we are coming to this country to escape war.” Raul Yzaguirre, President 
of the influential National Council of La Raza put it this way: “Black leadership in 
many large cities has failed to address Hispanic grievances such as job 
discrimination, police brutality, and inadequate bilingual education.” This initial 
rhetoric among Latino leaders has somewhat lessened over time, in an attempt to 
avoid the intensification of tensions between the two minority groups.12 
 Despite the occasional tensions between the Latino and black communities, 
there are parallels and connections between the two. Some commentators in the 
media as well as public leaders (including the mayor) have pinpointed parallels 
between the Latino communities and riot-oriented black communities of the ‘60s. 
One aspect worth noting is the involvement of black youths in the May 1991 Mount 
Pleasant riots. According to the newspaper coverage of the event, during the second 
night in particular, black youths joined Latino youths in the clashes with the police. 
 Race/ethnicity was explicitly used to frame the demands of the organized 
Latino community to the local authorities: the argument stated that blacks were vastly 
overrepresented in the city government, and that Latinos deserved parity in the 
treatment they received from the local government in jobs, city services, city 
contracts and education. Repeating Aviles assertion: "We [Latinos] are 10% of the 
population. We should be receiving 10% of the services,"  
 Some African American residents and leaders expressed disgust with the 
associations between black struggles for justice and Latino pleas. “Hispanics may 
suffer some discrimination, but they were never the victims of slavery or Jim Crow 
laws”, expressed one African American resident. In particular, the sudden attention to 
                                                 
12 The quotes here were gathered from an article in the Washington Post, May 12, 1991. 
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the Latino community irritated some black leaders, opening a gap in the politics of 
the 1990s in a majority-black city. Some African American Leaders rejected the 
analogy as irrelevant or false, stating for example that “We [African Americans] 
never came over as illegal aliens, as immigrants” or “They [Hispanics] were never 
slaves” (Calvin Rolark, United Black Fund). Other leaders acknowledged the 
similarity of the struggles, but warned that Latino gains could not come at the 





This section centers on the examination of the demographic, organizational 
and political background of the Latino community residing in Washington in 1991. 
The reconstruction of this landscape is meant to help illuminate the development of 
the occurrences that set the stage for the Mount Pleasant riots of 1991 and its 
aftermath. In the first subsection, I review some visible trends in the community 
composition and size. Following that, I examine the array of organizations that were 
founded by Latinos and/or that work primarily with the Latino community. 
Specifically, I look at the role of the first leaders in the post-Mount Pleasant 
community and their impact on the development of service-providing agencies. I also 
examine the weight these organizations have had in the community, their political 
role, and their transformations over time. The third subsection focuses on the analysis 
of the political profile of the community. In particular I look at the relations between 
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the community and its leaders with the city government and state agents, the patterns 
of political representation, and the experiences of collective action. 
 
4.2.1. Demographic profile 
 
Like their counterparts in other urban areas throughout the United States, 
immigrants from Latin America arrived in the District of Columbia in a number of 
separate waves. Those waves are related to the different social and political events 
occurring in the immigrants; countries of origin. In other words, what was happening 
in Latin America had a direct impact on the immigration streams directed to the D.C. 
region and on the political profile of the Latin American immigrant community 
residing in the area. As each of these waves landed on the DC shore, they affected the 
political development of the Latino community. 
The first substantive Latino presence in the area were Puerto Ricans and 
Chicanos, many of whom came to the area after Second World War to work for the 
federal government. Puerto Ricans and Chicanos had a peculiar status. Because they 
had citizenship, they enjoyed a series of privileges, ranging from voting, to access to 
public employment, to knowing how the system worked. From the beginning, the 
members of the first wave of Latino immigration established support networks and, at 
the same time, created a political voice within the community.  
The 1960s and 70s saw the next noticeable wave of Latino immigrants to the 
Washington, D.C. area. Cubans, fleeing post-revolutionary Cuba, moved into the 
District; however, unlike the first wave of Latino immigrants who were moved by a 
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rather local political agenda, most Cuban immigrants—many of whom were 
professionals, professors, bankers and intellectuals—were politically more engaged 
with an international agenda.  
During this same time period, a smaller wave of immigrants came to the US 
from Latin America. Employees of international organizations such as the World 
Bank and the International Monetary Fund brought laborers from throughout Latin 
America to work as housekeepers and domestic workers (Reepak 1995). 
The next immigrant wave led to a sort of political radicalization of the local 
Latino community in the District. In the 1970s, many South American countries 
experienced military coups, which naturally resulted in waves of emigration.  Several 
political activists arrived in the Washington area escaping from dictatorships in 
countries such as Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. According to Sebastian Puentes, a 
politically involved young person at the time, this process of politicization became 
especially noticeable after the abrupt end of the Chilean socialist government of 
Salvador Allende. 
 
What happens in Latin America has its impact here too. It had impact when 
they killed Salvador Allende. When they killed him… because I believe they 
killed him… many people came from abroad… people came from Chile, 
people from Nicaragua, people from different places… activists that were in 
Chile. From all the countries… Argentineans came too… when they had all 
that process with the military there. So then those people resided here. So 
then, for the first time the community develops a process towards the Left, I 
would say. The Left begins to have a little bit of impact in the community, a 
little bit of presence I would say. Chileans who came from over there with 
experience from their countries, some Argentineans, Nicaraguans…. The 
community started to form itself politically, with a sort of idea that we have to 
mobilize people, we have to organize ourselves… politically in that sense. 
And that has an impact because many of the youths in the area became… I 




 The most significant wave of Latin American immigrants to the District 
occurred in the 1980s as a result of the civil wars in El Salvador. From that point, an 
unprecedented flow of Central American immigrants relocated to the D.C. 
metropolitan area. The arrival of Salvadorans escaping from the war in Central 
America was significant not only because of its quantitative dimension--thousands of 
immigrants arrived in a short period of time-- but also because of the impact they had 
in the Latino community and the area’s population at large. Julio Cruz, a school 
teacher who has lived in the area for more than three decades now and who became a 
key figure in the Latino community in the area, described the significance of the 
massive arrival of Salvadorans as follows: “all the sudden the gates opened and 
prrrroom!... the flood of Salvadorans… Before then, nobody knew where El Salvador 
was located or what was going on there, or what a pupusa was. In the U.S. Senate 
they didn’t have any idea either. It was like what happened with the invasion of 
Grenada….” 
 The new immigrants from El Salvador and other areas in Central America 
introduced a new type of political presence in the District’s Latino community. On 
the one hand, most Central American immigrants came with no political protection of 
any kind. According to the Central American interviewees, they viewed themselves 
as second-class residents. On the other hand, given that most of them had escaped a 
war environment in their countries of origin, immigrants coming from Central 
America in the eighties had a very distinct political profile, which would ultimately 
be reflected in the character that the Mount Pleasant Riots adopted. The following 




People were coming kind of much closer to their militancy.  You know what I 
mean?  So that they had been…many of the people that were coming had been 
in a militant frame in El Salvador or wherever else they were coming from but 
primarily from El Salvador.  And so they had those identities much more 
intact.  And so in thinking of that, there was that.  If you look at the 
photographs or you listen to the kind of framing, it was a very…tactical.  It 
wasn’t a riot in the kinda more American sense; it was a riot in the Latin 
American sense. (Elizabeth Mederos) 
 
 By 1990 224,786 Latinos, which represented 5.7 percent of the total 
population, were living in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area13, with 
Salvadorans being the single largest group by country of origin. Furthermore, 
immigrants from El Salvador and other Central American countries became the city’s 
largest and most noticeable immigrant community (Repak 1995: 1). In fact, in a short 
period of time, Washington became home to the second largest community of 
Salvadorans in the U.S and the third largest settlement of Central Americans. This 
pattern stands out against the make up of the Latino population in the U.S. by national 
origin, whose largest groups are chiefly of Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cuban descent. 
 
 
 The changes in size and composition experienced by the Latino community in 
the area were also accompanied by the formation and transformation of a relatively 




                                                 
13 From the Census 1990 Summary Tape File 1 (STF 1) , 100-Percent Data.  
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4.2.2. Organizational landscape 
 
A few years after the first noticeable wave of Latino immigrants in the 
District, new organizations began to emerge within the community, most of them 
founded by prominent Latino leaders. These organizations adopted multiple roles: 
from providing services to the Spanish-speaking community in the area, to 
negotiating policies or distribution of resources with the local government, to giving a 
voice to the community. It is worth noting that because many of the Latino residents 
in the area were not citizens, these agencies tended to operate as mediators between 
the Latino population and the government. Whether they actually reflected the 
community prevailing will or not, at least in discourse, most of them claimed this role 
for themselves. These organizations, mostly services-providing agencies, would 
represent for many years to come the nucleus of power within the community. In 
particular, the heads of organizations became the ‘leaders’, representatives and 
political referents of Latinos residing in the area. Among other things, this symbolical 
role enabled these community leaders to negotiate with the government, search for 
funds, and speak to the media with respect to Latino affairs in the area. 
The power of this leadership elite, however, was in most cases based on a 
hierarchical relationship with the bases. Their location in a service providing 
organization guaranteed them regular contact with the community, and the possibility 
of being known, and usually respected by the service users. In addition, these leaders 
had special legal, economic, and cultural status, which differentiated them from the 
typical Latino residing in the area. Unlike many of the community members, these 
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leaders were usually bilingual citizens with a relatively comfortable economic status 
and a solid educational background. At the same time, this privileged position gave 
them access to a series of resources—including funds, government positions, contacts 
with key actors such as foundations, among others—which were critical for the 
operation of their organizations which, in turn, was beneficial for the community at 
large. 
Over the years, several organizations were created and started consolidating in 
the local scenario. The creation and growth of these organizations has been related to 
various degrees to a serious of co-operating factors, including the capacity of their 
leaders to secure funds, the availability of funds from the government and other 
sources to sustain their programs, the migratory flows arriving to the area, and to a 
lesser extent the capacity of the community to articulate demands. 
In the following subsection I will review different existing accounts on the 




The old guard and the origins of the Latino organizations in the Washington 
region 
 
Before the first Latino agencies were founded, the Latino population received 
most of their social support from churches—predominantly Catholic churches. 
However, the support provided by churches was neither formalized nor systematic, 
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which was one of the arguments mentioned by some of the agencies founders to 
justify the need for the establishment of more institutionalized and permanent 
channels of services. 
Many of the founders or heads of the first Latino organizations are known in 
the community as the old guard, and several of them have been active in the 
community ever since. Their role in the community has been crucial not only from a 
symbolic point of view but also as a resource that pushed a ‘Latino’ agenda in the 
local government.  
 
We inherited all that political, social, and economic expression, okay… 
mostly political and social, from a leadership that was mostly Puerto Rican. 
Because when Puerto Ricans came here in the fifties and sixties, since they 
were considered U.S. citizens, they enjoyed a series of privileges that allowed 
them to vote, well, a spectrum of…. and the knowledge of how the system 
worked. So then they started to establish to a great extent the networks of 
support and to create a sort of political voice within the community. (Tadeo 
Ramirez) 
 
I asked some of these referents how and why these organizations were 
created. The arguments I found ranged from the necessity of filling a service gap in 
the community, to the will and tenacity of a group of people, mostly Puerto Ricans—
especially Carlos Rosario—who already had political experience before coming to the 
District, and had become aware of the organizational experience of African 
Americans which constituted a model to be emulated. 
 
Carlos Rosario is the founding leader of this community. He was the first 
one… During the late sixties Latinos started arriving from Central and South 
America. And then there were many problems because there was not… there 
were no agencies, there was nothing in place to give services to Latinos. There 
were no English classes… the only English classes available were those in 
Americanization School in Georgetown… and that was mostly for…. Those 
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who went there were mainly diplomats, no? And so Carlos Rosario and the 
Latinos that were in Washington, D.C., that are citizens and are qualified and 
have a college degree and so on… have always been mostly Puerto Ricans, 
Mexican-Americans, and Cubans. But, what happens? Those people didn’t 
want to get involved with immigrants…. But Carlos Rosario did…. He started 
to realize what was going on. Rosario was an X-Ray technician that came 
from Puerto Rico and immediately became interested… he said, poor 
people… one day he saw… you know, Latinos talk a lot with our hands, and 
we speak loud. And the police came and if they saw that you were in a corner 
talking… bla bla bla, they thought you were fighting, they arrested you, and 
stuff like that… and so Rosario started to talk with other people and said, we 
need to do something to help these Latinos. But as I told you, only a few had 
the interest [to do so]. (Olga Puglisi). 
 
 Although there were other figures recognized as leaders in the community, 
only Carlos Rosario is valued as leaving a legacy behind him: 
 
In the community voluntary organizations were founded passed First World 
War, the Korean War… during the 60s, before the great exodus of Latinos to 
this region… There were three men. Carlos Rosario, of Puerto Rican origin, 
establishes many organizations… establishes the presence… makes the Latino 
presence noticeable. There is Mr. Vidaña in Virginia, of Cuban-American 
origin. They establish an organization in Virginia but mostly in the context of 
anti-Castro fight. The same thing happens in Maryland, Mr. Perichet Rivas 
establishes the Hispanic Community I think… But it is now relegated to a 
third, or fourth order. They simply do some work of translation or assistance 
with immigration forms, those types of things. So these three men become the 
principal leaders of each districts (…) Carlos Rosario dies but leaves behind 
him a legacy… the Center Carlos Rosario, and organizations that in that 
moment were run in Washington mostly by people of Puerto Rican origin, 
who had experience because they had come from the Bronx. They had the 
experience of how to work with a local government… So they came, settled, 
and created organizations, or improved the organizations already existent, and 
got involved in the government… (Jorge Inzaurralde) 
 
 
Many later agencies owe their creation to the original initiatives based on 
Rosario’s “formula to establish those organizations”. In other words, Rosario was a 
pioneer in planting the seeds of what would later become a relatively dense 
organizational structure providing a range of services to Latinos in general, to 
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immigrants in particular, and to other minorities residing in the region as well. 
Demanding services from the government for the Latino community has been seen as 
the raison d’être of many of these organizations. In other words, the leaders of the old 
guard played the role of intermediary between government and the community. In 
fact, government support has been critical in the survival of many of these 
organizations over time.  
 
The group [of community leaders, heads of agencies] developed with the goal 
of asking the government of the District that given the presence of the 
community in the area it should start providing certain basic services so that 
the community could sustain itself. This entailed negotiations with the African 
American community, especially with Mayor Washington. (Vicente Olleros) 
 
For others, the creation of these community organizations seemed to emulate 
the experience of the African American community and their civil rights struggle, 
which still dominated the political agenda in the country at the time the first Latino 
organizations were founded in the 1960s. 
 
These organizations emerge based on… in my opinion… based on the great 
necessity. All the struggle of civil rights that existed in the country in that 
moment made that there were more attention to minority groups. Of course, 
the African American community had a great impact in the country and 
started… they saw the problems that existed and the need that these needed 
attention from the government and so on… And the reforms started. Here 
there was a Puerto Rican community that was very strong… not strong but it 
was the one that started the process in the community. Some came with the 
experience from New York. Others came from Puerto Rico, such as Carlos 
Rosario who came I believe directly from Puerto Rico… and I think they had 
a lot of ability in the idea of forming agencies… So then, as I was telling you, 
African Americans have their organizations, we need to have ours. And so 
they started to from the different community centers of the community. 




 Given the profile of the heads of many of these organizations, it is not 
uncommon to hear comments about certain ‘paternalism’ or ‘maternalism’14 in their 
approach to the community. In particular, the concept refers to the idea that many of 
these leaders see themselves as fatherly or motherly figures who make decisions on 
behalf of a group of disadvantaged residents they have under their protection. The 
relationships established between leaders and the individuals under their safeguard 
are hierarchical and personal, and, therefore, there is a strong vertical dependency. 
The paternalist/maternalist approach is captured in the following segment from an 
interview with the head of a service-providing agency who belongs to the old guard: 
 
But my school is Salvadoran, my son. Here it is always full of… Those are my 
people. I adore them. They are the best, hard working, most honest people 
there exist. (Olga Puglisi) 
 
 In addition, the organizations’ heads or agencieros, as many call them, act as 
brokers with access to some state agents and structures. I will re-take this last point in 
the section devoted to the community’s political landscape. One of the community 
figures interviewed for this project associated the profiles of these agencieros with 
that of caciques, a term used in Latin America to refer to a tribal chief: 
 
Especially in the 70s there was… now it’s a little bit different, now it is more 
structured, more impersonal… they are institutions. But at that time the thing 
was very paternalistic. I think… there were Puerto Ricans and Chicanos that 
saw these just arrived ‘indians’ as ‘poor people, they don’t know anything’… 
we do, we have to inculcate and educate them because they don’t know and 
welcome to this country… and those types of things… some personalism in 
the form of doing it… […] The personalities that in the past emerged as 
leaders, such as Carlos Rosario, the caciques and cacicas… because women 
here have called the shots… they aren’t shy little flowers, no? they have taken 
                                                 




up the things… Those caciques don’t have any more space (José Bendicente, 
a long-term community leader) 
 
 This comment reveals the conception of an existing divide in the community 
between those who ‘suffer’ the process of immigration as a trajectory of hardships, 
and those who arrived to the community in a more privileged position. In the first 
group, we have more recent immigrants, primarily from Central or South America, 
who escaped from their countries under rather tumultuous circumstances. In this 
second group, we encounter those whose families had been in the United States for 
several generations, such as many of the Chicano and Puerto Rican immigrants. 
Included in the privileged group are those who moved to the District to work in 
international organizations or family members of those who came in those conditions. 
For the ‘privileged’ group, citizenship and language was not an issue and their 
integration in many levels to the community was not as problematic as it was for 
more recent immigrants 
 
Puerto Ricans and Chicanos at that time were citizens. They had citizenship, a 
secure residency… even Cubans who hadn’t been born here, no? The others 
yes… They never knew what it was to be standing in an immigration line… 
they never had the problem of immigration, they had always been citizens, 
they had always spoken English, and they were proud of being able to move 
themselves in that sea… swim better that universe than the other recently 
arrived fish that came from some stream lost somewhere…. (José Bendicente) 
 
 Although often criticized for their paternalistic approach and their privileged 
situation compared to those enjoyed by ordinary immigrants, these long-term leaders 
had access to different structures of power and resources also made them a critical 
asset for the community. This access, in turn, was what allowed them to create the 
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Growth and strengthening of agencies over the years 
 
 Most of the agencies had very humble beginnings—reflected in small budgets, 
low number of employees, and limited number of programs they could afford to 
engage in. Over time and, in many cases, after long periods of struggles and 
negotiation with the local government, some managed to achieve exceptional 
expansion in their organizational structures, as well as in the activities developed and 
in the population covered by their services.  
 
The agencies are now more like institutions, they are bigger…. I was in the 
board of directors of the Latin American Youth Center. I was there for years. 
And I remember when the board had to clean the floors, for example, or paint 
some walls… in the little house where it was back then… now it is not a little 
house any more… there is center here, a center there… there is a new one in 
Maryland… it is a great octopus and they have professionals of different 
levels doing… the accountants, the grant managers and all those people… that 
before was pure voluntarism and let’s see the roof… how far can we get with 
the resources we have. At that time yes, people, the director and the board of 
directors I could say, I know this, that and that… now it is… and I am only 
talking about the Youth Center, but Ayuda too, a lot bigger, Andromeda is 
still there… the director of Andromeda has his own style, with a lot of 
personal presence in the agency. But he also has a lot of doctors, assistants, 
and those things… it is much bigger… (José Bendicente) 
 
Along the same lines, one of the most prominent leaders of the community 
from the old guard described the beginnings of the school she was in charge of: 
 
So the school started to grow and we started only with English and a 
department of services that we still have that was established by Roberto 
Taibo. So then we were only Roberto and myself…. in ‘72…. And other girl 
that was Roberto’s assistant… she died as well. But let me tell you that I was 
 
 99 
the one who wrote the proposals, I answered the phone, I directed the school, I 
did everything…. (Olga Puglisi) 
 
The success of an agency, according to the prevailing view I found in the 
community, is to a great extent expressed in the buildings that the organization is able 
to acquire for their operations. That is, there was—and still exists-- a prevailing belief 
that a symbiotic relationship exists between the agency, the person who is running it, 
and the building where activities are performed: 
 
In the ‘80s Maria established what was called the Multicultural Career Intern 
Program, which later became the Bell Multicultural. But that is another story, 
a beautiful story of how an extraordinary woman who fought… And the story 
of Maria is another story… Because Bell is there… And if that building is 
there it is because of Maria Tukeva. Bell is Maria Tukeva, okay? (Olga 
Puglisi) [italics mine] 
 
Struggles for funds and other resources in order to run or expand programs 
was a constant in the early history of many organizations operating in the District. 
Although fund availability directly affected the agencies operating capacity, 
strengthening these organizations also resulted in the increasing needs of the 
population and the organizations’ proven ability to provide services of quality. 
According to a long-term resident, “everybody sooner or later came seeking medical 
help, legal assistant, help with housing, or this or that” 
In 1991, the Latino nonprofit sector in the Washington, D.C. region was still 
relatively small, young, and fairly diverse15. According to data from the National 
Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS)16—based on information filed by 
                                                 
15 The Latino nonprofit sector is conceived here as encompassed by organizations whose missions 
explicitly concentrate on Latino population issues or have a history of primarily serving the Latino 
community (based on Cordero-Guzman 2005) 
16 From the Urban Institute National Center for Charitable Statistics Core File (Public Charities, circa 
1991 and 2005). 
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organizations with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 17—30 Latino 
organizations were operating in the area in 1991, with total combined revenues of 13 
million dollars. All of these organizations had revenues of less than 2 million dollars 
and the majority of them (63 percent) operated on annual budgets of less than 
$500,000. Additionally, of all the Latino nonprofits active and filing Form 990 
returns in 1991, most of them had been created in the 1970s or 1980s (43 and 40 
percent respectively).  With respect to geographical location, 70 percent of active 
organizations in the metropolitan area were running their operations in the District of 
Columbia. The remaining organizations were divided between Maryland (20 percent) 
and Virginia (10 percent).  
Taken as a set, locally based Latino nonprofits offered a broad variety of 
services, from specialized activities concerning immigration including legal 
assistance, employment aid and training, language tutoring, and translation services, 
among others to more traditional areas of education and health care. The majority of 
these organizations, in turn, carried out several missions simultaneously. 
As a result of the creation and development of these organizations, 
Washington became the organizational hub, where the political expression of the 
community was concentrated. In the next subsection, I will pay specific attention to 




                                                 
17 Only nonprofit organizations with more than $25,000 in annual gross receipts are required to file 
Form 990 with the IRS. Consequently, small organizations that do not complete Form 990 are not in 
the dataset and were not included here.  
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Role of agencies in politics  
 
 The links between Latino organizations and politics started from early in the 
life of Latino nonprofits. For a variety of reasons, service-providing agencies became 
the pivotal piece in Latino politics in the city. Given that they served a population 
composed by many noncitizens, structurally, the Latino organizations took the role of 
representatives of this group by default. Because of their needs for funds, leaders of 
agencies also had their own agendas that, according to many informants, were aimed 
at preserving the existence or guaranteed growth of their organizations. Additionally, 
the previous political experience of many of their leaders impacted in political profile 
acquired by agencies. 
First, these organizations had the structural and logistical capabilities to 
facilitate the performance of political activities. Structurally, people in the community 
gravitated to them seeking services, so the agencies had permanent contact with 
ordinary community members. Logistically, agencies had the resources to gather 
people together –e.g., by carrying out meetings. As one of the interviewees put it, “in 
order to do politics you need to have space and meet”. In that sense, agencies could 
provide the basic resources necessary for people to meet and coordinate meetings—a 
phone line, a meeting room, a meeting table, etc.  
Their increasing visibility in the city made them also become referents of the 
Latino community for outside organizations, including the government. When trying 
to address issues concerning the Latino community in the area, the government, the 
press, and even other private actors went to the agencies. In fact, those agencies and 
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their directors adopted the role of de facto representatives of the community. 
However, some voices question the legitimacy of the role played by the heads of 
these organizations representing the interests of the community.  
 
The political organization [of the community] was very weak. There were 
simply the service-providing agencies, which were always and are now in 
charge of… they played the role of leaders without having been elected by 
anyone, simply because they supposedly knew more the community because 
they ran some organizations that worked and continue working with funds 
from the government and the private sector. (Jorge Inzaurralde, journalist) 
 
 The notion underlying this view is that the leaders of these organizations were 
only interested in getting support for their maintenance and the continuity and 
enlargement of their organizations. Furthermore, the group of agencies had attracted 
people with previous political experience. In particular, some leaders who had had 
political experience in New York City and were used to negotiating urban politics. 
These experienced leaders not only had the ambition to get involved but they could 
also identify the spaces where they could get access to the government. 
 
Those people knew how to move politically, and when they came they were 
triggering all the cylinders of the engine. They were people that in the 
agencies had the capacity to move… and the ambition to do it because they 
were also more “people”. And maybe they viewed the spaces where to get 
into the government. (José Bendicente) 
 
As mentioned earlier, organizations and programs required funding and, 
although funds from foundations and other private donors were sought, it was the 
local government which was viewed as the natural supporter of these programs18. 
From then on, the struggle for funds was a constant in the history of the community 
                                                 
18 The dependency of Latino organizations on government funds is not unique to this sector. According 
to Lipsky and Smith (1989-90), for most nonprofit service organizations government funds represent 
over half of their revenues. 
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leadership. As one of the interviewees graphically put it, “it wasn’t just about 
establishing programs, it was about maintaining them”. 
 These struggles for maintaining programs were often channeled through 
negotiation with local authorities. However, when beneficial results could not be 
reached through negotiations, this network of leaders made their demands more 
public by organizing small but quite frequent rallies. Latino agencies, especially 
schools, had the infrastructure ready that allowed them to quickly mobilize a number 
of people to the street. One of these old guard leaders told me that in the 70s they 
were “demonstrating” all the time, so I asked her to give me some examples: 
 
OP: For example, the Sed Center… they didn’t give us the money, and we 
went over there to make a demonstration so they would give them the 
money… 
GC: And what did you guys do? 
OP: What did we did? Huge scandals, my son… We sent… mostly my 
students who were the ones who went out because I had the people… So with 
what they had we made signs and everything and we went to make a picket. 
Oh… in the 70s, my son, we organized pickets in a way you cannot imagine. 
All the time, all the time… And so we continued that way… and Rosario was 
the cacique and we were the Indians. He said and we went… 
 
 A sequence that went from programs being interrupted because of lack of 
funding or re-started after a persistent negotiation with government and foundations 
gave a sense that most of the political activity in the group of ‘leaders’ was focused 
on the obtainment and allocation of public monies. At the same time the agencies 
were growing, moving a political agenda at the local government started to become 
burdensome for some of their directors who had to split their time between running 
their programs and negotiating with the government. Consequently, agencies agreed 
to create an organism that would be exclusively in charge of the negotiation with the 
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local authorities around issues affecting the Latino community: the Council of Latino 
Agencies. 
 
Mayor Washington was not showing any interest in appointing the 
commission  [that would appoint the director of the Office of Latino 
Agencies]… So then I told Pepe, this cannot continue like this. I mean, all the 
organizations are growing… at the time we didn’t have emails, cells, or 
anything like that…. We couldn’t coordinate anything because we were all up 
in the air duplicating the effort. So I told Pepe, why don’t we establish a 
Council of Hispanic Agencies. And from there the Council of Agencies 
emerged, that is now the Federation of Agencies… I established it in 1977.  
So then that night I called everybody. I remember, all of them were there, 
Ricardo Galbis, Father John of Catholic Center, Richard Gutierrez from 
Ayuda, Pepe Lujan as a member of the community, myself… all the directors 
were there… we were around 10 of us. And I talked to them and said, why 
don’t we make a council of Hispanic Agencies to start coordinating… and 
there the Council of Agencies was born, which lived during all these years…. 
So I said, let’s be the council the one who names the commission, and once 
appointed we terminate the Council… but what happened, that the council 
turned to be a greatly effective political body. (Olga Puglisi) 
 
 Formally, from 1977 onwards, the Council of Latino Agencies was in charge 
of advocating for the member-organizations. The idea was that as a block and with a 
unified voice, the organizations would be in better shape to advocate, lobby, and 
conduct negotiations with different levels of government. However, this unity, in 
reality, hardly existed. In fact, member organizations often negotiated by themselves 
or entered in a more or less direct competition for funds with the Council or other 
member organizations. 
 
Agencies as target of criticisms 
 
One constant that marks the development of the Latino community in the D.C. 
area is the belief that the development and growth of service oriented agencies within 
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the Latino community imposes a constraint for the community’s political 
development. The following testimony is particularly revealing about this 
phenomenon: 
 
I think that unfortunately in our community the political base is in the hands 
of the people that are in charge of social services’ centers. There isn’t a more 
independent political movement. There hasn’t been a type of grassroots 
movement. For some reason way before 1991 the power of the community 
started to be established in nonprofits. People saw that in them there was a 
possibility not only of getting money but also of creating services that didn’t 
exist in the government and that the community couldn’t access…. But by 
those means the base of power was created in them […] People talk a lot 
about the limitations that this creates, because if you receive contracts from 
the government, then how eager would you be to do this type of political 
advocacy that needs to be done and at the same time the fight is always to 
attract resources for these organizations. (Blanca Galindez) 
 
This quote captures an extended perception in the community. On the one hand, 
service-provided agencies, appear to be solving a problem for the government by 
reaching out to a community that the government did not or could not reach. For that 
reason, the local government supported, with ups and downs, the development of 
some of these organizations. On the other hand, these service-oriented agencies are 
problem solvers for the Latino community by providing numerous services needed. 
At the same time, service-providing agencies and their leaders took a vacant place 
and emerged as the “political nucleus” of the community. Given the fact that a 
considerable proportion of the Latino population was undocumented, those 
organizations surfaced as the political voice of those without a voice. However, the 
structural location of most of those agencies (e.g., dependency of contracts with the 
government) constrained the range of political actions that it could pursue. 
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Some of the informants interviewed for this project agreed in that since their 
settlement, service-providing agencies had “marked the territory” and emerged as the 
gatekeepers of Latino organization. Throughout the history of the community, 
however, there had been attempts by some community figures to challenge the 
agencies’ privilege of monopolizing the voice of the community in an ‘organized’ 
manner. Examples of these attempts, which were largely unsuccessful, come from 
both particular businessmen in dispute with social service organizations or from 
immigrants with a high political profile. One of the most radical anti-agencies 
positions was held by a group of Latino business owners, who resented the growth of 
power in the community nonprofits. 
 
It started to enter a thought, a politics and some ideology… that said that the 
agencies were a threat for the community because they concentrated too much 
power, that they were the gravitational weight that formed the time-space in 
the community. And that nobody else could move and that they wanted to be 
the leadership… not only at the level of business but in terms of organizing 
the bases. But that they couldn’t do it with the agencies. First of all agencies 
needed to be destroyed so that…. Trees needed to be cut so that new ones 
could emerge… new shrub could sprout, new thoughts… (José Bendicente)  
 
Another set of defiant voices came from the immigrant community. For 
example, when Salvadorans arrived in large numbers throughout the 80s, those 
among them who had a higher level of education and previous political experience 
began presenting claims stating that they wanted to be leaders of their own 
organizations. “There was that critique that the leaders were mostly Puerto Ricans 
and that now they wanted to be representative of the organizations… they wanted to 
represent the community…” (Hilda Brunetti) 
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The criticisms against the Latino service-providing agencies operating in the 
district will resurface again in the aftermath of the Mount Pleasant riots. These 
criticisms, in turn, reflect historical internal political struggles within the Latino 





As mentioned earlier, much of the community organizational landscape, as we 
know it today, originated from the labor of a pioneer generation of leaders, most of 
whom were Puerto Ricans. Among the latter, Carlos Rosario was the unquestionable 
leader throughout the sixties and seventies. 
 
Look, when Carlos was here the community was less heterogeneous, less 
fractioned, had less differences… When Carlos started… they were Puerto 
Ricans, Dominicans, Caribbeans, and there was a Central American 
community. But the Central American community is a phenomenon from the 
70s only. Carlos started in 51. So Carlos was an indisputable leader in the 
whole community. Up to the years 80… 85, when Carlos died. (Rafael 
Hernandez) 
 
 Although most people active in the community in the 60s and 70s underscore 
the central role that Puerto Ricans had in the community at the time, also visible and 
working for the community in different capacities were people from other 
backgrounds, primarily Cubans, and Dominicans. Referring to this first generation of 
leaders, Vicente Olleros, a long time resident in the area, brought up one element that 
will be key in understanding the differing organizational development in the District 
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and in the suburbs. Because they started their work in a sort of “organizational 
vacuum”, they did not encounter serious obstacles: 
 
They were very effective… because they were not trained by previous 
communities. They were the pioneers. Okay? So then they… many of they 
came from Puerto Rico where the environment is different, where politics is 
hot, and where there is also an absence of massive repression such as the one 
that occurred in Central and South America. So there is more political 
sophistication. There is a level of accommodation with respect to African 
American people, because in the island they already had that experience. 
(Vicente Olleros) 
 
 The idea of tolerance and the capacity to adjust to the socio-demographic 
environment in the city is an important axis on which to evaluate the difference with 
more recent generations of leaders, who, according to the same informant, were 
engaged in more tension with locals because of that. With the arrival of large 
numbers of immigrants from Central America during the 1980s and the resulting 
change in the composition of the Latino community in the region, there were also 
tensions in terms of leadership. Specifically, there was an idea floating around the 
community that because Salvadorans made up the larger group within the Latino 
community, they should have a seat at the table. This idea caused some resentment 
among the directors of organizations serving the community, most of whom, as 
mentioned before, were not Salvadorans or Central Americans. 
 
Many of the organizations there in Washington have been fearful that 
Salvadorans organized themselves because the leadership was not Salvadoran. 
The old leadership was not Salvadoran…. (Julio Cruz) 
 
 This divide and tension came to the foreground when the Mount Pleasant riots 




4.2.3. Political landscape 
 
 
Crystallization of the “Latino issue” in the State apparatus: the creation and 
survival of the Office on Latino Affairs (OLA) 
 
In 1976 the government of the District of Columbia created the Office on 
Latino Affairs (hereafter, OLA). The creation of OLA was the result of the pressure 
from the Latino leader elite to get recognition from the government for the growing 
Latino community residing in the District. OLA’s institutional mission was to serve 
as community liaison among the Mayor, the City Council, governmental agencies, 
community organizations and the private sector. Its mission and scope of action has 
varied over time. In particular, its formal goal was to ensure full access to quality 
health, education, employment, and social services in the district for the Latino 
community. 
 
Rosario went with Vidaña and some friends he had named Chavez… and 
through Congress they got 50 thousand dollars for the establishment of the 
first Office of Spanish Speaking Affairs… that was its name. What today is 
OLA, Spanish Speaking Affairs Office… and their purpose was to work 
inside the government to help, to see how they could help the community. 
That office reported not to the Mayor’s office, it reported to what then was 
HEW, Health, Education, and Welfare (Olga Puglisi) 
 
At the same time they established and pushed for the maintenance of community 
serving agencies in the District, the “founding fathers’ pressed the government for 
permanent institutionalized attention to Latinos. To that end, they engaged in 
lobbying at different levels of government. 
 After OLA’s creation, however, it was chronically marginalized in the 
government structure. For example, numerous mayors in office failed to appoint 
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directors for OLA, a fact that was interpreted by many Latino leaders as a sign of 
disrespect and lack of interest toward the Latino community. At other times, its 
performance was perceived as inconsequential by many sectors in the Latino 
community. For that reason, over the years OLA has been the center of dispute from 
the Latino community side: the recognition given to OLA by the government, its 
location in government structure, and the appointment of its authorities have been 
traditional fields of political struggle. 
 The inefficacy of OLA as a government facilitator for the needs of the Latino 
community in the District was vehemently brought to the public attention by several 
community members and leaders in the course of the Mount Pleasant riots in 1991. 
Some of the issues that were raised in the riot aftermath were that the office had 
disregarded the functions it was supposed to perform—namely, to communicate 
Latino concerns to the mayor’s office and to address the needs of the community—
and had instead been used to fulfill the mayor’s public relation needs; and that the 
creation of a specific office to focus on Latinos’ needs had freed other government 
agencies to disregard Latinos.   
In fact, OLA was depicted as helpless during the weeks that preceded and 
followed the riots. As the Washington Post put it, “OLA, generally ignored by Mayor 
Sharon Pratt Dixon (who has not appointed a permanent director) could provide no 
warning of the brewing trouble and could not dispute the chorus of complaints from 
Hispanic community activists who feel ignored by the D.C. government” (The 
Washington Post, May 16, 1991). One of the strongest criticisms brought up during 
that time—and after—is that OLA was used to co-opt the Latino community’s 
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leadership. In other words, by appointing activists into government positions, the 
mayor(s) in office would be immune from criticisms from this sector. This 
relationship of community leaders and the government will be explored in further 
detail in the following sub-section. 
 
Latinos and the city government 
 
Throughout the history of the Latino community in the district, relations with 
the District government have never resulted in the election of Latinos in office. In 
fact, an expression that keeps coming up in the narratives of many Latinos is that ‘we 
[Latinos] have never been able to elect any Latino in a government position’. 
In the absence of elected representatives from the community in the D.C. 
government, the entry of Latinos in the local administration was often a result of 
negotiations with the mayor or other elected officials to gain special positions ‘for the 
community’. Although many times the appointment of Latinos in government was the 
outcome of community pressure (or, more specifically, pressures from organized 
actors in the community), other times the government itself took the initiative and 
appointed Latino figures to key positions.  
Over the years, several noticeable members of the community have been 
appointed to relatively important positions in the government structure. The argument 
often utilized not only by those aspiring to fill the positions but also by many 
community leaders was that this was a way of giving recognition to the Latino 
community and its contributions—not only to the city in general but, most 
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importantly, to the government in office. The following quotations illustrate a 
defining moment in the relationship of the Latino leaders with the city government: 
the election of Mayor Marion Barry. 
 
In 1979 there was a movement in the community oriented to influence the 
elections of Mayor. And they created a group pretty well organized to support 
candidate Marion Barry. Barry won the election and apparently received 
enough support… both popular and economic support that pushed him to meet 
a couple of times with the community. And they got to have very big 
meetings, 30, 40 selected people, representative heads of agencies, people that 
had something to do… so then the Mayor knew that those who were there 
weren’t inconsequential. So they told him where are the Latinos in the 
government? You need to put them in. And Barry… it’s okay… this wasn’t 
much later than the civil rights movement and there was a follow-up, a trail, a 
wave that was still there somehow… that Nixon, who had set that wave back 
wasn’t in office any more… and he saw that in any event he would have to put 
Latinos in the government. The community was growing at that time. So he 
told them, I don’t know them, I don’t know where they are, you give me their 
resumes… so we can choose from them…. (José Bendicente) 
 
Marion Barry was elected Mayor, he appointed José Gutierrez, José Gutierrez 
took with him Angel Luis Irene, and also took Luis Rumbaut to the 
government. The leadership of the community got drained… because José 
took with him a lot of people to work for the government…. (Olga Puglisi) 
 
The opening of government structures to community leaders was repeatedly 
viewed as co-optation by some of the more politically active Latino leaders or cadres. 
In other words, many ordinary people and leaders in the community believed that by 
appointing some of the most visible and potentially disturbing political cadres in the 
Latino community, the government in office was really trying to subordinate and  
minimize the capacity of disturbance of Latinos as a political group. 
When I asked Ms. Puglisi why the entry of these prominent leaders in the 
government structures at different stages was harmful, Ms. Puglisi’s answer was as 
follows: “Because they were the leadership… they knew that they were activists. 
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When you are in the government you cannot be an activist in the way they had been. 
The community didn’t ‘bleed to death’ but the leadership was gone, it was gone from 
here with them” 
Throughout the years, the relationship between the community and the 
government was tied to the personal bonds that some of these key leaders had with 
the mayor in office. In fact, some of the turning points in the position of the 
community leadership with respect to the local government had been tied to 
personal/political conflicts of some leaders with the mayor. Some of the interviewees 
recall, for example, the public discomfort in the community when José Gutierrez, one 
of the most visible Latinos in the government structure, was fired from the 
government in 1985 after confronting the mayor19.   
All in all, the type of relationship established between Latino leaders and the 
local government contributed to the existence and reproduction of a type of elitism. In 
other words, the politics of the community was resolved at the top level, either 
through the intervention of heads of service-providing organizations who spoke on 
behalf of the community, or by some of these prominent figures (also attached and in 
most cases supported by local organizations) who became part of government 
structures.  
 
History of tensions with government/state agents 
 
                                                 
19 The incident between Gutierrez and Barry occurred after the first one publicly accused the City 
Administrator of attempting to influence the assignment of a multimillion-dollar contract (Washington 
Post, April 26, 1987). 
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 While at the top level of the community, the negotiations with the government 
for services for the community and positions for Latinos –especially for key leaders—
in the government structure were visible throughout the period, at the ground level, 
the interactions that took place between ordinary people in the Latino community and 
government agents were rather combative, Specifically, the way ordinary people 
interacted with the government was through their encounters with agents of public 
bureaucracy, particularly the police. Most of the key informants interviewed talk 
about a ‘history of abuse from authorities against Latinos’.  
According to many, the abuse was rooted in the lack of understanding and 
obstacles to communication, as many of the Latinos residing in the area were not 
fluent in English—and only a handful of police agents in the area were bilingual.  
 
They didn’t want to admit that for a long time we had been asking that in this 
community there had to be more police officers and more attention to the 
community with bilingual police officers and detectives. They never wanted 
to accept that. (Avelina Quinteros) 
 
In addition, some community members and leaders also believed that the causes of 
such tensions with the government had a strong racial component: 
 
Graciela Vallejos: I can tell you that the government of the District has never 
welcomed Latinos…. The opposite… It has been quite resistant. (Graciela 
Vallejos) 
GC: How so? 
GV: Of not welcoming, not embracing the Latino. Very protectionist of its 
African-American government. The idea was a little bit that it has cost us so 
much, here we are, we are the ones who rule, the ones who are looking for our 
interests, and you… what are you coming to ask a place that doesn’t belong to 
you? 
 
In a similar tone, Cesar Barragan, a Latino leader with many years in the area asserted  
that “back then the majority in the city continued to be black. And there was a 
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minority discriminating another minority. People here don’t talk much about that 
because nobody wants… But that is in fact what has occurred. Blacks discriminating 
Latinos…. And there was a clash of forces, the police doesn’t respond… the problem 
of language many times…”  
 The idea underlying many accounts was that there was a juxtaposition 
between state authority and race which operated marginalizing, discriminating, and 
maltreating Latinos residing in the city. Specifically, the prevailing perception was 
one that emphasized the existence of a racialized state apparatus whose tentacles 
injured Latinos in a systematic fashion. 
 
 
For many years a series of tensions have been accumulating with the Latin 
American community, not only Salvadoran, although in its majority it was 
Salvadoran. But in general, any immigrant that had a precarious state had had 
a sort of bad experiences not only with police authorities but also with all the 
tentacles of the system. It was a system that primarily existed to benefit the 
African American community. Because this was at that time the city was much 
more black. The political institutions, the political power was in their hands, 
when they take power, they create a whole infrastructure in face of the needs 
of that community… (Tadeo Ramirez) [italics mine] 
 
According to other accounts, the tensions between the community members and the 
authorities stemmed from historical frictions that some Latino immigrants had had 
with the authorities in their countries of origin: 
 
The Latino communities [in the D.C. area] are in general from Central 
America, and come escaping from authorities, from people wearing 
uniform….” (Nicolas Martinez) 
 
 
 The history of misunderstandings of the Latino community by both authorities 
and ground-level bureaucratic officials were also attributed to an array of cultural 
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differences that exist in everyday practices. In fact, some talk about how regimes of 
legality that regulate everyday life differ in some Latin American countries from the 
United States. 
 
I think there has been a lack of respect from politicians against Hispanics in 
the area of Washington, D.C…. Politicians want to see the status of 
citizenship, how many votes I’m going to get. The community was a young 
community, a community that has just arrived, a community that still didn’t 
have the documents or had the ability to be able to apply for citizenship…if 
they didn’t even have documents. The maltreatments against Latinos by the 
police started…. And you know, Latin American culture isn’t… one can drink 
outside, have his little beer or whatever and that isn’t considered illegal. And 
here it is considered illegal… (Hilda Brunetti) 
 
Although the abuses received by the community from the police are 
overwhelmingly present in interviewees’ narratives, there are also a number of other 
situations in which maltreatments, according to our sources, have taken place. 
Characterized as products of ‘racial prejudice’, abuses in schools, episodes in 
workplaces, and situations in the street were mentioned as well. The accumulation of 
tensions in these different spheres will be the basis, after the riots of May 1991, over 
which the community leadership will request a report on Latinos’ civil rights. 
   
 
History of racial tension  
 
 As has been documented in other places in the U.S., historically there have 
been racial tensions between Latinos and African Americans residing in the 
Washington, D.C. area. These tensions have manifested in an array of everyday 
conflicts in different shared spaces, such as schools, workplaces, or even the street. 
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They usually included fights, including both verbal and physical aggression. These 
conflicts were, in turn, grounded in a series of resentments and prejudices about the 
presence of the other. 
My conversations with people in the area captured several interpretations of 
this phenomenon, which have in common the idea of lack of communication and 
understanding of the other group, its realities, previous struggles, and deserved rights. 
Specifically, both groups, Latinos and African Americans experienced violent 
struggles against some sort of injustice. For African Americans, the recent struggles 
came from the Civil Rights Movement and the various efforts to become to achieve 
inclusion in a series of spheres of social life that were denied to them. For the Latin 
American immigrants in the city, their struggles often came from experiences in their 
countries of origin: wars in Central America, dictatorships in South America, or 
economic poverty all over. In other words, taken as a whole, both groups shared 
tumultuous histories. However, collaboration based on shared hardships was hard to 
achieve.  
 
The African American community says: we scarified ourselves, we moved 
here against “the white” to achieve certain opening and advance certain social 
elements such as improve our salaries, have access to housing, improve the 
school system, etcetera… Where were our people while these battles were 
taking place here? When these battles were taking place here, we weren’t 
here, my brother…. (Sebastian Puentes) 
 
We were in the ghetto… blacks were coming from the civil rights movement, 
and we, Latinos, were entering and that was…. we, Latinos received… I 
didn’t, thank god…but there were beatings every night, in my school, we had 
ambulances and the police coming in every night… and that because our 






Experiences of Collective Action 
 
 For the most part, Latinos as a distinct political category remained invisible to 
the public eye. However, prior to 1991 there had been some instances of protest 
involving the Latino community. Tadeo Ramirez, one of the most prominent leaders 
emerging from the Mount Pleasant Riots, described the general situation of Latinos 
before the 1991 riots as follows:  
 
The social dichotomy was black and white. Latinos still didn’t exist… they 
were like invisible. They had then accumulated so many years of 
invisibility… and also of economic and social marginality, with badly paid 
jobs or living in overcrowded houses, not having any political voice or 
expression, because we didn’t even have documents, right? (Tadeo Ramirez)  
  
In the 1970s, for example, small sporadic pickets were mounted by a small 
elite group of leaders of service-providing agencies. Usually in reaction to a funding 
cut, these demonstrations were often planned with little lead time. The protests took 
the shape of small gatherings in front of an office that was viewed as ‘adverse’ to the 
interests of the Latino community. On several occasions, leaders used their own 
organizations to recruit among their ‘clients’ and bring them with them to the 
‘demonstration’. A common target group for these mobilization efforts was students 
from Latino educational centers. The patterns of organization and the repertoires of 
action utilized in most of these small protests showed little variation despite the 
different cases. All in all, the relevance of these experiences is that they contributed to 
certain institutionalization in the community. In other words, each and every threat 
received from the government (and sometimes from private actors) was read as a sign 
of the vulnerability of organizations that the community (or the community 
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leadership) recognized as their own. As a result, the community usually followed a 
strategy to preserve some organization so as to guarantee its continuity and financial 
sustainability over time. A few cases that illustrate this pattern are, the cutting of 
funds that Spanish Education Development Center (Sed Center) received from United 
Way, the cutting of government funds for the Program of English Instruction for 
Latin Americans (PEILA), and the attempts to close or relocate the office of Spanish 
Speaking Affairs. 
  
In 1974 my bass in the school system called and told me, there is no more 
money for PEILA, the grant is over and we have to close the school until we 
see if we renew the grant. And the school was already growing… I called the 
old man, Carlos Rosario, who was then in the office of Spanish Speaking 
Affairs and told him…look, they are going to close me the school and he said 
mmm… they are not going to close anything. I have just received a 50 
thousand dollar grant from Right to Read for EOFULA, that grant goes for 
your program…. So they don’t close it. The program continued. But then I 
said, we are not going anywhere with this. This program needs to be inserted 
in the budget of public schools. And then the fight started…. (Olga Puglisi) 
 
Another example of community mobilization for collective action is the 
protest following the closing of the Ontario Theater in the Columbia Heights 
neighborhood. As opposed to the top-down efforts led by agency leaders to defend 
the continuity of programs, the collective actions deployed in defense of the only 
Spanish-language movie theater in the city emerged as a result of informal 
coordination among neighbors. Since 1951, the Ontario Theater was well-known as 
‘the only Latino theatre in the city’. Around 1978, all of the sudden the owners 
changed the profile of the theater, removing all the Spanish language films from its 
screens. Almost instantaneously, the Latino community took to the streets to preserve 




There was a mini-movement in the 70s… in what is now a bazaar more or 
less…. In the corner of Ontario and Columbia Road… it still has the sign on 
top that says Ontario… from when it was an immense theater. The Ontario 
Theater had 2000 seats or something like that. It was the biggest theater, I 
believe, the largest movie theater that existed in Washington… luxurious, it 
had been very nice. And there was a moment in which the neighborhood was 
run down and before this demographic change… they started showing Latino 
movies… Charros and churros mexicanos, the leap against the leprous… and 
movies… every now and then some interesting movie, and you wondered how 
could this one get here… but things like that… like Mr. Calimán, a Latin 
American superman… things like that, movies without major importance but 
that were in Spanish, and then people came to the movie theater… So the son 
of a landlord from the neighborhood, who was already older and had his own 
business and a store on 18th, bought the theater and suddenly decided that it 
was the moment to change the neighborhood. He started with Fritz the Cat and 
something like Rolling Stone, and started having programming with Punk 
groups and stuff like that, which completely changed the thing. So he installed 
one of those lights Hollywood style which goes up to the clouds, for grand 
openings and those things… and there was a truck full of those types of things 
in the little corner of Ontario and Columbia announcing coming now…. And 
he clashed terribly with the Latino community which saw with that an 
announcement that… you go, get out of here; this is now a neighborhood for 
different type of people, from a different level. And the muddle got started. 
There were demonstrations in the cold, a terrible cold weather at that time; it 
was December or January… (José Bendicente) 
 
During the demonstrations, people gathered in the streets and played instruments, as a 
way to show the attachment to their cultural symbols. In fact, one of the participants 
of the demonstrations described the Ontario Theater protest as a “Latino Festival in 
December”.20 Another community member commented that there was a “flavor on 
the streets”, referring to a marked Latino undertone in the cultural-political struggle. 
 
 
                                                 
20 The Latino Festival is an annual community celebration that has been celebrated in the Latino 
neighborhood of Washington, D.C. since 1970. The festival not only was a place where the Latino 
community was enjoyed dance, music, and typical foods but also a site of political struggles within the 
Latino leadership (given the symbolic power associated to being in charge of the organization of the 
event). An in-depth study of the event can be found in Cadaval (1998). 
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4.3. The event’s aftermath 
 
4.3.1. Attribution of threats and political opportunities 
 
The Mount Pleasant Riots was a significant turning point for the Latino 
community partly because of the ways the various actors directly or indirectly 
involved in the riots and their aftermath constructed opportunities for political action. 
In this particular case, the political opportunities were attributed by a number of 
collective entities easily identifiable in the scene: unorganized members of the Latino 
community, constituted political actors enjoying routine access to government agents, 
agents of the government, outside political actors (i.e. allies from other jurisdictions), 
and the media. The shooting of a Salvadorian resident by a police officer was the 
attack which ordinary people residing in the area collectively read—and reacted to. 
The sequence of “readings” and subsequent actions adopted by other actors both 
inside and outside the Latino community resulted from this singular event and, 
especially, the element of violence present in it. The ways in which different actors 
read the opportunities for action were in many ways simultaneous as well as 







Ordinary people take to the streets: from a perception of a threat to the 
externalization of anger  
 
Reading the shooting of Daniel Gomez by a black police officer in Mount 
Pleasant as a threat, neighbors from Mount Pleasant as along with angry Latino 
youths (following McAdam et al.’s classification, persons and groups not currently 
organized into constituted political actors) took to the streets. Their actions in the 
streets were both intended to and conceived by others as a direct challenge to the 
authorities. Specifically, the riots were seen as fights against police agents—
perceived as continuous perpetrators of abuses against Latinos. However, and most 
importantly, the engagement of sectors of the community in violent acts caught the 
attention of local government officials, who read the riots as a challenge to the public 
order which, in turn, put their own legitimacy up for debate. The question is, then, 
how and why did the residents get involved in these actions? Why, in a matter of 
minutes after the shooting, did they come out onto the streets of Mount Pleasant? 
Why was the story that “the police had shot and killed a handcuffed man” so 
powerful? And how and why did the rumor spread so quickly? There are several 
elements embedded in this rumor that when combined, operated as the primary 
trigger. For this reason, they are worth dissecting and reviewing separately: 
a)  The shooter was a police officer. Latino immigrants residing in the area had a 
long history of confrontation with the police. In fact, most of the 
interpretations circulating soon after the shooting stated that the incident was 
not a surprise but reflected an established tradition of lack of communication 
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between Latinos and the police, which was further exasperated by language 
barriers.  
b) The victim was dead. The fact that the man had been killed represented no 
second choices and operated for the group as the limit of what was tolerable. 
Even when the media broadcasted the information that the man shot was 
actually alive, most neighbors refused to accept it. Rumors that Gomez had 
died became so pervasive in the Latino community that the police had to ask 
Gomez’s sister to announce publicly that he was still alive and being treated at 
the Hospital.  
c) The victim was in handcuffs. Having one’s hands tied represents the ultimate 
inability to defend oneself. In this particular situation, the oppression and 
injustice of the shooting was maximized by removing any argument that 
would potentially justify the police action. Most people would agree that it is 
unreasonable under any circumstance to kill a defenseless man. Moreover, the 
importance that “the hands” have in immigrant communities also adds greater 
significance to that element of the rumor. The victim of the shooting was, as 
most of the Latino immigrants residing in the area, a manual worker. Their 
hands, in many respects, define their relationship to the world. As one 
immigrant present at the meeting with the City’s CRCB clearly asserted, “All 
this violence is because of misunderstanding… because we don't speak the 
language. We try to explain with our hands. They (police) just take out their 




When they shot that individual it was like… they had attacked everybody with 
a sword… in their heart… You know what that means? And above all, 
because it was the police. For them that meant the same as a soldier in El 
Salvador, the same as a military in El Salvador. It was too big an offense, no? 
So to me that was what it meant. Kids, youths, and people in their twenties 
were already too tired, too exhausted and hurt by all what was going on… 
(Avelina, head of a community agency).  
 
Having read the shooting as a direct and unacceptable threat, Latino residents 
of Mount Pleasant and surrounding areas rapidly took to the streets. According to 
several witnesses of the riots, the outburst of the community was spontaneous and 
fast. 
 
It happened that an inexperienced policewoman shot a drunk man of 
Salvadoran origin in a predominantly Latino area. Consequently, all the 
people who were in their houses, looking through their windows, rose and 
without any organization, spontaneously expressed their discomfort with the 
city. In a way that we are very skilled in Latin America… Making barricades, 




As this last quote shows, there was a neighborhood quality to it that facilitated 
the rapid mobilization of Latino residents. Things were happening right outside 
people’s houses. Events could be seen through their windows. In addition, everybody 
was talking about it in the neighborhood grocery stores, bakeries, barber shops, and 
other places of everyday encounter. There was no need for an invitation for 
mobilization. Things were happening just very close to people’s lives.  
Because the intense deployment of occurrences located at the initial moments 
of a historical event has a significant impact on the way in which the political process 
evolves, the early reading of the threat and the perception of the need to do something 
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about it were critical for the actions adopted later on. Also critical was the immediate 
reaction in the community and the use of violence.  
 
 
Why use violence? 
 
 There was nearly unanimous agreement that violence was the key ingredient 
needed to mobilize the Latino agenda. With the violent acts, the attention of the 
government agents and agencies that had long ignored the problems in the Latino 
community was finally awakened. The repertoire of actions deployed from throwing 
rocks, to setting cars afire, to smashing windows, put the “Latino issue” at the core of 
political discussions at many levels of government as well as in the forefront of media 
coverage. The Latino issue had become “the” most important public problem to be 
addressed in the city. As one long term Latino resident in the city stated, “What got 
finally established is that through violence you can capture attention from the 
government so they [the agencies] can then start providing certain services.” 
 This attention, however, not only came from the government and the media, 
but also from the group of established Latino leaders—mainly, the directors of 
service providing agencies—who had long been discussing and trying to seek public 
attention to the community.  
 While the demonstration of anger could have adopted many shapes, the 
protesters ended up utilizing violent means. The question then goes, why was 
violence central to the protest? Among the arguments I found during my fieldwork 
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one of them highlighted previous experiences among immigrants from Central 
America. Specifically, many of those who intervened directly in the acts of violence 
in the streets of Mount Pleasant in May 1991 have had a dense political background 
which included conflictive relations with authorities in their countries of origin. 
Those experiences, according to some of the testimonies gathered for this research, 
might have impacted their relationships with the police once in the U.S. Additionally, 
these experiences might have shaped the violent repertoires adopted in the riots. 
 
 
I think that the biggest difference was that people were coming kind of much 
closer to their militancy. […] many of the people who were coming had been in a 
militant frame in El Salvador or wherever else they were coming from but 
primarily from El Salvador.  And so they had those identities much more intact. If 
you look at the photographs or you listen to the kind of framing, it was a 
very…tactical.  It wasn’t a riot in the kind of more American sense; it was a riot 
in the Latin American sense.  In the sense that there were people who were 
mobilized and people who weren’t mobilized and people who had a sense of 
tactic and others who didn’t [….] there was an organized underpinning like 
people who had been involved in street demonstrations and street destructions in 
Latin America, particularly in El Salvador as part of the struggle, you know and so 
it just wasn’t like an organic explosion of people who were angry.  It was some of 
that and it was also some people who knew how to make something happen.  And 
I think that for some of the Latino leadership, most of whom actually are not from 
El Salvador, that they didn’t really have the framework to understand what was 
happening […] there was a lot of urban…tactic and people who know how to 
make a Molotov cocktail – they know that you take the cars out.  They know that 
you come in and you come out.  You know, that kind of thing. (Elizabeth 
Mederos, a director of a Latino agency) 
 
The familiarity that Central American immigrants had with violence is also 
graphically depicted in the following quotes: 
 
This was a spontaneous thing that emerged from the base. And someone threw 
the spark in a field that was already dry or maybe wet but with gasoline. And 
the thing was set in fire… Puf! Let’s go do it… Well, this one is doing it; I do 
it chiqui chin… and where you go… It was immigration a little different 
because those were people who came from Central America, who had seen the 
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civil war up close. And it wasn’t strange to be fighting against tear gas or 
painting graffiti, direct action in the street, breaking windows… well; those 
were small things in relation to what they had live. But for some reason that 
caught fire and suddenly the leadership were looking at how to control this 
and how to put themselves in front of this. And how to establish an order… a 
level of dialogue and negotiation with the government. (José Bendicente, a 
long-term community resident) [italics mine] 
 
There was here in Washington a community fairly experimented in issues of 
war, because former militants from one faction or the other were here. That 
is, for them the construction of Molotov bombs and those sorts of things was a 
matter of minutes… and they set afire buses, police cars… I mean, there was 
plunder; they were there… (Tadeo Ramirez, an emerging leader in 1991) 
[italics mine] 
 
Previously, people who came… and with a reason, they had to be 
understood… they made themselves heard in their countries, burning buses, 
painting walls, using weapons. And here, those same people… many of them 
came fleeing the war… they were in the guerrilla… and there were ordinary 
people as well. So here they had to unite in that context guerrilla and ordinary 
citizens. But that was still infiltrated. Guerrilla elements were still infiltrated. 
To the extent that they even investigated us… detectives of the FBI…. 
Because they thought that we were part of the guerrilla (Cesar Recalde, a 
priest working with the Latino community) [italics mine] 
 
As can be seen from these testimonies, aside from the aversion against some 
authority figures, the availability and knowledge of contentious repertoires as the 
ones utilized in guerrilla wars in Central America may have had a direct impact on 
the types of performances utilized the nights of May 5th and May 6th in Mount 
Pleasant. 
 
Community leadership attributing opportunity to move an agenda 
 
The most prominent group within the larger group of constituted political 
actors with regular access to government agents and resources, was the cluster of 
leaders of service providing organizations who held a pivotal position between the 
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city government and their clients. These Latino organizations and their formal 
political arm, the Council of Latino Agencies, had a tradition of discussing policy 
priorities and resource allocation with different city government administrations. 
Although they had had a history of struggling with government official for resources, 
they knew which doors to knock on. They had access to higher level offices in the 
government often up to the level of mayor. Most of the leaders of these organizations 
were respected by both the Latino community and by members of the city 
government, who saw these organizations as indispensable in reaching a community 
they knew very little about. 
The Mount Pleasant Riots spurred these organizations and their leaders into 
action. The public disturbances were loud enough to awaken the leadership and make 
them take a closer look at what was happening in the Latino community. They also 
presented an opening for community leaders to get attention from government 
authorities. Tadeo Ramirez, who was just emerging as a Latino community leader 
when the riots happened confirmed that there were Latino issues that had been 
overlooked or ignored: 
 
The events of 1991 gave the community leadership of the moment the 
opportunity to get into an introspective process to see what was happening in 
our community and well… this is an opportunity to persuade city authorities 
that we feel marginalized, that we do not have representation, so then we 
started a process of diagnosis, that is, what is going on in the area of health, 
what is going on in the area of education… and to promulgate a series of 
recommendations so that the administration would start to deal systematically 
with a spectrum of issues […] So then while the community was suffering that 
maltreatment by the police and continued to host a sense of being 
marginalized, the leadership was also looking at how to take up this 
opportunity, in order to persuade a black leadership that many times was not 
sensitive to our needs and was ignorant of what was going on with us and 
sometimes it was even hostile, characterized by racial prejudice. 
 
 129 
Maltreatments in schools, episodes with workers… (Tadeo Ramirez) [italics 
mine] 
 
That [the riot] was an opportunity for those of us who had been working in the 
community to see which were the needs, listen to the frustrations and the 
reality that the government was not responding to the needs of the people who 
lived in this area…. (Hilda Brunetti, head of one of the Latino agencies). 
 
 
The riots offered an opening for the old guard leaders to push an old agenda 
that that had not seen movement in many years. Specifically, in 1986 there had been 
an attempt to improve the living conditions of Latinos in the city in a variety of areas. 
Although the attempt stalled in the 80s, it constituted an invaluable antecedent for the 
actions undertaken in the context of the riots of 1991. Community leader, Tadeo 
Ramirez explained the agenda in more detail: 
  
This wasn’t the first attempt of working with the government. In 1986 there 
had been a similar process in which for the first time this group mainly 
directed by Puerto Ricans, and a few Cuban Americans presented what was 
then called the “Latino Agenda”. In 1986… we had worked with the 
administration that was very open… it was the administration of Marion Barry 
and it started a process to reform and institute new procedures that would help 
the Latino community to be better served by the government services in a 
number of areas.  (Tadeo Ramirez) 
 
Several community referents put together a report in 1986, which according to 
one prominent community member, “did not differ much” from the report prepared in 
199121, after the Mount Pleasant Riots. Moreover, some informants define the 
original 1986 reports as the readily available platform that would be reintroduced in 
as a blueprint for the 1991 policy reforms. The speed with which the traditional 
                                                 
21   After a few months of preparation, the D.C. Latino Civil Rights Task Force, an entity formed after 
the event (we will address the formation of this actor in the next section) submitted a report to city 
officials “calling for channeling city money, jobs, housing, and educational, health and other services 





leadership was able to intervene, and the clarity of demands posed to the government 
and to private funding organizations later on, was only possible, I argue, because the 
Latino leadership had already prepared, developed and pushed an agenda for public 
intervention. This helped the Latino leadership in 1991, frame the riot immediately 
(regardless of whether the conflict per se was related to the issues raised by this 
agenda) and appear as the “natural” interlocutors for government officials. 
The traditional leadership, which were primarily  directors of community 
organizations, as well as the emerging leadership utilized not only local government 
structures as spaces in which to push their demands, but also federal instances of 
power, such as the U.S. Congress or the U.S. Commission on Human Rights. They 
sought out allies from other jurisdictions and support from beyond the local 
government in order to pressure the local authorities into promoting change. Although 
this created tension with local authorities (mainly African Americans), who read 
Latinos utilization of indirect routes as shortcuts around their power and legitimacy, 
this strategy of creating networks outside the local community constituted a critical 
piece to push the Latino Agenda. 
Although the Latino leadership was quick to act, there were different 
perspectives on how to make the best use of the opportunity created by the increased 
attention gathered by the government, the media, and the community at large for the 
problems affecting the Latino community in the city. In this respect, the biggest split 
within the community leadership occurred between those leaning towards the 
adoption of a more aggressive approach against the city (i.e., proposing suing the 
government), and those privileging a more negotiated exit to the problems (i.e., by 
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seeking the opportunity to gather more public resources to fund Latino oriented 
services). The following testimonies illustrate the rationale underlying the 
justification of the more confrontational line of action: 
 
I have always thought… that that was a fault… that we have failed, period. 
The leadership have failed in not suing the city… we did not need an incident 
in the Mount Pleasant, it is not necessary. It is necessary to simply document 
the faults… the violation of civil rights, the discrimination… and it is easy… 
well, not easy, it would take work but I believe that it would be very feasible 
to place a lawsuit against the city, for lack of participation in the electoral, 
economic, political processes… the marginalization of the community… That 
is, yes, there are many people that criticize Pedro Aviles and others that were 
involved in the Task Force… for not having done that in spite of the fact that 
they had the money and law firms that were willing to do it… and I don’t 
know why they didn’t do it. That has been a long term fault of us. I believe 
that part of the reason is that much of our leadership comes from the 
community agencies, no?... which depend to a great extent on government 
grants to be able to function…. And much of the leadership fears losing that 
money… if they get involved in something like that… but I think it is a 
misplaced fear…. We should do it…. The black community, black activists, 
African Americans, have always functioned in that way… Place a lawsuit…. 
Let’s negotiate, yes… but in the meantime let’s place a lawsuit and the lawsuit 
will continue its course. It is a different front of battle, I think…. a front of 
battle that we weren’t able to use. (Esteban Gorostiza, a long time Latino 
leader). 
 
With the Task Force Pedro focused so much in developing and maintaining an 
organization that instead of focusing on the report, which are the 
recommendations of the report… yes, they sought law firms because all the 
law firms, everybody wanted to help us to be in the portraits, and to get 
publicity as you can imagine… And there was no lawsuit against the district. 
What lawsuit existed…? They couldn’t find people who would be willing to 
sign to take legal actions against the police, against the system of education, 
there weren’t any people who would want to be the plaintiffs to make the 
case. We were in Ayuda, with all the clients who came… look, sir, would 
you…? No, Madam, I don’t want to get involved in this. There was such 
passivity that there was no success. There was, yes, a report that documented 
that the city was not responding to the needs of the Hispanic community. 
There was success in the sense that there existed that report, that that was 
documented. But in fact before the Latino Civil Rights Task Force, there was 




So from there the Latino Civil Rights Task force emerged in the city… and 
they brought the National Civil Rights Commission which is a powerful 
entity. They conducted a hearing, and some people went to testify and others 
didn’t because… in my opinion it declined a little because the agencies did 
not want to put… did not make a big lawsuit against the city […] The 
Commission on Civil rights came and documented the thing. And if you look 
at that document, it is hot! And there should have been a suit of hell with that! 
And I don’t know why there was no lawsuit, and there was a series of lawyers 
involved and so on… but there wasn’t the impact that could have been. 
(Cecilio Reverte) 
 
 Adopting the confrontational approach—that is, suing the city government—
was, according to many community leaders risky. First, there was a practical issue: 
How could they bite the hand that was “feeding” them? In other words, how could 
they maintain the programs and organizations if the government adopted a hostile 
political attitude as retaliation for the Latino leaders’ actions? The second issue was 
philosophical. Many people held that the ultimate goal of the community agencies 
was to deliver services that the government could not and/or would not ever directly 
provide to the members of the Latino community. As Roberto Couto, a community 
referent for many years, stated: 
 
The raison d’être is to provide… The argument that was given after the 
disturbances was that the city was neither prepared nor disposed to provide the 
services to the community. So there was a requirement of social services […] 
Fundamentally every political event and every political act in all that period 
was made with the conscience of the leaders of those agencies of getting more 
funds or resources so that their agencies could provide services….  (Roberto 
Couto) 
 
 This philosophy of service argument prevailed, and it defined the 
development of actions and strategies adopted by the community political actors who 
managed the transition and negotiations following the Mount Pleasant Riots. I will 
elaborate more on this dispute and how the community leaders and organizations 
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resolved their actions in the following section, devoted to the examination of social 




The media, not only the Latino media but more importantly the mainstream 
media, placed critical attention on the community as never before. For several weeks 
the events in Mount Pleasant made headlines in the local newspapers and appeared as 
a central news piece in television news programs as well as a topic of discussion in 
radio shows. This media attention turned what had been a Latino community issue 
into a District-wide concern that occupied the attention of the city. As the story 
proved to have legs, news about the incidents of Mount Pleasant was picked up and 
broadcast through media outlets all over the world, showing international audiences 
what was taking place in the heart of the US capital. The incident in Mount Pleasant 
had become a serious public issue. 
Even as the riots were ongoing, the role of the media was publicly discussed. 
According to an article in The Washington Post, media members were concerned for 
their own safety while covering the events in Mount Pleasant. Given the violent 
nature of the disturbances, local media journalists, cameramen, and photographers 
were at risk. This sparked an internal discussion in the local media in terms of how 
far reporters could go to get coverage, without putting themselves in danger. 
For government officials, the media itself had become central in the creation and 
continuation of the event. In other words, by covering the incidents live, the media 
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were accused of increasing the magnitude of the disturbances. In fact, according to an 
article in the Washington Post, “Dixon and her aides skirmished with area's news 
media yesterday [May 7th 1991], attempting to sharply limit their coverage of the MP 
[Mount Pleasant] disturbance area during last night's curfew” (The Washington Post, 
May 8th 1991). The Washington Times, the same day reported that “journalists said 
they are walking that line as best they can, covering the story aggressively without 
contributing to its outcome.” Furthermore, the mayor's office attempted to limit 
coverage, allowing only a limited number of reporters the area under closely 
controlled police escort. However, most major news outlet executives ignored these 
rules, and found alternative ways to get the story. In particular, many of them 
broadcasted from privately owned roofs in the area.  
 
The local government response 
 
One of the most meaningful immediate results of the riots was the change of 
attitude of the local government with respect to the Latino community. The violent 
and, at moments, apparently uncontrollable eruption of events within the 
predominantly Latino area of Mount Pleasant forced the mayor and other local 
officials to focus their attention in “the Latino problem”. 
 During her time in office, then Mayor Sharon Pratt-Dixon had been notorious 
for neglecting the Latino community. This was well-documented by the Washington 
Post. “Dixon had ignored requests to meet with members of the Commission on 
Latino Economic Development since January, reinforcing the perception in the 
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Hispanic community that the city wasn’t listening.” (Washington Post, May 11th 
1991). Another indicator of that lack of attention to the Latino community in the city 
is the fact that Mayor Dixon had not appointed a permanent director for the Office on 
Latino Affairs. 
In the course of riots, the mayor’s attitude remained ambiguous. First, she 
neglected to recognize the level of seriousness the incidents warranted. On the first 
night of the riots, Mayor Dixon chose to monitor the situation from her home. Only 
after evaluating the damages produced by the riots in person the following day, and 
having conferred with the city council members and her top aides did she become 
more involved in the situation, In an attempt to regain control after her initial 
missteps, Mayor Dixon established two goals: in the short run, try to resolve tensions, 
and in the long run, bridge the gap between the Spanish speaking population and the 
English speaking majority. These changes from the local authority indicated a real 
possibility for introducing additional reforms regarding the conditions of the Latino 
residents in the District. They also reflected the immediate opportunities created by 
the violent disturbances of Mount Pleasant. 
 
When there were the disturbances this community has fought a lot. It is true 
that we got recognition at the local level of the government of Washington and 
other local governments as well. There have been disturbances. There have 
been dead people. There have been murders. Here the police have killed 
people. We had told this to them in their face. The same way as I am 
interviewing with you I have been debating with people from the City Council 
in Washington, we have interviewed with the president of the local council, 




 However, for many Latinos government officials’ initial actions also revealed 
the lack of knowledge that those officials had of the Latino community, which 
constituted nearly one tenth of the total population in the district. 
 
The government had no idea of what was going on. Sharon Pratt-Dixon had 
recently been elected as mayor. She became notorious for a phrase she told an 
African American young woman… ‘We didn’t have a clue’, she told her…. 
We didn’t have any idea that that was going on in the African American 
neighborhoods, which left many people thinking then…. So how is this mayor 
going to solve the problems in the neighborhood? But if she didn’t have any 
clue on the African American neighborhoods, much less did she know what 
was going on in the Latino neighborhood (José Bendicente) 
 
 With respect to concrete actions taken, Mayor Dixon agreed to form a 
commission to study the causes of the disturbances and acknowledged that her 
government had not done enough to solve the crisis in the Latino community. Aside 
from imposing a curfew and adopting a series of measures in order to pacify the 
residents, she started meeting with other government officials and Latino leaders in 
order to define an agenda. As a result, the mayor decided to create a commission 
whose mission would be to improve the relations between Latinos and the city 
government. In addition, the mayor commited to asking the members of her cabinet to 
work in such improvement.  
 It has been reported that part of the reason the mayor was showing special 
interest in finding solutions to the Latino problems had to do with the alleged fear that 
the conflict would expand to the African American community residing in the city. In 
an evident effort to minimize the racial tensions that could be triggered by the Latino 
protests, Mayor Dixon referred to the similarities between the Latino struggles and 
those faced by African Americans in a speech she gave at Howard University on May 
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11th, Specifically, she called on the African American community to understand the 
frustrations faced by Latinos, which had led to the outbreak of the riots. 
 All in all, this change in attitude from government officials and, in particular, 
in the mayor, would be crucial for the Latino community., As a quote from the 
Washington Post graphically puts it, “with no more votes or dollars, they [D.C. 
Latinos] remain dependent on their relationship with the Dixon administration.” 




4.3.2. Social/organizational appropriation 
 
This section will identify and explore the factors that contributed to and those 
that hindered the social/organizational appropriation process. During and after the 
riots Latinos constituted themselves in a challenger group both by utilizing existing 
organizations and by creating new ones. To explore this process, it is necessary to 
disentangle the various aspects that compose the concept of “Latinos”. It is especially 
critical to take a closer look at the ways various constituencies appropriated political 
space; specifically ordinary people (as opposed to subjects organized politically), 
organized political actors in the Latino community with ties with the government 
(especially, organizations that provide services to the community) as well as newly 
formed political actors.  
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Almost as soon as the shooting occurred, community members began to take 
action. Leaders of established community organizations as well as other prominent 
figures in the community intervened immediately on the scene, in the literal sense as 
well as in the political sense by claiming the right to act as political interlocutors. . 
The Mount Pleasant Riots were significant in that they allowed community leaders to 
claim the right to be a part of the political process by the virtue of the fact of their 
long term presence serving the community. In addition to the existing actors and 
organizations, the community created an ad hoc political organization, the DC Civil 
Rights Latino Task Force, which stepped in to negotiate with the local government as 
well as to fundraise for the community. This new political space created by a shooting 
in the community, and the shared anger of ordinary people was quickly captured by 
larger organized structures. From that point onwards, the community’s ire was 
channeled from street-level violence into conventional negotiations and lobbying 
strategies. These post-riot organizations would impart a notable mark on the political 
profile of this Latino community for years to come. 
 
In what follows, I will review the involvement of ordinary people, the role of 
service providing agencies in the process, the significance of the D.C. Latino Task 







The neighborhood got agitated: how ordinary people got involved 
 
 Unlike many other public mobilizations, the Mount Pleasant Riots started as a 
spontaneous gathering of people in the streets of the neighborhood. A few people 
came out to simply see what was going on. Some came out to nonviolently protest the 
treatment of the Latino community, and yet many others came out with the intent to 
express all their rage at years of injustices.   
 With an elevated degree of frustration already in Mount Pleasant, ordinary 
people did not need to be organized or prepared to take to the streets when the 
Salvadorean manual laborer was shot by a police officer in their neighborhood. They 
were only too aware of the level of discrimination they faced from city 
authorities/agents. Most residents in the District viewed Mount Pleasant as ‘the’ 
Latino neighborhood in the city. The attack to a Latino worker was, for many Mount 
Pleasant neighbors, conceived as an attack to the Latino community as a whole.  
 According to local newspapers, the involvement of neighbors in the event was 
immediate. A large crowd formed minutes after the shooting. Although the  police on 
the scene summoned reinforcements to disperse the crowd, the situation was out of 
control from the beginning. As the violence escalated, residents from high rise 
buildings poured into the streets, and in no time, “hundreds of people surged into the 
street, throwing bricks and bottles at the police” (The Washington Post, May 6 1991). 
 The massive presence of neighbors in the streets did not take long to form, 
and neither did the escalation of violence that ensued. The sheer number of people in 
the streets served to make a statement on the reality that Latinos were facing in the 
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city, and the violence that followed highlighted the frustration and anger that many 
people in the community were experiencing in their everyday interaction with the 
tentacles of the local bureaucracy. These displays of anger, were further articulated 
when organized political actors entered the scene. In particular, the Latino service 
providing agencies and their leaders would play a critical role in making a political 
point by raising the level of discourse, by interpreting the sources of problems 
embedded in the riots of Mount Pleasant, as well as articulating an agenda of 
necessary reforms to guarantee the inclusion of this growing community in a number 
of areas. The leaders of these organizations ended up being informally “chosen” by 
the local authorities as the privileged interlocutors to negotiate solutions to the 
“Latino problem”. 
 
Role of Service Providing Agencies 
 While the presence of so many ordinary Latinos in the streets of Mount 
Pleasant, and especially, when so many of them began engaging in violent activities 
played a critical role in attracting the attention of local authorities to the Latino 
community, it would be the more visible figures of the community who would claim 
the representation of the Latino community as a whole and fully articulate the needs 
of the neighborhood. Of primary importance was the role played by the leaders of 
service providing agencies as well as leaders with certain visibility in the community, 
such as Latinos appointed in the local government, teachers, journalists, and priests. 
In a sense, whereas ordinary people, and especially Latino youths, played a critical 
part in opening the gap for a potential political transformation, organizations and 
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traditional leaders would be readily available to seize an opportunity to control the 
posterior stages of the event. These organizations and their leaders constituted the 
visible face of the Latino community in the eyes of government officials, and they 
were generally well known by Latino residents.  
 
From the moment the riots occurred in 1991… I live two blocks away from 
where the riots took place. We got together… a group of people in the 
neighborhood who were linked to the organizations or that had done some 
type of work. We were a group of about 15 to 20. So we went and stood in the 
street and we made a blockade in the street between the police and the youths. 
And we maintained that for a long time while we tried to lower a little bit the 
pressure and from there a group of 3 or 4 of us went to negotiate with the 
police and the mayor on how to work with… first of all, calm people down, 
and from there work on resolutions in relation to the complaints that existed in 
the community…. Police related, et cetera. (Blanca Galindez) 
 
Another leader present at the site of tension also expressed a similar story: 
 
What we [the heads of Latino organizations] demanded was to meet with the 
police, meet with the mayor and inquire about what had happened […] We 
were trying to see how we could… not fix… but how we could talk and open 
a dialogue with the community… of how that had happened… why it had 
happened… and what the government was going to do, what the city would 
do, so that this would not happen ever again, no? And what the police and the 
mayor would do with the community so that it would be heard, so that there 
would be more communication, no? So there were like two… the way in 
which I saw it at the time in which I participated, my part was to try to calm 
down the people. Because, you know, people would come here [to the clinic], 
they wanted to know what was going on, why this was happening… and that 
was our role here inside our organization, right? Go to the radios, go to the 
TV, and talk and say what was going on, why it was going on, and that we 
wanted to open the communication with the government, that the best thing 
we could do was to stop the violence… that violence with violence, there is no 
way to fix anything that way… but that what would indeed be possible is over 
time make a lawsuit, make a difference, and make the changes in this city, no? 
Other people were more in charge of the political part, of meeting with the 
mayor and demand certain things, no? Each of us, without the need of having 





As the previous quotations suggest, the heads of community organizations 
quickly entered the scene and assumed the following two roles. First, they tried to 
calm the community by being present at the riots and by utilizing various channels of 
communication such us the agencies themselves, and different media to try to 
dissuade them from using violence. Second, they negotiated with the local authorities 
on a range of measures to create a sustainable peace,. No other agents could have 
taken on these two roles. In other words, the heads of the community organizations 
were immediate central players in the aftermath of the riots because of their direct 
connection with ordinary people in the community and their relatively easy access to 
government offices. 
There were, however, several critical voices in the community with respect to 
the role played by the leaders of service-providing agencies. 
 
With no organization, with very weak political organizations. There were 
simply the services agencies, those who ran and currently run the service 
providing agencies who adopted the role of…. who played the role of leaders 
without having been elected by anybody, simply because presumably knew 
more the community because they ran organizations that operated based on 
government and private sector funds. So those same directors that have been 
for years taking the role of leaders in the moment of confusion. One of a few 
authentic leaders emerged as well, for example Mr. Pedro Aviles, although in 
a way he was manipulated by the leaders… no leaders, the “agencieros”, who 
were pursuing their own interests… for their agencies and were trying to 
defend their small kingdoms…. (Jorge Inzaurralde) 
 
For some reason that caught fire and suddenly the leadership were looking at 
how to control this and how to put themselves in front of this. And how to 
establish an order… a level of dialogue and negotiation with the government. 
(José Bendicente, a long-term community resident and a prominent figure in 
the community) 
 
This idea of control achieved by simply being ahead of the process opened by the 
riots reflects the place that the old guard played in the aftermath of the event. As 
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mentioned earlier, although the organizations did not start the incident that captured 
the attention of the city authorities, the public and the media, they did intervene 
quickly and were very effective in controlling the following stages of the political 
process. 
 
[The events of 1991] demonstrated the tremendous need for an organized 
expression in the [Latino] community. The most important element in this 
event is that it opened the door to develop instruments so the community 
would have a voice and eventually vote. That it had an organized presence, 
although obviously, the bulk of the population was Salvadoran, immigrant, 
and that community for evident reasons of immigration law and etcetera 
remained at the margin. In my opinion it demonstrated the great need to create 
forms of organization… The great contradiction was that the same instruments 
that were created were not political… In part because the population did not 
have the right to vote. There were the social service organizations …. [The 
1991 riots] was a civil rights type of movement. But in a moment in which the 
civil rights period had ended in the country. It had been co-opted precisely 
through the complex of organizations that provided social services. So that 
was the great contradiction because while the leadership that mobilized and 
participated in the Mount Pleasant riots was trying to organize the voice of the 
community… the leadership was occupied by the heads of the agencies, who 
by definition were limited in their political horizon […] Any mobilization that 
would take place was very limited by the economic needs of the agencies that 
by definition could not participate in political activities. What was necessary 
then and continues to be now is the formation of alternative organizational 
structures beyond the shield of social agencies. (Roberto Couto) 
 
The importance of this quote resides in the fact that although their access to 
authorities and other important actors in the private and philanthropic sector placed 
the cluster of service providing agencies at the center stage of the initial negotiations 
and actions aimed at finding solutions to the emerging “Latino issue”, the agencies’ 
role also contributed to the minimization of the “challenging” quality of the Latino 





The D.C. Latino Civil Rights Task Force 
 
Two days after the incidents started in Mount Pleasant, Mayor Sharon Pratt 
Dixon announced that she was forming a task force aimed at improving the relations 
between the city government and Latinos in the District. This Multicultural Task 
Force, as it was called, was borne out of the post-shooting community violence. It 
was constituted after Latino leaders complained to the mayor that “the rioting in 
Mount Pleasant reflected the city’s failure to address a number of issues affecting the 
Hispanic community, including the problems of homelessness, unemployment, poor 
access to health care, a high rate of alcoholism and a lack of bilingual officers in the 
Metropolitan Police Department” (Washington Post, May 9, 1991). However, a 
second group with similar membership was created immediately after “because 
participants said they did not want to be considered as serving at the mayor’s 
pleasure” (Washington Post, May 10, 1991). This second group was called the D.C. 
Latino Civil Rights Task Force. As a result, two groups were constituted in the 
immediate aftermath of the riots: one created and led by the city government, and the 
other one conceived by the community as an autonomous instrument to move an 
agenda of reforms. 
 
 
In that moment there was a change, a displacement of the old guard… Sonia 
Gutierrez, Marina Felix, who has already died, Casilda Luna, who is still 
alive… Doctor José Gutierrez, who was a public official. We made him part 
of the Latino Task Force because we invited everybody… it was a very broad 
effort. We called all of those who were Latino government officials who also 
participated, some of them protecting their jobs, because they were appointed, 
designated by the mayor. And sometimes we required more from them. But 
they also helped a lot from their own perspective, with what they knew. Many 
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of them took the opportunity to help us. So they played an excellent role… So 
in order to prepare that agenda we also had… also the mayor allowed… sent 
all her people to work with us. She made her parallel task force, she made a 
committee, and some of us participated in both. The majority participated in 
both to take there our perspective but also to maintain our independence and 
be able to prepare something. We prepared a blue print, the Latino blue print 
(Julio Cruz, a community leader). 
 
Soon after being formed, the Latino Civil Rights Task Force became the scene 
of disputes between the old guard and the emerging leadership within the Salvadoran 
community. The conflict, which was framed in terms of nationality, was also 
generational and reflected a dispute between insiders and outsiders22.The Task Force 
had become the field on which the difference between those who had certain routine 
access to government agents and resources (also known as the old guard) and those 
subjects who had emerged as a challenger group in the middle of the riots but who 
were not yet constituted political actors. This tension was the most salient divide in 
the community and had a direct impact on the ways in which the community at large 
capitalized on the opportunities produced by the riots in the long run.  
 
When the Salvadorans arrived, because they were so many, they got into the 
Latino Civil Rights Task Force and so on… and they adopted the position of 
‘we are the majority, so we are the leaders now’. They did not take into 
consideration that they did not know the history of the community, they did 
not speak English, they weren’t American citizens and they didn’t know the 
system. All of us, those who were the leadership said, fine, you are the 
majority, you do not want our help in anything, we retire. All of us retired. In 
fact, José Gutierrez, who was elected, because there were popular elections to 
elect the members of the Task Force and so on, was elected to the Task Force, 
and started to get resources, and I remember that he got something in the area 
of health, and he went to the Task Force to tell them. Look, I got this for blab 
la bla… someone stopped him and told him, okay José, great, but you cannot 
be in charge of that because you are Puerto Rican, you are not Salvadoran and 
                                                 
22 The divide insiders-outsiders with respect to civil society organizations and/or networks usually refer 
to the attitude toward the official process. While insiders are usually favorable to cooperation and 
participation in government structures, outsiders usually engage in challenging strategies (see, for 
example, Korzeniewicz and Smith 2001) 
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this has to be Salvadoran. And José Gutierrez said ah…, and then left. […] So 
the Salvadorans wanted to take over, take over…. Down the drain! Because 
they didn’t know the system, they weren’t citizens, they didn’t have access 
and access is power…. And who had the access? We did. And we still do. 
(Olga Puglisi) 
 
 The members of the old guard had not always enjoyed the condition of 
insiders. As we saw in earlier sections, it took these traditional leaders a long series of 
struggles with government authorities to gain recognition as “the faces” of the 
community. As Olga’s previous quotation signals, however, the group’s awareness of 
such privileged condition, referred to as “being part of the system”would eventually 
be utilized as a tool to demonstrate strength in the power struggles within the 
community. 
The broad membership of the Task Force was a source of tension that would have 
repercussions on the political positions present and create competition from within. In 
particular, the presence of directors of agencies would be a matter of debate. 
 
After all, the Latino Civil Rights Task Force, which didn’t last for much 
longer after, was integrated by the directors of agencies as well… because that 
was the political formation that had taken place in D.C. So I believe that there 
did not exist a durable formation that could root politically. Everything 
developed, I believe, in function and around the agencies which were the 
islands around which the community established itself. We didn’t get out of 
that model, we didn’t… (Roberto Couto) 
 
The debate concerned not only the role of agencies in the task force but also—and 
more importantly—the character that Latino politics should adopt in the city. Two 
main positions emerged in the city: one embedded in –or attributed to—the agencies, 
which would be linked to the provision of services to the community and which, in 
turn, would push for contract negotiation and lobby to get resources to enhance and 
improve the quality of those services; and two, a more radical position that put them 
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in direct confrontation with the Old guard, which promoted the development of 
political mobilization and organization within the Latino community. This last view 
advocated youth empowerment and elevating the level of other disadvantaged groups 
in the community. 
 
Different sectors [participated in the Task Force] because the viejitos (old 
men) were also involved. That is, the directors of the agencies that served the 
community were at the table discussing the needs of youths, the needs of the 
elderly, the needs of women, the needs of students. In this case these people 
were professionals, very well known in the matters in which they worked. 
And of course, many of them were directors of the agencies that provided 
these services. On the other hand, there was another sector, I would say much 
more militant, that weren’t representing the sector of agencies that provided 
services, but were representing a sector that had a sort of political 
consciousness and which looked this new space for the popular participation 
in the articulation of their problems and their solutions. And many of them 
worked, I believe, in those times for groups of solidarity who came with a 
vision a lot more… We had internal debates on how to mark a political 
presence beyond the provision of services. That is, if the Youth Center 
determines that there is a scarcity of opportunities, of extra-curricular 
activities for youths and we get that, is that all we want? Or is there some 
method of organization and community mobilization that will allow us to have 
political power not only today but also in the short, median, and long run. 
(Tadeo Ramirez) 
 
The prevailing direction that the internal debates in the Latino Task Force adopted 
would be reflected in the preparation of the Latino Blueprint, a thorough study of the 
needs of the community, which resulted in the creation of several organizations and 
the development of platforms of policy agendas for the city with relation to the 
treatment of Latinos. According to several people who participated in the Latino Task 
Force, the blueprint was their most important development. Some also view this 
document as the crystallization of the service-oriented approach. The political 
struggles within the Latino leadership in the aftermath of the riots will be examined in 




Internal Debates in Latino Leadership 
 
The riots of 1991 gave the Latino community leadership, both the old guard 
and the emerging figures, a chance to discuss the political profile that the community 
as a group would adopt. In general terms, two main positions could be distinguished 
in the debate that occurred within the D.C. Latino Civil Rights task force: one radical, 
and one conservative. However, interestingly, most members of the so-called old 
guard, when I interviewed them for this project, expressed the belief that “the fight” 
could have been taken even further and that the community fell short in posing its 
claims. No one would admit compromising especially with the government, when in 
reality, that is exactly what happened. Talking about the direction taken by the 
community referents, and in particular the task force in the aftermath of the riots, José 
Bendicente, a long time community figure described the situation in the following 
terms: 
 
GC: Although there were marked differences in positions, the community 
agreed upon a common agenda of demands, right?  
JB: It [The Blueprint] was written and then stored in a drawer… that is the 
difference… that is the institutional-bureaucratic response. The thing has to be 
taken to a different level…. With meetings, and analyses and blah blah 
blah…. And that takes away, steals all content of mass mobilization. All 
content of something more political beyond an initiative in the sense of ‘we 
expect the response from the director of public works on what he would do 
with respect to the place where the trash accumulates’. Those are problems of 
organizational detail. If there is a broad political problem that generates that… 
that is something different […] 
GC: The task force was formed and came up with a series of 




JB: Consensus was achieved at the level of particular meetings within a 
chapter. Then we will ask for 3 people here or 5 people in an x field of 
government… or we will request a space for 3 or 6 months…. But that is 
administration, that is not politics. That is not a movement that would change 
the relation of forces. Those are the details of accommodation…so as the 
process unfolds it loses its content… the original impulse… it becomes an 
administration of details. 
 
 Dealing with bureaucracies and requesting responses from the administrative 
apparatus of both the state and private foundations was clearly seen as one of the 
political lines to follow. Surprisingly, this line of action stands in the prevailing 
discourse about the Mount Pleasant aftermath as contrary to a more promising 
direction that could have invested more effort in community empowerment through 
“political work”. In other words, dealing with bureaucracies is generally understood 
in these arguments as distracting from the “real work” that the community owed to 
itself. In part, this suggests more autonomous work would have strengthened the 
community capacity, rather than relying on its already visible faces to negotiate 
improvements and acquire benefits from ‘outside’ in a number of areas.  
 
We had… I tell you this because I was elected to the Latino Civil Rights Task 
Force… and there was a foundation that gave us $300,000 to do certain things 
that required a lot of paperwork and very narrow goals… to do something that 
wasn’t in line with the reality that we were living. So then a professional 
mentality of community work developed…which I do not think should be at 
the core of community mobilization. It does not have to be through… there 
must be professionals who support… but they should not be dictating what 
should be done. There should be people capable of writing something, but 
there should be a political conscience, community conscience… In that sense, 
sometimes philanthropic organizations require individuals to produce written 
reports. That’s what universities are for… to study the situation…. We did it 
at certain moment […] but you cannot limit the community work to the 
preparation of studies. (Julio Cruz) 
 
Although the political mobilization perspective was brought up by several 
participants in the Latino Task Force, as well as community actors outside the Task 
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Force, that road was never taken. In fact, in the few moments in which opportunities 
of mobilizations could have been created, the community never showed a capacity for 
mobilization at the grassroots level. According to some Latino figures interviewed, 
the possibility of sustainable community political development was hindered rather 
than helped by community leaders, who treated clients as their own bastions. When I 
asked Roberto Couto, one of my interviewees, why this position that needed 
grassroots-level political development did not prosper, he related it to the caciques-
type role that the leaders of organizations played in the community. 
  
You want to organize my clients… No! I organize my clients… because the 
number of clients I have will determine the amount of money we will receive 
from the foundations or the government. (Roberto Couto) 
 
 Another reason for the limited success of the community political 
development perspective emphasizes the framework often appearing in the Central 
American political cadres. According to this view, those who could have led an effort 
to organize the community in order to create a stable ‘grounded’ political actor did 
not know how to play the game according to the rules in the US..  
 
We also tried to look at ourselves. Internally, we had a discussion on how to 
create a political entity that would give us power. And I believe that in that 
area we failed in part because we lack the experience of the technique of 
community organization in the United States. Although the goals are the same 
in every part in the world…. Because ultimately what one wants is more 
power, no? But there is a technique of community organizing that many of us 
did not know at the time. And because we came from another culture, from 
another form of doing things, many of us didn’t have the political experience, 
and when we had it, it was very different. Many Salvadoran activists had had 
a revolutionary experience, weapons. A paradigm very different from the one 
here. Democracy, pluralism, and on top of that they are a minority…. And 
there were conflicts… Blacks have political power, we don’t. So I think that 
we didn’t know how to create the instruments, because in that moment there 
were no citizens’ forum… which exists in every county… there is an 
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organization at least one of volunteers. There wasn’t something like that here. 
(Tadeo Ramirez) 
 
Although this view might partially explain why the community did not embrace 
grassroots development as some expected, it is precisely this alternative political 
paradigm—based on previous experiences in their countries of origins—that placed 
Latinos at the center of the public sphere in the first place. In other words, the street 
struggles with public authorities, the utilization of hand-made weapons, and violent 
tactics is what caught the attention of the authorities. It is this repertoire of tactics that 
put the Latino issue in the public agenda—at least for a few weeks. It is true, 
however, that beyond the initial moments of the riots, the Central American 
community members lost leadership of the event. It was the presence and rapid 
response of powerful old guard actors within the community who had the ability, 
resources, and access to key decision-makers that allowed them to step in front of the 
unorganized masses and take the lead. 
 
All those people [the directors of agencies and community political figures] 
had contacts within foundations…. The thing is that the contacts that had been 
useful to obtain funds and provide services… direct services, not something 
more educational or more political, which would have required more activism. 
So they used their contacts, but many people came to us as well. Resources 
came to us, tremendous resources, the church supported us “de pe a pa” 
[meaning a lot]. The Catholic Church was with us, the Protestant Church, the 
Episcopal Church that is huge here… many churches helped us out (an elected 
member of the Latino Task Force) 
 
The structural location of community actors with routine access to powerful 
actors in the government and the philanthropic sector was critical in the route taken 
by the collective action that followed the riots. However, it was the way in which 
these actors operated at the time of and right after the riot, utilizing the 
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traditional/contained means of claim-making (meeting with government officials in 
order to negotiate resources for the community, aiming at strengthening the structure 
of services of the community, requesting funds from the private sector, writing 
proposals, using the media, and especially talking about services) that reinforced the 
path adopted by the community. This path, in turn, consisted of strengthening a 
landscape and a structure of power that was already established within the Latino 
community in D.C.  
 
 
4.4. Innovation in the public sphere: the formation or redefinition of a political 
actor 
 
As mentioned earlier in this work, the notion of innovation used in this 
research can be broadly defined as the introduction of something new into the 
political sphere. More precisely, the concept of innovation, as used here, refers to a 
type of collective action that “incorporates claims, selects objects of claims, includes 
collective self-representations, and/or adopts means that are either unprecedented or 
forbidden within the regime in question.” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 7) 
The riots of Mount Pleasant of May 1991 constituted an episode of mixed 
contention—including both contained and transgressive components. Following 
McAdam et al.’s characterization of contentious politics, contained contention 
assumes that all parties are previously established actors employing well-established 
means of claim-making. Transgressive contention, on the other hand, “consists of 
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episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims when at least some 
parties to the conflict are newly self-identified political actors, and/or at least some 
parties employ innovative collective action.” (McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001: 7) 
When we look at the actors intervening in the Mount Pleasant event and the actions 
that were deployed, we can easily notice the presence of well-established and well-
connected actors in the Latino community utilizing routine tools of claim-making—
specifically, groups of agency directors and government officials with access to 
centers of decision making—as well as an unorganized group of residents—mostly 
immigrants—emerging as a group making claims in the name of a Latino identity. 
This section will be devoted to examining the impact and limitations of the formation 
of a new identity-based political actor within the Latino community as a result of the 
collective interactions launched immediately after the violent events of Mount 
Pleasant. The main questions I address in this section are as follows: Did a new 
political actor emerge within the Latino community as a result of the political 
interactions initiated by the riots in Mount Pleasant? If so, what were their features? 
What factors limited their scope and sustainability? 
In order to determine whether a new Latino political actor emerged as a result 
of the Mount Pleasant riots, we must first clarify the attributes that define a political 
actor. In the perspective I adopted in this work, based on McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 
(2001), political actors are operationally defined as arrays of persons--and relations 
among them--with an internal organization and links to other political actors with 
substantial continuity over time. Based on this definition, the question can be 
reframed by asking to what extent Latinos residing in D.C. were able to organize 
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themselves into a single entity, in a way that would allow them to speak with one 
voice (despite internal differences), maintaining a relatively stable structure, and 
being conceived as an interlocutor in local politics by other constituted actors. In my 
effort to try to answer these questions, though, I encountered different interpretations 
of what a political actor is. In other words, many of my interviewees emphasized the 
‘political’ aspect of the actor by relating it to the ‘politicization’ of the bases. In these 
interpretations, the political quality of Latinos would develop only if there the 
ordinary people in the Latino community were politically empowered and if these 
ordinary people were mobilized as a way to have a noticeable impact on local 
politics. 
 The section is organized as follows. First, I analyze internal aspects of the 
constitution/re-constitution of Latinos as a political actor—in particular, I examine 
the changes and continuities in leadership, as well as the internal competition and 
actual scope of two approaches in dispute--namely, community empowerment and 
service provision. In particular, I analyze the organizational strengthening of the 
community. Following, I review the actor from outside, focusing on the increased 
visibility of Latinos as political actors and its impact in both the racial paradigm 
embedded in local politics as well as the formal system of political representation.  
 
Community leadership: a change within continuity 
 
At first sight, the Mount Pleasant riots showed the emergence of a new 
leadership that reflected the characteristics of the Latino community (primarily in 
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terms of nationality) in its current make-up. There was, indeed, a change manifested 
in the appearance of new faces, mainly of Central American descent, intervening and 
negotiating on behalf of the Latino community.  
 
I believe that every time that one of those situations take place there is always 
a change in the local leadership. There is an opportunity for change in the 
local leadership. In 1991 that was very clear. It was really a moment in which 
there was the opportunity for a group to take power. And what you saw in the 
task force was to some extent those people who felt a little bit marginalized, 
who were younger, and had not been in the place of being able to negotiate… 
(Blanca Galindez) 
 
However, for many voices in the community, this slight modification in 
visible leadership did not represent a radical enough transformation in the power 
structure of the community. In fact, there was a relatively broad consensus that those 
who actually made the decisions regarding agenda in the riot aftermath were the 
directors of service-providing agencies. An exploration of the chain of events that 
followed the riots provide more clues to understand the phenomenon in which, both 
arguments contain some truth.  
Given that the Latino population in the District was overwhelmingly 
composed of residents who had emigrated from Central America, there was an 
increasing feeling this new leadership had to be Central American—in particular, 
Salvadoran, which was the largest minority within the community. This need was 
rapidly noticed by the long term activists in the community, who were trying to find a 
way to make the most of the opportunities presented by the disturbances. This was the 
context in which Pedro Aviles, a Salvadoran resident in the area who had grown up 
under the tutelage of senior community activists, emerged as the visible face of the 
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community after the riots. The truth is that “Hispanic activists chose him to lead the 
D.C. Latino Civil Rights Task Force” (Washington Post, June 2 1991).  
After being elected as leader of the Latino Task Force, Pedro Aviles rapidly 
acquired a high profile—aside from being seated at the negotiation table across from 
local government officials and other public authorities, his name was constantly 
featured in the main newspapers in the District in the weeks following the riots. Of 
particular significance is a move that Aviles made on behalf of the Task Force 
requesting that the mayor recognize the Latino Task force as “the body representing 
the interests of the Latino community” (Washington Post, June 2 1991). This request 
constituted an attempt to centralize authority—although in a different way from the 
one in which the community authority had been concentrated until then. As 
mentioned several times in this work, the community authority had been largely 
exercised by the heads of service organizations, even after those same organizations 
had created the Council of Latino Agencies, which was supposed to be the political 
arm of the Latino nonprofits in the District and, for that reason, the political actor 
negotiating on behalf of the Latino community at large. The formation and profile of 
the Latino Task Force, on the other hand, was an effort to create a more legitimate 
political actor. Backed by the mass mobilization during and after the riots the 
constitution of the Task Force was an attempt to conform a body that directly 
represented the community and whose members would be directly elected. This 
legitimacy contrasted the oligopolistic representation of the agencies embedded in the 
work of the Council of Latino Agencies. In other words, it is one thing is to represent 
“people” and another thing to represent “agencies”. In this dispute alone, two models 
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of representation were at stake: a corporate model that for years had prevailed in the 
community was now juxtaposed and would eventually be overshadowed by a model 
of direct pluralistic representation. 
But despite these attempts to shift the political board, these changes were 
constrained by several factors. Not only had these leaders been ‘chosen’ by the old 
guard to give a new and more representative face to the community collective voice 
after the disturbances, but the new leadership was still to some extent guided or even 
obstructed by the established community leadership. 
 
A young Salvadoran man, with a society, the American establishment, the 
media, everything opening to him…. was not capable of taking distance and 
follow a path of protest, of advocacy, and pressure in support of the positions 
of a community against…. He let himself be swallowed. (Rafael Hernandez, a 
longtime community resident) 
 
Efforts of coalition, of creating structures have been made, but they always 
fail because there are people putting obstacles… (Tadeo Ramirez) 
 
The argument made by some of the members of the old guard was that although ‘the 
Salvadorans’ aspired to become the new heads of the community, they did not have 
the resources that members of the old guard had—language, citizenship, knowledge 
of how the system worked, and most importantly the connections and relations they 
had established over years of work in the city. In addition, the heads of service-
providing agencies had know-how in their respective areas, so when the direction of 
the claims was finally framed in terms services, their role in the political process was 
even stronger. 
 
I think particularly the first three years [following the riots] were very 
important, sort of a visible organizing coming together of very large numbers 
of people, mobilizing to be part of that kind of community political process.  It 
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didn’t, it wasn’t sustainable for lots of reasons.  And that kind of died out.  I 
think the immediate pieces were around funding, 
unfortunately…unfortunately that funding for nonprofit organizations…and I 
think very quickly, like in a matter of four or five years, […] the impulse from 
the riots had been incorporated into, recuperated I’d say into kind of the 
nonprofit dynamic.  Funding and services.  Unfortunately. (Elizabeth 
Mederos) 
 
 All in all, from the Mount Pleasant riots emerged new visible figures in the 
community who were not attached to the organizations in leading roles but in many 
cases had previously done some work in the community at a grassroots level—
working as community organizers or in activism. Some of these leaders had, in fact, 
brought to the table a more political approach—proposing, for example, that they 
concentrate more on advocacy, community organizing, or political development. 
Some of the members of the old guard even supported this approach in theory. 
However, at the end of the day, the most visible outcomes of the political efforts that 
followed the riots would be the strengthening of the nonprofit sector, which, in turn, 
revealed the prevalence of the ‘service provision’ approach. 
 
Community organization and empowerment 
 
The events of May 1991 constituted a moment in which the Latino community 
mobilized in large numbers and acquired a visible presence. In fact, it is “the” 
milestone in the political history of the community. The question then becomes, was 
that mobilization translated into a renovated political organization in the community? 
In order to answer this question, the narratives of the different figures of the 
community interviewed for this research suggest looking simultaneously at the 
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prevailing approach utilized in the efforts adopted by the leadership right after the 
event as well as the actors intervening in those sequences. The numerous descriptions 
I encountered about the impact that the riots had on the articulation of the community 
as a political actor usually refer to two competing and, to a great extent, mutually 
exclusive approaches: the first one focusing on community organizing and the second 
one focusing on providing services. Whereas the first one is framed in terms of 
community empowerment and ‘political subjects’, the second one is defined in terms 
of social needs and clients. Those who saw the context created by the riots of Mount 
Pleasant as an opening that should have been followed by an active work of 
community organizing and people empowerment tend to agree on pointing out that 
such a line was drowned in the strength of the service providing advocates. 
 
You had a moment where you had a very visible mobilization and the 
potential for a large membership base, platform, and organization that could 
really drive for political change and power, and access that then becomes a 
process in which a small identifiable number of elites negotiate with the city 
for resources that are constructed as essential service resources rather than 
economic justice resources. (Elizabeth Mederos)  
 
However, some efforts were made in the line of community organizing and 
empowering. These efforts were particularly significant in the work of the Latino 
Task Force and, although this line would not be as visible as the strengthening of the 
“service-providing apparatus”, it did have some in the immediate aftermath of the 
riots. 
 
Look, the work in the beginning… we had a tremendous activism. We formed 
task forces, civil rights committees in all the Washington metropolitan area. 
We went to the suburbs, to the different municipalities… Fairfax, Herndon… 
We went to spread information to all the festivals…. to guide people on what 
was going on. We monitored what was happening in terms of civil and human 
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rights violations. And we denounced when it was necessary. We were with the 
media at all moment we needed to do things. We monitored and organized, 
organized, and organized. But the staff ended up staying stuck in research. 
And we would fall in such a ridiculous activism that there were folks doing 
research on the yellow pages…. In the past we used the money to do, to 
form… we organized a Latino congress each year in which everybody 
participated… and people came from everywhere to denounced what people 
were feeling. And people would come to propose ideas to solve those 
problems… (Julio Cruz)  
 
 For some Latino leaders, one of the biggest problems that led to the vanishing 
of the organizing line was the failure to achieve a sustained contact with the base. Part 
of it was attributed to the apathy of the community to continue participating in the 
structures formed after the fever of the riots had calmed down. In particular, the 
failure in developing a sustainable and grounded political vehicle for the Latino 
community in the aftermath of the riots is partially attributed to the lack of 
involvement of ordinary people in the Task Force, which, as a result ended up being 
poorly attached to the bases.  
 
The Task Force also increasingly losses strength because Latinos are… you 
have to take into account that it is an immigration of first generation so the 
roof is the main thing, right? Many of them come from countries were the 
leaderships have left very deep traces in their families, so they don’t want to 
be involved in politics, they don’t want to know of leaderships. So they 
concentrate in looking for jobs, and working. (Jorge Inzaurralde) 
 
 This lack of involvement of ordinary people in the political life of their 
community was in many cases due to both the fear provoked by their lack of legal 
status, and also to the absence of an active political work of civic education and 
organization that would encourage and facilitate their participation. 
  
The lack of legalization, on the one hand, the fact that the majority of that 
population comes from rural areas in Central America and then it is not used 
to the whole urban phenomenon and how to conduct themselves in the new 
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socioeconomic coordinates. And also the fact that there was no vision or 
priority to really educate them… (Roberto Couto)  
 
The failure of the community empowerment line of action is, then, 
characterized as the combined product of the weakness of the political strategy 
adopted by the leadership and the lack of engagement observed in the population, in 
part due to the precarious immigration status of many of the residents. More 
important than that, however, was the role played by the nonprofit sector whose 
actions favoring the providing of services would make this one the prevailing 
approach in the political strategies deployed by the Latino organizations speaking on 
behalf of the community. We will cover this extensively in the following subsection. 
 
Services versus empowerment? Agencies blocking community political development 
 
One of the elements that emerged clearly from the interviews I conducted  
was the notion that although the riots of Mount Pleasant presented an opening for the 
community to introduce a unified actor with certain weight in the negotiation of local 
policies, there had been no real political development in the community in the sense 
of empowering the base and establishing a powerful political organization. As a 
result, even if there were one Latino voice that grew louder after the riots, this one 
was largely centered on organizations that did not heavily rely on the support of 
ordinary people in the community (who were not largely engaged in the actions taken 
after the riots). In particular, this situation is specifically attributed to the type of 
participation adopted by certain community actors—specifically, the leaders of 
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community agencies, who, according to this view, were more interested in protecting 
and expanding their own businesses rather than empowering the community. 
The DC Latino Civil Rights Task Force was meant to be an instrument 
specifically for community needs and problems, and was constituted as a democratic 
organism, whose leaders were elected in open elections within the community. 
Although the Task Force was effective in setting an agenda for reforms that would 
benefit the community (crystallized in the blueprint), and a promising vehicle through 
which the community could have a presence in the political sphere, its work and 
development would soon be jeopardized by established organizations that saw their 
power affected by the growth of such independent force. 
 
[The Latino Task Force] vanished over time because the agencieros 
themselves saw with displeasure that many of the funds went to an 
organization that wasn’t theirs. So within them [some] would put obstacles 
attempting to capitalize such funding for their organization. So there is a very 
thorough underground struggle within themselves for not supporting…. 
Frontally supporting but surreptitiously obstructing the work and funding 
which is the most important thing for the task force. (Jorge Inzaurralde) 
 
 Some community political activists even view the formation of the Latino 
Task force as a problem in itself. In this view, the institutionalization of the fight 
translated into the creation of an organization which deactivated the political potential 
of the moment for the community. 
 
The Latino Civil Rights Task Force was formed, but the problem was 
precisely that another organization was created. And this organization had to 
compete with the other organizations that were providing services to get 
funds. We organized everything, everything… But instead of adopting a 
political strategy of organizing the community politically, we formed another 
organization that would supposedly be the spokesman on the needs of the 




 A similar phenomenon occurred with respect to the Council of Latino 
Agencies, an organization originally created as the political arm of the agencies. 
According to an informant from the Council of Latino Agencies, this organization 
was very sensitive to the agency heads’ individual interests. Specifically, these 
agency directors used the agency as an instrument, but other times they cut 
themselves off. The reason is that because they are trying to get funds for their 
organizations they prefer not to be seen as doing advocacy. 
The link between the perceived capacity of service providing organizations 
and the lack of political presence of the community at large has to do with the special 
characteristic of the Latino community. As mentioned before, this community 
includes a large number of noncitizens, who cannot vote or participate in the formal 
political system, and who have a number of other limitations that locate them at the 
margin of a number of social fields. Because they are obviously attached to a partial 
interest—namely, the growth and continuity of their organization—these service 
providing organizations have been visualized as not necessarily pursuing the general 
interest of the community. In other words, while their work in the community is 
broadly recognized as extremely relevant, their role in politics would not necessarily 
reflect of the common interest of Latinos, even when they have traditionally acted in 
their representation. 
 
The organizations have done an excellent job, but in their areas…sometimes 
at the expense of the global growth of the community. But it is not necessarily 
their fault. I believe that they have done what they have to do so that their 
institution could serve the population they were serving. But that has 





In any event, the perception is that the only ones who “won something” with 
the riots of Mount Pleasant were the agencieros (heads of service providing 
organizations). These agents are depicted as moving by pure economic interests 
which did not necessarily overlap the general interests of the Latino community at 
large. Many community members agreed that after the Mount Pleasant riots the 
community did not gain political power. In this widespread view, it was the leaders of 
service organizations who were able to increase their political power, crystallized in 
their ability to negotiate with different entities, and whose success was reflected in the 
construction of onerous buildings. 
 
The agencieros took advantage of this situation to make themselves heard and 
to be able to lay the foundations of their base, which in the long run translated 
in buildings, in very well established organizations. We have the Youth 
Center, Centronia, La Clinica del Pueblo, Carecen… all of them worked 
before in skanky rooms or offices, and are now respected entities within the 
community. (Jorge Inzaurralde)  
 
In this zero-sum logic, the gains achieved by community agencies and 
reflected in those buildings implied a loss for the community at large. The idea 
implied in this logic is that there is a divide between agencies and ordinary people in 
the community. Therefore, following this argument, when agencies achieve gains for 
their organizations, these gains do not necessarily mean an achievement for the 
community at large.  For some people in the community, however, the Mount 
Pleasant riots indicated a crisis of a model of representation that had functioned for 
years, since the organizational capital of the community was developed in DC—that 
model is the one in which the old guard, largely composed by prominent figures that 
in the way of caciques took for themselves the representation of the community.  
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However, in practice, although there were some shifts in the leadership that in the 
aftermath of the riots took on behalf of the community, the power of the old guard 
was not substantially affected. In fact, it was quite the opposite, they controlled and 
profited from the following developments of the political process opened with the 
event (see section on strengthening of service providing agencies). 
The lack of an active strategy of community organizing and political 
mobilization is broadly attributed to the action of so-called leaders in the course of the 
Mount Pleasant events. However, although the agencies profile and actions in the 
aftermath of the riots are usually perceived as blocking the community political 
development, there are also voices that emphasize the fallacy involved in expecting 
agencies to be the ones directly in charge of such mobilization. The reason is that 
there is an internal contradiction in such expected behavior from the agencies, given 
that by definition they could not participate in political activities. 
 
I don’t believe that the organizations have to be the ones mobilizing the 
community, developing the community politically. I don’t believe so… 
because there is a conflict for many organizations. There is a conflict because 
in order to sustain your organization, you depend on money… that “they” give 
you funds to maintain your organization. And if you go to a foundation that 
believes in I don’t know what… in the policies of so and so, they can’t find 
you politically against them because they take your funds away. And the 
advocacy is not the same as it was when these organizations were formed. 
And it is that honestly I think there was a change in the organizations. I think 
many are already established and happy and that’s it. (Hilda Brunetti) 
 
 Again in this quote, the assumption is that the institutionalization of the 
community (understood here as the formalization of practices in established 
organizations) deactivates its political potential by creating new constraints to the 
actions that these organizations can engage in. These limits, in turn, emerged from 
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compromises adopted with other actors from which they depend financially (mainly, 
the government and foundations). In particular, this quote alludes to the fact that the 
political potential present when the agencies were created (back in the seventies) and 
fighting for their funds and resources but also for other issues concerning the 
community, was less promising in the nineties. 
 Although there had been attempts to organize the community—for example, 
through the Council of Latino Agencies—those endeavors were frustrated by the 
position of agencies who viewed the Latino population exclusively as “clients” and 
not as political subjects. 
 
[The Council of Latino Agencies] has a structure that replicates the model of 
an agency of services. It has its board, its executive director… the board was 
composed by the directors of the agencies that were members of the council… 
and by definition had the power of veto.  The great contradiction…. We 
wanted to utilize that entity to start organizing people, to empower them… 
And immediately a conflict took place with the board. Because they said no, 
‘the people are my clients’. There was a big struggle, a big division. It was 
never possible to… the main reason why there is no political cohesion or a 
political will or a political projection is because the model is competitive in 





During the years that followed the riots the Latino nonprofit sector23 in the 
Washington area experienced a remarkable growth, both in number and size.24 
According to the Urban Institute’s National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS), a 
                                                 
23 Latino nonprofit organizations are conceived as organizations whose missions explicitly concentrate 
on Latino population issues or have a history of primarily serving the Latino community (based on 
Cordero-Guzman 2005). 
24 A more detailed diagnosis of the size, scope, and profile of the Latino nonprofit sector in the 
Washington, D.C. metropolitan area can be found in Cantor (2008). 
 
 167 
national repository of 501(c)(3) organizations that file with the U.S. Internal Revenue 
Service,  the number of Latino organizations filing Forms 99025 rose 150 percent 
(from 30 to 75) between 1991 and 2005.26 Of all the Latino nonprofits active and 
filing Form 990 returns in 2005, 46 percent were created during the 1990s. 
Additionally, the combined total annual revenues of Latino nonprofits in the D.C. 
area increased 569 percent (from $13 million to $87 million) from 1991 to 2005.27 If 
we add to this the wide array of organizations that are not required to file tax returns 
with IRS, such as the multiple churches operating in the district, we can presume that 
the size of the nonprofit sector serving with Latinos is today quite extensive. 
This jump in the creation of new agencies coincided with the increase in 
Latino migration during that decade and with an upsurge in the visibility of Latinos in 
the area that occurred after the riots of Mount Pleasant. It is fair to assume, then, that 
both the creation of new organizations and the consolidation of older ones suggest the 
existence of an increase in the availability of funds for social programs targeting the 
Latino community during the 1990s and an effective effort to appropriate those funds 
by heads of organizations serving the Latino community.  
 It is interesting that the organizations tend to be associated with their heads 
and with their buildings. There is a sort of symbiosis between organization, leader 
and building. From this equation, people in the community ascribe certain power to 
each of these units. Nearly everybody I interviewed is aware of how many millions of 
                                                 
25 Only nonprofit organizations with more than $25,000 in annual gross receipts are required to file 
Form 990 with the IRS. Consequently, small organizations that do not complete Form 990 are not in 
the dataset and were not included in our analysis. 
26 From the Urban Institute National Center for Charitable Statistics Core File (Public Charities, circa 
1991 and 2005). 
27 From the Urban Institute National Center for Charitable Statistics Core File (Public Charities, circa 
1991 and 2005). 
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dollars compose the budgets of each of these organizations, and this information was 
brought to my attention several times when talking about the organizational landscape 
in the community. 
 
There is no vanguard because, well, BB Otero has a thing of 8 million dollars 
which is CentroNia, Lori Kaplan has 17 million dollars put in all the programs 
of the Youth Center. Maria Tukeva has just finished making a building, a 
school, the Bell Multicultural on 16th, Maria Gomez has a Mary’s Center that 
costs money, she is “the health person”, BB’s husband has something that is 
called MI Casa on housing, Ricardo Galvis has Andromeda, Angel has 
EOFULA… that is, they have created kinds of kingdoms….  (Rafael 
Hernandez) 
 
The great majority of organizations have grown tremendously. They could 
managed to get a big quantity of funds in part based on the disturbances… 
attention needs to be placed on this community, we need to deal with the 
problems it is facing, so we are going to give money to these organizations… 
a result has been an incredible growth of many of the organizations. Budgets 
of less than a million have become budgets of 12 millions. It is in part the 
increase in the living cost, but it is to a great extent the broadening of 
resources that were made available… (Esteban Gorostiza) 
 
The symbolic power of building ownership for an organization is graphically 
displayed in the following quote: 
 
There has been a influx and a strengthening of organizations. Like BB Otero, 
for example, who now has a building. A building that is worth millions of 
dollars… A building that is worth 5 or 6 million dollars. And it was given to 
her by Verizon, which used to be Pacific Bell, or something like that. The 
Latin American Youth Center did not have a space, now it does. The Latino 
Economic Development Corporation was formed through the Latino Civil 
Rights Task Force…. And now has its space. They bought a building. And 
they receive money from the government so they can guide people in 
economic matters. (Julio Cruz) 
 
The increase of funds made available to the Latino nonprofits has been reflected in an 
organizational sophistication of each of these service centers, many of which are 




In the last 20 years incredible organizations and institutions have developed, 
which were able not only to get money from the government and assure that 
the government be investing in this community but also that the private sector, 
foundations, etcetera…. We have brought a lot of money to the community in 
this sense. And we have created employment. Centronia has 250 employees, 
many of who are immigrants. The Latin American Youth Center, Mary’s 
Center, Clinica del Pueblo… you go to any of those and they are places where 
many people from our community can start a professional career in a way that 
maybe they would not be able to do in other places. In that sense, we serve as 
a source of employment, a source of services and a very strong economic 
source in the community. So the main development in the last few years since 
1991 is that the organizations that were then relatively small and kind of 
grassroots, have become institutions that if you put together 5 or 6 and add a 
couple of schools that were formed, with this process of charter schools and so 
on…. We are talking of a very large economic and political potential. Is this 
utilized in such a way? I’m not sure… I would say no… (Blanca Galindez) 
 
 
 So pivotal was the presence of nonprofits organizations in the perception of 
Latinos in the city that one of the people interviewed associated the organizational 
development (meaning the growth of the nonprofit sector) as “the development of the 
Latino community”. In particular, the permanent status acquired by these 
organizations is generally valued not only as an asset of the Latino community but an 
asset of the community at large.   
 
Although the idea that dominates the community is that the Latino nonprofit 
sector in the district is financially very powerful, over half of the Latino nonprofits 
filing forms 990 in the D.C. metropolitan area are still small in size, with total 
revenues under $500,000.28 At the other end of the spectrum, large organizations 
operating with budgets of $2 million or more make up only 13 percent of the total. 
                                                 
28 Considering that organizations with annual gross receipts below $25,000 are not required to file 
Form 990 with the IRS and are thus excluded from the analysis, this number of small nonprofits in the 
area would likely be even higher. 
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For the most part, Latino-serving nonprofits in the region have few assets upon which 
to draw in times of financial need. Forty percent of these groups have assets below 
$100,000, and an additional 10 percent report assets between $100,000 and $200,000. 
Only 7 of the 75 nonprofits in the study had assets of more than $3 million.29 
 
Public visibility: adding one more term to the bi-racial dominant paradigm 
 
Through the Mount Pleasant riots, Latinos in the District of Columbia gained 
substantial visibility. This increase in visibility is particularly important considering 
that being able to be seen, heard and acknowledged is a pre-condition for any political 
actor. As an example, from May through December of 1991 (that is, from the moment 
the riots broke out in Mount Pleasant to the presentation of the blueprint to the local 
authorities), 122 news stories in The Washington Post and The Washington Times 
referred to the social conditions, political status and/or actions of the 
Latino/Hispanic30 community residing in the District. In addition, the riots got 
international coverage. (see The Washington Post, May 9 1991).  
 
It was a moment to force the politicians to see the needs of the communities 
and convince them of the needs of the community. Because the complete 
nation was pending and with its eyes put in what was going on in the capital 
of the United States. That was a moment in which the whole world was 
looking at the disturbances that was in one street but, forget it! Those 
disturbances captured national and international attention. (Hilda Brunetti) 
  
                                                 
29 From the Urban Institute National Center for Charitable Statistics Core File (Public Charities, circa 
2005). 
30 The press uses the term Hispanic and not Latino to refer to the Spanish speaking population residing 
in the U.S. 
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Maybe the most evident of the implications of the riots, not only for Latinos 
but also for the community at large, was that a collectivity that had been largely 
invisible and hidden all of the sudden irrupted and turned perceptible for the public 
eye. 
 
I think for a while there [the riots] put the Latino community into the 
consciousness of the city, do you know what I mean?  In a way that it was sort 
of hidden or it was very much a small enclave.  All of a sudden there was kind 
of understanding, like that you needed to attend to the community, like that 
there needed to be some effort by the city’s leadership, formal and informal 
leadership, to integrate the Latino community and so I think there were 
particular people who were reached out to, who were…kind of bridge build 
with.  And I think there were some gains and I think that there were huge 
gains in general (Elizabeth Mederos) 
 
 The entry of Latinos in the public consciousness was important, as was  the 
way in which this entry was framed. It was the race/ethnicity and nationality of the 
collectivity the factor that had determined so far its fate31. Therefore, the claim for 
inclusion was also framed in terms of recognition of the specifics of a racial/ethnic 
and nationality-based group. That appears very clear when one of the main characters 
intervening in the aftermath of the riots affirmed that “we utilized that to bring to 
light the fact that there was here already a new paradigm, that it was not only the 
white and the black any longer, but it was the white, the black and the Latino” (Tadeo 
Ramirez). Also clear in this last quote is the fact that the increase of visibility of 
Latinos did not just happen but was the product, as mentioned in previous sections, of 
the attribution of the opportunity by the group. This visibility gained by the group as 
“Latinos” was also used in the negotiations with agents of government that followed 
                                                 
31 The race/ethnicity and nationality determined not only formal exclusion in the group (i.e., it was 
because the group was largely deprived of the privileges of legal membership in the system that their 
voice remained shut and their needs largely ignored), but also the everyday abuses some Latinos 
experienced from government agents, police, and ordinary people from other racial minorities. 
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the event. There was a Latino issue that needed to be resolved. And there was, 
according to the claims presented by leaders acting on behalf of the Latino 
community, a need for an inclusion of a Latino component in the table of negotiations 
in which public policy decisions were made.  
 Symbolically, then, the entry of Latinos as a factor in the racial schema in 
which city politics was organized had a clear impact. At least for a while, this idea of 
a multi-racial schema, as opposed to bi-racial, was present in the political debates in 
those instances in which political decisions were made. Interestingly, the argument 
posed by those figures negotiating in behalf or the Latino community with city 
authorities was nourished by the logic that had been utilized by the African American 
community in the past. 
 
The Latino community in the District of Columbia has constructed that 
political subject, in a way, trying to insert itself in a paradigm that was of 
black or white. So it had to go and say ‘there is one more’. So there was a 
question, s kind of incivility, no? And the object of our action was not a 
typical political structure of the US, let’s say, white… No, they were blacks 
who came from the struggles for civil rights in the sixties. And here there was 
a minority group requesting, demanding other minority group that with much 
work and effort had reached the political power of the city because they 
represented the majority of the population. But without a process of harmony, 
of reciprocal understanding between both communities… (Tadeo Ramirez) 
 
 This increased visibility achieved during and in the immediate months 
following the riots would fade out later on. In a sense, if we assume that the visibility 
was accompanied by a capacity to generate pressure in the political process; such 
capacity would soon depend not so much on conveying public messages through the 




Political representation of Latino community 
 
 In talking about the political status of the Latino community in the District of 
Columbia, in particular, after the riots, I found a recurring comment: ‘We [ Latinos in 
Washington] have been not able to elect a representative of us to the city 
government’. That phenomenon of lack of formal representatives who are “Latinos” 
themselves reveal a conception that maintains that Latino interests can only—or 
mainly—be represented by Latinos in office. In fact, this perception is consistent with 
a research finding that states that the presence of a Latino candidate mobilizes the 
Latino electorate, which is revealed in high voting rates and strong support for co-
ethnic candidates (Barreto 2007). 
 The lack of this formal political representation symbolizes, according to 
several figures interviewed, an inability of the Latino community to place Latinos in 
elected positions in the government, which, according to this view, would warranty 
an effective ongoing impact in routine politics. 
 
We do not have people placed in different positions that could say look, do 
this… there are many people in the county that put me obstacles doing this or 
that…. You know what? Do it! Period. It sounds difficult, but if it is necessary 
you can say that…. What I mean with this is that in Washington and other 
places we do not have the influence to be able to say, do it! Right? Here in the 
county it is possible to say that because I was elected by vote, by the people. 
And that entails a strong message (Sergio Arteaga, an elected official from the 
Washington suburbs) 
 
 On the one hand, the representation of the community is viewed as still 
embodied in the heads of Latino organizations that have more or less direct access to 
authorities. As one interviewee put it “unfortunately in our community the political 
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base is in hands of people who are running social service centers.” (Blanca Galindez). 
Since much attention has been placed to this phenomenon in previous sections, I will 
not elaborate more on this process here. 
 On the other hand, the representation of Latino interests has been viewed as 
crystallized in the representative/s of the Latino Ward, who need the vote of Latino 
residents in order to be elected. 
 
After what happened in Mount Pleasant… [Latinos in the District] were not 
able to institutionalize a presence. So even now in the Council [meaning the 
Council of Latino Agencies] they do not have the political strength that we 
should have in the district, no? Because Jim Graham is a good person but he 
should not be the one who represent the majority of the Latino area, no? At 
least there should be at least one or two candidates that run against him. 
(Graciela Vallejos) 
 
 All in all, there is no clear impact of the Mount Pleasant riots in the electoral 
field. Although there were some isolated cases of Latinos running for office in the 
District after the riots, they were not the result of active collective efforts. The 
political work carried out by the leadership after the riots, as we mentioned, was not 
especially concentrated on the electoral arena. Given the low numbers of eligible 




Although the Mount Pleasant Riots impacted the Latino community greatly, no 
significant transformation occurred in its structure of power. In other words, even 
when new faces representing the new demographic makeup of the community 
emerged, the old guard’s concentrated power remained essentially intact. In 
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particular, the new leaders were chosen, guided and, sometimes, obstructed in their 
work by old guard leaders. In addition, although a new lasting organization was 
constituted to specifically monitor and speak on behalf of the community after the 
incidents—namely, the D.C. Latino Civil Rights Task Force—, its operation was far 
from autonomous from the influence of the established Latino agencies.  
Because of the old guard’s uninterrupted influence, the approach that 
prevailed was “service-oriented” even when some advocated for an alternative 
approach of political empowerment and organizing. As a result of the political path 
chosen, over the years the structure of Latino service providing agencies was 
strengthened. In the end, the community did not achieve visible changes in terms of 
political representation. The lack of significant impact in the electoral arena was 
reflected in the absence of Latinos elected in local government positions and 
insufficient efforts of electoral mobilization. With no formal representatives from the 
community in the government, the voice of the community continued to be channeled 
through either the members of the old guard, or, eventually, through “Anglo” 
representatives from “el barrio”.  
In terms of change and continuity in the prevailing mode of power within the 
Latino community, these outcomes were partly a result of the local conditions in 
which the event took place, and were partly a consequence of the way and sequence 
in which key actors played within it. In particular, the members of the old guard, who 
had already been central in the community before the riots, were able to shape the 
course of the event by framing the “Latino problem” in terms of need for services, 
and deactivating more alternative radical paths of action. Agencies’ structural 
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location as brokers between the government and ordinary people in the Latino 
community allowed them to become central actors in the political process opened by 
the riots. The intervention of agencieros on the scene occurred soon after the riots 
started, and their decisions and actions were critical in the political outcome achieved. 
 When looking at the impact of the riots in terms of the community influence 
in the local political arena, though, the riots put Latinos and the “Latino problem” on 
the map. Local authorities were forced to find ways to reach out to the Spanish 
speaking community in the city, and they did so both through the newly created D.C. 
Latino Civil Rights Task Force and through direct interaction with leaders of service 
providing agencies. There was an implicit pact between government officials and 
service providing agencies whereby the District government would help strengthen 
the structure of services in the city in order to get the “Latino problem” under control 
without having to deal directly with it.  
Perhaps one of the most significant outcomes of the riots involved raising 
overall awareness of the Latino community.  The various actors were successful in 
inserting one more term into the prevailing bi-racial paradigm on which the political 
constitution of the city was framed. That is, rather than the traditional black-white 
distinction that is often made in public discourse, there were three parties – black, 
white, and Latino – implicated in this case.  Latinos appeared as a minority that 
expressed the desire and need to be seen and heard, and through the Mount Pleasant 
Riots that goal was undeniably accomplished. This increased visibility was to a great 
extent due to the presence of Latino ordinary people in the streets of Mount Pleasant 
in a contentious performance. 
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Chapter 5: “La Marcha” at the Washington Monument of 
April 10
th
, 2006  
 
 The mass rally for immigrant rights that took place on April 10, 2006 at the 
Washington Monument in Washington, D.C., known among Latinos by the Spanish 
term “la marcha”, constituted one of the most extraordinary political moments of the 
Latino community of the area –which was, in turn, part of a network of rallies 
throughout the country. Unlike what happened in Mount Pleasant in 1991, where 
ordinary people took to the streets as soon as they heard about the attack on a Latino 
worker from a police officer, La Marcha took considerable planning. The period 
between the approval of HR 4037 by the House of Representatives and the massive 
rallies in March and April of 2006, was characterized by intense organizing and a 
massive mobilizing effort by community-based organizations. In fact, the 
demonstration was a product of effective coordination and planning efforts by 
different local actors linked to the Latino community, including community based 
organizations, churches, unions, and different media outlets. 
 This chapter centers on the examination of the factors that made the 
production of the event possible, as well as the impact it had in terms of the process 
of emergence of a transformed political actor within the Latino community.    
 The analysis of this event will start by describing some critical facts that took 
place before and after the demonstration as depicted by the media. Then, I will look at 
some prominent contextual features—which I classified as demographic, 
organizational, and political. Following, I examine the ways in which different sectors 
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read the threat and attributed an opportunity to plan a collective action. Finally, I 
review some of the innovative features that Latinos acquired as a political actor. 
 
5.1. Chronology of the event 
 
In this section I describe the main stages that surrounded “La Marcha”, as 
depicted in mainstream newspapers32 in the district. This depiction of the event, its 
antecedents and aftermath, has two main purposes: (1) to reconstruct the “public side” 
of the political process surrounding the immigration rallies in the district; and (2) to 
identify those gaps that could not be filled using this source. 
The main stages identified include the approval of the Sensenbrenner Bill by 
the U.S. House of Representatives, the immigration rallies of March and April 2006, 
the leadership split, and the movement decline. 
  
Approval of the Sensenbrenner Bill by the U.S. House of Representatives 
On December 16, 2005 the United States House of Representatives passed the 
Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (H.R. 4437), a 
bill introduced by House Judiciary Committee Chairman James Sensenbrenner (R-
WI). The bill appealed to the fears many Americans had of immigrants and potential 
immigrants, but for those immigrants, their friends and relatives, the bill itself was 
terrifying. If enacted, the lives of immigrants, both legal and undocumented, as well 
as all those who interact with them, employers, clergy, community service providers, 
                                                 
32 The deliberate decision of utilizing mainstream media outlets instead of “ethnic” newspapers 
responds to an attempt to look at how the event impacted the public agenda. 
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family, friends and mere neighbors could be put in jeopardy. Among the many 
limitations and restrictions towards immigrations, it called for the construction of a 
700-mile fence along the US-Mexican border, a signal to the Latino world that they 
were unwelcome in the US. Even more offensive to the Latino community was the 
move to make any unlawful presence in the country a felony, effectively 
criminalizing millions of undocumented immigrants, many of whom were from Latin 
American countries. However, the most damaging stipulation was the decision to 
make humanitarian assistance to undocumented individuals a felony. By broadening 
the definition of “smuggling” to include assisting a person attempting to remain in the 
United States when the “offender” knows that the person is in the United States 
unlawfully, anyone aiding undocumented immigrants could be fined, have property 
confiscated or even be imprisoned. Moreover, HR 4437 would grant state and local 
law enforcement agencies the authority to investigate, identify, apprehend, arrest, 
detain and transfer to Federal custody any undocumented immigrants found in the 
United States.  
 
The response to H.R. 4437: the Immigration rallies of March and April 2006 
 On March 8, 2006 the National Capital Immigration Coalition (NCIC) 
organized a demonstration to protest bill HR 4437 outside the U.S. Capitol. The 
NCIC rallied thousands of people from across the region. In this first large-scale 
Latino political experiment in political activism, the NCIC organizers’ expectations 
were exceeded. While organizers predicted a turnout of 20,000, the crowd far 
surpassed that number. Although the protest was quantitatively significant, it received 
 
 180 
limited media attention. For the planners, however, it was assessed as an important 
success. The unexpected high turnout at the rally was read by organizers as an 
indication that with more planning, a bigger protest could be mounted. 
After the first successful rally on March 8th, NCIC organizers planned a new 
rally in Washington, D.C. A month later, on April 10th, an even larger demonstration 
of immigrants, a majority of whom were Latinos, took place at the foot of the 
Washington Monument. This massive protest was the flagship in a widespread fleet 
of simultaneous demonstrations across the country. This mobilization was one of the 
largest—if not the largest—political protest in the history of the Latino population. 
The event received wide media coverage before, during, and after the occurrence.  
 
Leadership split: Internal discussions in the Latino community on the next steps  
 Immediately after the highly successful rally of April 10th, the Latino was 
faced with new challenges. Finding themselves in a new level of national politics, the 
leadership debated how best to capitalize on this new ‘state of mobilization’ and the 
potential political power that came with it. While some proposed to hold a general 
boycott on May 1st, others opted for a more moderate approach, aiming at increasing 
voter roles, petitioning, and opening dialogues with elected officials instead. This 
debate over the next step resulted in a major split in the Latino leadership that spread 
throughout the country. In the Washington, D.C. area, in particular, most Latino 
organizations favored the moderate line. 
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The faction proposing a boycott continued on their chosen path, and on May 
1st a series of rallies and boycotts of schools and businesses took place across the 
nation to highlight how vital immigrants are to the country’s economy.  
The Latino leadership in the D.C. area, however, supported the more cautious 
route. The rally to boycott was minimal, and so was the effect of the boycott in the 
D.C. area. Despite the lack of higher level support for the boycott, many 
neighborhoods did organize small demonstrations. In several points of the 
metropolitan region, including Meridian Park in the Mount Pleasant neighborhood, 
Herndon, Alexandria and Baileys Crossroads, Latinos gathered to protest. 
 
Post-protests backlash  
 Local newspapers report the existence of backlash in several localities in the 
region. Cases of backlash went from arrests of undocumented immigrants, to the 
impact in local elections (e.g., in Herndon, Virginia, where candidates who supported 
the establishment of an immigrant worker center were ousted), to the multiplication 
of local voices that oppose undocumented immigrants. 
 
 
The decline: Low turnout in new round of immigration rallies  
After four months of relative quiet, immigration reform advocates  mobilized 
a new round of protests in Washington and beyond to put further pressure on a 
returning Congress and to reinvigorate the nascent Latino political movement that had 
been awakened in massive demonstrations earlier that spring. Local organizers’ 
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declared goal was to gather 1 million protesters from up and down the East coast in 
the nation’s capital to demand legalization for the unauthorized and end to arrest of 
undocumented immigrants. 
After such a promising beginning, the Latino political movement took a 
serious hit on September 7th. The massive pro-immigration rally that promised to 
bring the anger of 1 million Latino community members to the foot of the national 
government managed to draw fewer than 5,000 people. Long before the event, 
organizers from other localities had already begun expressing concerns about the 
turnout. They recognized that they were losing the momentum built up by the huge 
marches in the spring. Moreover, leaders from outside the District were concerned 
that the movement's national organizers in Washington had lost touch with the people 




5.2.1. Demographic and geographical changes 
 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, Latinos are the second-largest minority 
group in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area, after African Americans33. In the 
year 2000, 432,003 Latinos (8.8 percent of the total population) were living in the 
region34; and by 2006 numbers had grown to 608,884.35 This figure represents a 170 
                                                 
33 From the Census 2000 Summary File 1, 100-Percent Data. 
34 From the Census 2000 Summary File 4, 100-Sample Data. 
35 U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey 
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percent increase over the 1990 population (224,786). Much of this growth is 
attributed to the rise in immigration. 
Among the Latinos living in the region in 2006, 59.2 percent were foreign 
born and 44.3 percent were non US citizens.36 The proportion of noncitizens grows 
even higher when limited to only those who could potentially be politically active. 
Specifically, 58.2 percent of Latinos 18 years and over are noncitizens and, thus, are 
technically excluded from the formal political life in the US. 
These numbers, however, most likely underestimate the real population 
residing in the area because of the limitations in counting the undocumented. 
According to several community leaders interviewed, the actual number of Latinos 
residing in the area was approximately 1 million.  
The changes in the region’s Latino population since 1991 were not only 
quantitative but also qualitative. In particular, the characteristics of the new 
immigrants and their rationale for coming to the country were different than those 
who arrived earlier: 
 
In the nineties there was an increasing influx of Central American population. 
This influx started in the eighties, but then there was a lot of political 
immigration to the area. In the nineties you have not only political 
immigration, and you cannot separate them, but also an economic 
immigration…. people who are poor. (Cesar Barragan) 
 
Latinos in general, and Latin American immigrants in particular, are widely 
dispersed throughout the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area.  For the most part, 
Latin American immigrants did not cluster in ethnically homogeneous residential 
enclaves (Singer et al. 2001 although there were important concentrations in 
                                                 
36 U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey. 
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Columbia Pike in Virginia, Langley Park/Hyattsville and Silver Spring/Wheaton in 
Maryland, and Mount Pleasant/Adams Morgan in the District of Columbia.). Adding 
to the Latino population dispersion, during the last decade, the Latino population also 
experienced a high degree of suburbanization. In 2000, only 10.4 percent of all 
Latinos in the metropolitan area resided in the District—down from 14.6 percent in 
199037. This proportion was even lower in 2006, with only 7.8 percent of all Latinos 
in the region residing in Washington, D.C. In addition, whereas in the entire 
metropolitan area Latinos represent 11.5 percent of the total population, in 
Washington, D.C., this proportion falls to 8.2 to percent.38 
 This significant growth of the Latino population in the Maryland and Virginia 
suburbs of D.C. is in part the result of the tremendous increase that housing prices 
experienced in the District during the last few years. As a resident in Mount Pleasant 
graphically asserts, “The houses in Mount Pleasant that were bought in the nineties… 
93, 96, 97… for 150 thousand dollars are now selling for 750 thousand dollars! What 
happened? This meant the expulsion of our community” Traditionally Latino 
neighborhoods were in decline as old residents found that their earlier investments 
had skyrocketed and new immigrants were priced out of the market.  
 The change in geographical distribution of Latinos in the region, as revealed 
in their increasing presence in the suburbs, also had implications for the community 
organizational landscape and the community presence in formal political 
institutions—in this latter sense, through the presence of Latino elected officials. The 
                                                 
37 From the Census 2000 Summary File 1, 100-Percent Data, and Census 1990 Summary Tape File 1, 
100-Percent Data. 
38 U.S. Census Bureau, 2006 American Community Survey. 
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challenges the community organizations now faced were evolving. How would they 
respond to the new reality of a region-based community? 
 
 
5.2.2. Organizational landscape 
 
Portrait of the Latino organizational structure in 2005 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, the organizational capital of the Latino 
community experienced a remarkable growth, both in size and number of 
organizations between 1990 and 2005. The question then became what were these 
new organizations doing exactly and how were they functioning? In research I 
conducted on Latino nonprofits in the area (see Cantor 2008), I found that the 
organizations primarily serving the Latino community covered a wide spectrum of 
services, ranging from those affecting the immigrant community in general, such as 
legal assistance for immigration issues and English language programs, to more 
general social services that would benefit immigrant and nonimmigrant populations 
equally. The primary service providers were community organizations and religious 
congregations. Collectively, these nonprofits made the Latino sector a crucial asset 
for the community at large. 
The most common types of Latino-serving nonprofits were focused on 
education, including English as a second language, literacy, and computer training 
services; children and youth services, such as child care, gang violence prevention, 
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tutoring and mentoring, and sports programs; religion-related activities, which 
includes a wide array of social services; and ethnic and immigrant centers, which 
were often multiservice centers structured to meet social, educational, economic, 
recreational, and other needs specific to the Latino population. Combined, these four 
types of providers accounted for 57 percent of Latino-serving nonprofits in the 
study.39 
Most of the Latino nonprofits operating in the area presented hybrid 
organizational forms,40 assisting the population on a broad spectrum of issues. In 
particular, many organizations combined provision of services with advocacy 
practices for the community they served.41 As noted earlier, heads of these nonprofits 
were commonly charged with giving a voice to, or elevating the demands of, the 
Latino community, operating as the channels through which Latinos’ private 
problems become public issues. 
The universe of nonprofits primarily serving Latinos registered with the IRS 
accounted for total annual revenues of over $87 million, total annual expenses of over 
$81 million, and assets of nearly $57 million. The majority of these organizations, 
were small, as defined by having total revenues under $500,000.42 At the other end of 
the spectrum, large organizations, those operating with budgets of $2 million or more, 
comprised only 13% of the total.  
                                                 
39 This data is based on Using data from the National Center for Charitable Statistics (NCCS) based on 
information filed by organizations with the U.S. Internal Revenue Service (IRS). 
40 A detailed analysis of hybrid forms of ethnic organizations can be found in Minkoff (2002).  
41 By formal, we mean explicitly specified in their missions or program descriptions. 
42 Given that organizations with annual gross receipts below $25,000 are not required to file Form 990 
with the IRS and are thus excluded from the analysis, this number of small nonprofits in the area 
would likely be even higher. 
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By and large, Latino-serving nonprofits in the region had few assets to draw 
upon in times of financial need. Forty percent of these groups had assets below 
$100,000, and an additional 10 percent reported assets between $100,000 and 
$200,000. Only 7 of the 75 nonprofits in the study had assets of more than $3 
million.43 
In the universe of Latino nonprofits operating at that time in the area, we can 
observe a correlation between size of the organization and age. Not surprisingly, the 
overwhelming majority of the organizations created or incorporated during the 1970s 
and 1980s had grown to a medium or large size, while those founded in the 1990s and 
2000s were generally small. We can safely presume that either young organizations 
encounter more constraints affecting their survival than those that consolidated in an 
earlier era or that financial capacity strengthening merely takes time. 
The sector’s total revenue was divided rather evenly among government 
contributions, private donations, and other sources.44 However, only 55 percent of the 
nonprofits in the sample received any money from the government—a rather small 
proportion when compared to the number of organizations receiving funding from 
private donations (93 percent) or other sources (also 93 percent). Moreover, the 
distribution of government contributions tended to be more concentrated in large 
organizations. While 39 percent of the revenues of large organizations came from 
government sources, government funds in small organizations only accounted for 13 
percent of the total revenues. As a result, small organizations needed to rely heavily 
                                                 
43 From the Urban Institute National Center for Charitable Statistics Core File (Public Charities, circa 
2005). 
44 Private contributions include contributions, gifts, grants, and bequests that the organization received 
directly or indirectly from the public. Other revenues comprise membership dues, interest, dividends, 
rental income, other investment, sales of goods, and revenue from special events and activities. 
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on direct and indirect private support, including contributions, gifts, grants, and 
bequests from the public.  
 In terms of area of activity, the largest portion of government funds was 
allocated to health-related agencies (40 percent), followed by education (29 percent), 
family services (14 percent), and ethnic and immigrant centers (8 percent, as shown 
in table 6). Lesser areas funded by the government include children and youth 
services, housing and shelter, and legal-related services. 
 To sum up, although the universe and financial weight of Latino organizations 
in 2005 have grown substantially compared to their profile in 1990, most of the 
organizations continued to be small. One of the most outstanding aspects of the sector 
was its diversity, considering both the range of activities covered and the resources it 
relied on. The range of services spans from traditional areas (such as education and 
health) to more political activities (such as advocacy). With respect to funding, the 
sources were diverse, which can be viewed as strength. The distribution of the 
different types of funds in different organizations, however, was uneven. Government 
funds, for example, were especially concentrated in larger organizations. This 
element alone is an indicator of the types of connections that heads of larger 








Religious congregations serving the Latino community 
 
According to a survey conducted in 200745, churches serving the Latino 
community are widely dispersed across the Washington, D.C., metropolitan region, 
with their presence in the suburbs, in particular, holding special significance. Of the 
116 churches identified as specifically serving the Spanish-speaking population, only 
20 percent were located in the District, while the remaining 80 percent operate in the 
suburbs of Maryland and Virginia.  
 Three quarters of those religious congregations, the study found, performed a 
variety of activities beyond their spiritual missions. Common services included 
supplying food and clothing, providing financial and legal assistance, and offering 
English as a second language lessons and other specialized education programs.  
 The study also showed that the services delivered by congregations often 
addressed emergency situations. For example, financial help and food assistance were 
often provided to those who suffered temporary unemployment or extraordinary 
circumstances. In addition, most congregations surveyed relied almost exclusively on 
private donations and service provision tended to be dictated by the availability of 
financial resources.  
Although many churches offered direct provision to the Latino community, an 
important part of their work was accomplished through informal collaboration with 
local nonprofits. The vast majority of the congregations reported working with other 
churches or community organizations in various capacities. 
                                                 
45 See Cantor 2008. 
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 A number of congregations were cautious about being linked too closely with 
political issues, yet many of them either had directly or indirectly assisted the political 
empowerment of the Latino community, through their engagement in various 
activities. Of the congregations surveyed, 54 percent worked with other organizations 
or volunteers to assist church members in obtaining documentation, including driver’s 
licenses, citizenship applications, or Temporary Protected Status forms.  
In addition to direct service provision, congregations engaged in a variety of 
advocacy activities. For example, roughly a third of churches reported encouraging 
members to attend rallies and sign petitions. Other forms of public participation 
included elaborating on policy issues during sermons and engaging in campaigns or 
lobbying for issues that would benefit the community they served.  
 
Latino organizations’ response to geographical distribution of population 
 
The geographic diffusion of the Latino population in the metropolitan area 
contrasts sharply with the concentration of Latino organizations in the District (see 
Figure 3). In 2005, over 60 percent of active organizations in the metropolitan area 
ran their operations in the District of Columbia. The remaining organizations were 
split between Virginia (21 percent) and Maryland (17 percent). This trend was 
accentuated by the fact that 90 percent of large organizations (those with total annual 
revenues of at least $2 million) and 74 percent of medium organizations (those with 
total annual revenues between $500,000 and $1,999,999) were located in the District. 
By contrast, most (55 percent) smaller organizations were situated in the suburbs of 
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Maryland or Virginia46. This pattern, however, has shifted over time. In fact, the 
proportion of new organizations created in D.C. over the total created in the 
metropolitan area has decreased each successive decade since the 1970s. By contrast, 




Distribution of the Latino Population and Latino Nonprofits in the 















Virginia Maryland District of Columbia
%
 
Sources: The Urban Institute National Center for Charitable Statistics Core File (Public Charities, circa 
2005) and Census 2000 Summary File 1, 100-Percent Data.  
 
 
 Although spatial proximity is often perceived as an indicator of access to 
services (see Truelove 2000 and Hutcheson and Dominguez 1986), users of District 
services quite frequently resided in the suburbs. In recent years, some large 
                                                 
46 The Urban Institute National Center for Charitable Statistics Core File (Public Charities, circa 2005). 
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organizations serving the Latino community in the District of Columbia has adapted 
to this new geo-demographic reality by either opening new facilities in the suburbs or 
providing expertise to other organizations situated outside the District. Three of the 
largest agencies in the District of Columbia, for example, were in the process of 
opening their branches in a Maryland suburb. This change was even recommended by 
the Council of Latino Agencies in 2004, stating that ‘we need to go where the 
population goes, and not [expect] that the population [will] come [to] where we are’.  
The interpretations of these organizational adaptations to the flows of 
population differ according to who the interlocutor is. For some, the expansion of 
services to the suburbs was a positive phenomenon that would cover growing need, 
although it could cause conflict with certain existing organizations: 
 
BG: This has been a very interesting phenomenon. Because I think it will 
create friction with the organizations that are developing there. Because you 
have sources of funding and the same governments which have seen that there 
are models that have developed here [in the district] that they need in the same 
way. In Montgomery County there is a huge growth in the population. A huge 
need, there are gangs, lack of education, a number of things and they don’t 
even know how to start to address [the problems]. So, in part, they are pulling 
us there. They are opening the door for us. 
 
GC: You mean the government? 
 
BG: The government definitely, and other organizations. To me the most 
interesting has been that there is an organization in Montgomery County that 
has always told us ‘we need you to do something here, we have no capacity, 
etcetera’. And now that we have started going in that direction they are 
freaking out. They are ‘what are they thinking… the big ones from DC who 
come, they are going to take what is ours’… be careful what you wish for, you 
might get it. 
 
 For others, this advancement of established organizations from D.C. into the 
suburbs was considered to be a sign of the ‘colonization’ of a growing population by 
these agencies conceived as “empires”. In a sense, the idea implicit in these 
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arguments is that because the large District organizations were losing their 
constituents (through the shrinking of the proportion of the Latino population in the 
District), these organizations needed to expand their base in order to continue 
receiving funds. In addition, moving to the suburbs provided them access to new 
sources of funders. 
 
Now [the agencies] are expanding… into Maryland and Virginia. Because 
there is more money. We have to follow the base of clients to justify our 
existence. So if poverty disappears, if gangs disappear, if women stop having 
plenty of babies… many of these organizations would disappear (Vicente 
Olleros) 
 
They definitely fill the gap that exists. Because there are not many 
organizations here. But it is also in their interest, being able to enter Maryland 
and enter Montgomery County…they will be able to have access to money 
from Montgomery County and money from the state, no? (Graciela Vallejos) 
  
In the narratives of many organization leaders I interviewed for this research, 
there is a very noticeable territorial approach. Each organization had its own 
jurisdiction and moving into someone else’s territory was considered a threat. 
 
CASA de Maryland has its place in Maryland, obviously. The work they do is 
wonderful, right? It has never been in DC. What happens now is that we are 
going to Maryland… (Avelina Quinteros, a leader of an organization in DC) 
 
 
Emergence of regional organizations  
 
 As Latinos began settling in the suburbs, new organizational configurations 
appeared in order to address this new demographic pattern. Examples of these new 
configurations include the Regional Coalition of Latino Organizations (RECOLAO), 
the National Capital Immigration Coalition (NCIC), and the Latino Federation of 
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Greater Washington (which replaced the Council of Latino Agencies of Washington, 
D.C). What all three of them had in common was that each was umbrella group, i.e. a 
cluster of different, smaller organizations all operating in different jurisdictions of the 
metropolitan area. They were all founded in the early 2000s as a way to deal with 
issues across jurisdictions and create stronger political actors. In particular, the 
creation of each of these groups was intended, in their own way, to deal with what 
was seen as an increasingly anti-immigrant environment in the area. 
 Of these three, the one that would be critical in the 2006 marches was the 
NCIC. Founded in 2001, this group was explicitly engaged in immigration issues and 
included the main Latino organizations operating in the region. In addition, it was 
integrated into and, to some extent, informally led by the capital area district of SEIU 
local 32BJ, the largest building service workers union in the country. 
 
The NCIC was formed in 2001, and I was there when it was formed… We had 
a strategic planning session in 2001 and it started there, no? So the structure, 
the organization was already formed. We did several things… several political 
campaigns… we did lobbying… we used the model of freedom rights to 
launch a campaign for immigrants. The immigrant movement used that model 
in the year 2004 as part of that campaign. With the Reward Work campaign 
we collected a million postcards to send to the president. That is, we 
participated together with the immigrant movement to do things at the 
national and local levels… since 2001. But last year when everything became 
national, the movement got to a spike, because every movement goes up and 
down, up and down… but last year there was a spike, and because we already 
had the structure, the organization, we were already prepared to participate, 
you know? So it was easy, well, not easy, but because the structure was there 
we could do it. All the work in this area was done through NCIC, because the 
structure was already formed… (Gerardo Cejas, a young Latino leader) 
 
 The existence of these bridges of collaboration across jurisdictions reflected 
an effort to respond to the patterns of geographical settlement of Latinos in the area.  
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These umbrella organizations differed greatly in regard to their structure. The Latino 
Federation, for example, was a more formal organization, mounted on a group with a 
relatively long institutional history, with full time staff, and an Executive director. On 
the other extreme, NCIC acted more like a network encompassing not only Latino 
organizations but other groups as well. In particular, its flexible and open framework, 
which allowed it to quickly redefine and adapt its agenda, would be important for the 
organization of the rallies. 
  
 
Development of new types of community organizations: The Case of CASA de 
Maryland 
 
Over the last few years before the rallies of 2006, a new type of organizations 
emerged in the suburbs. Based on a discourse of community empowerment, their 
strategies were explicitly directed to organizing the low income Latino community 
around issues of public concern.  
The most notable of this new type of organization is CASA de Maryland, a 
community-based group oriented primarily around the promotion of community-
based development of low-income Latinos in the State of Maryland. Consistent with 
this approach, its mission centers on the organization of three groups of immigrants, 
namely, women, tenants, and day laborers. Like other worker centers across the 
country, Casa de Maryland filled a void in representation that had occurred due to the 
institutional narrowness of the contemporary labor movement that did not contain 
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very low-wage, poorly organized workers such as day laborers and domestic workers 
(Fine 2006).  
The organization’s presence in the area is critical for the Latino community 
because it is recognized as the most important immigrant rights advocacy 
organization in the region. Whereas the majority of immigrant organizations 
operating in the area are primarily devoted to providing social services, the work of 
Casa de Maryland focuses on strengthening and empowering the community. As with 
other worker centers that successfully organize immigrant workers using a multi-level 
strategy (see Gordon 2000), Casa’s greater focus on empowerment rather than 
representation was crucial in the constitution of the group of Latino immigrants as a 
political actor making claims to the government. As mentioned by one of the leaders 
of the organization, one of CASA’s main missions was “to empower our community, 
so it can have its own voice; we do not want to speak for our community but have it 
speak for itself”.  
 At the same time, the internal structure of Casa de Maryland and the manner 
in which this structure shapes its everyday work, presented promising channels 
through which the problematic of particular segments in the community transformed 
itself from a sum of private problems to a public issue. Specifically, Casa de 
Maryland has on staff lawyers, educators, community organizers, and service 
providers. With such a diverse pool of human resources, problems for one segment of 
the organization often find solutions in another segment. A service provider might 
look to one of CASA’s lawyers or community organizers or educators to address a 




I used to always come here looking for a job. And once I was in the office and 
then L. comes and she tells me come in. I came in and she sat down with me. I 
started telling her my story, the story that I have suffered of domestic abuse. 
And then I noticed how she felt… we cried together. She got very interested 
in my case. And a few days later she formed the group. But I didn’t know that 
there were other people that she had already heard of… That was the story of 
how we started organising ourselves…  (Silvia, an immigrant worker) 
 
 Not only did Casa de Maryland encourage its members to take action but also 
it provided them with the resources to do it, including workshops, trainings, 
leadership development, and legal assistance.  
  
Maybe a difference that we can pinpoint (with respect to other Latino-serving 
organizations in the area) is that we put a lot of emphasis on the community 
side, on leadership, on the political part, where we emphasize the participation 
of our community regardless of their immigration status. So we can be 
subjects of their own destiny. (Gonzalo Diaz, a leader of CASA de Maryland). 
 
 So whereas most organizations operating in the region have a clear focus on 
providing services, the main focus of CASA de Maryland has been the political 
organization of the community. This focus responded to a strategic shift that took 
place in 1998, when the organization refocused its mission from providing services to 
supporting political activism and advocacy.  
 
The political fact that made us decide to focus on leadership, community 
action, and political actions, at the same time that we worked on services was 
a demand from the community. They were demanding us that we had to 
respond more aggressively to the anti-immigrant attacks, more aggressively to 
the political attacks that were occurring in the 90s and that continue to occur 
during the 2000’s (Gonzalo Diaz, a leader of CASA). 
 
 When I asked leaders in CASA about the reasons and conditions for the 
‘political’ profile adopted, most of them referred to the decision made in 1998 as part 
of the strategic planning based on a diagnosis of a community that needed to be 
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empowered and not only served. One of the leaders in DC, however, gave an 
argument that was indeed interesting when providing clues to better understand the 
emergence of a politically oriented Latino agency like CASA de Maryland:  
 
They were capable of achieving that because [in Maryland] there were no 
established agencies as they were here [in the District]… Here there were 
several of us who wanted to create that type of formation. On the one hand, 
provide basic services but on the other, the introduction of civic service… 
with a projection of political education, etcetera… but the field was already 
taken. I would say that in a sense the fact that they were more pioneers there 
was an important factor…. (Roberto Couto) 
 
  
 In a sense, what this quote is pointing out is that whereas the dense 
organizational landscape in the Latino community in Washington, D.C. blocked the 
emergence of explicitly politically oriented organizations, the lack of a consolidated 
network of service providing agencies in Maryland opened the territory for the 
emergence of a community-based organization oriented to advocacy and political 
empowerment. In Maryland, following this argument, there were no established 
leaders to act as interlocutors in the community to agents in power (government, the 
media, foundations, other organizations, etc.), which made it easier to create an 
innovative structure detached from traditional practices and constraints. 
Because most of the work of Latino serving organizations has traditionally 
been funded by government contracts and foundations grants, the question then 
comes how it would be possible for an organization to gather resources from these 
traditional sources in order to deploy political activities. In other words, providing 
services to underserved minorities might represent a safe bet for those who decide on 
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funds assignments. Funding “politics”, on the contrary, is often looked at with 
skepticism. Thus, according to a member of CASA:  
 
[It was necessary to] educate a great number of foundations and people who 
were frightened to give money to fund political actions, who were frightened 
to give money to do advocacy, to do lobbying, to fight to organize the 
community. In the past, ten years ago, talk about community organizing here 
was a sin. Now we could change that dynamic in a way that, even in the 
contracts we have with the government there is a strong component of 
community organizing and we describe it clearly and we have educated 
bureaucrats on the importance of doing community organizing to make a 
positive change in our community. (Gonzalo Diaz, a leader of CASA)  
 
 In fact, one of the reasons why Casa de Maryland developed the strong 
presence it had was the robust two-way relationship it had with public officials in the 
local and state government. That relationship was mutually beneficial: the partnership 
gave the organization access to funds and resources from the public sector, and it 
allows local and state bureaucrats to deal more effectively with the problems linked to 
recent demographic changes (Frasure and Jones Correa 2005). One state official 
interviewed put it in these terms: “I participate in the session where they are debating. 
I want to listen to them. The relationship [with CASA] is symbiotic” (Graciela 
Vallejos, public official). 
 Given the respectability and reach that Casa de Maryland achieved in the 
growing Latino population in the area, many politicians who aspired to be elected to 
public office sought community support through CASA de Maryland. 
 
Many Latinos and even many American people when they want to be elected 
go to Casa de Maryland. Of course that Casa de Maryland is a nonprofit 
organization, but people there can give support personally, not in the name of 
the organization. And many go and seek the support of the leaders. Because 




 In addition, as we will see in the next section, (on political landscape) not only 
did key individuals in Casa play a critical role in the support of Latino and non Latino 
candidates for public office, but also some of the Latino and non Latino elected 
officials were necessary for the development and growth of CASA de Maryland and 
its political profile. 
 In sum, the emergence and consolidation of a strong politically oriented 
organization as Casa de Maryland, whose role would be critical in the immigration 
rallies of March and April 2006, was possible due to a combination of factors, 
including the existence of a “fertile area” with a growing underrepresented population 
and a low organizational density; a strategically mutually convenient alliance with 
local governments in the area; and functional partnerships with political 
candidates/officials. 
 In the Virginia section of the Washington metropolitan area, there were efforts 
in a similar direction, although none of them achieved the magnitude of CASA de 
Maryland. One of the organizations working directly on organizing low income 
minorities, including a large proportion of Latino immigrants, was Tenants and 
Workers United. Throughout its history, starting back in the mid eighties, the 
organization had conducted successful organizing campaigns in areas such as 
housing, day labor, living wages for contract workers, and immigration. As Casa de 
Maryland, Tenants and Workers also received funds from foundations and the 
government for the explicit purpose of doing political organizing in the community. 
 
We organize the old way. Knocking on doors, making phone calls, we do 
some newsletters, we use the media somewhat… we should use it much more 
but we use it somewhat… we work with our allies churches and unions. So 
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those are all things that we do. But it’s… our focus, our approach to 
organizing is to build cadre and leaderships… people that understand the sort 
of opportunity, understand the campaign, understand what we are working on 
and are leaders and can move other people. That’s our approach to work. I 
mean, unfortunately it’s hard to grow massively… a thousand people show up 
it’s only so much leadership you can do if you have that scale. But up to 
know, for the last 20 years we’ve really been working on sort of that narrow… 
you know, find particular issues that are affecting people, organize the people 
most effective at the core of your work, develop allies around that, make your 
demands on the state, collect your victory. That’s been sort of our approach, 




5.2.3. Political Landscape 
 
Latinos in government 
 
From a political point of view, the election of several Latino officials for 
different positions at different levels (including local, county, and state level) 
represented a significant change for the community. That process was much more 
accentuated in the Maryland section of the Washington suburbs. Following the 
election of Ana Sol Gutierrez to the Montgomery County Board of Education in 
1990—which as the first Salvadoran in the history of the US to win an elected 
position, represented a symbolic milestone—there was a palpable increase in the 
presence of Latinos in elected offices. In 2006, three Latinos from the metropolitan 
area (Victor Ramirez, Ana Sol Gutierrez, and Jocelyn Peña-Melnyk) held elective 
seats in the Maryland House of Delegates; and two other Latinos (William Campos, 
Tom Perez) were elected members of the Prince George’s County Council and the 
Montgomery County Council respectively. In addition, the town of Edmonston had a 
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Latino mayor and a few Latinos held elected seats in the City councils of 
Gaithersburg, Bladensburg, and Mount Ranier. Given the minority status of Latinos 
in each of the jurisdictions, the election of these officials relied heavily on the support 
of voters from other ethnicities—whites and, against the odds, also blacks.47 In the 
Virginia portion of the metropolitan area, only one Latino occupied an elected office 
higher the level of school board (Arlington County Board Walter Tejada). The 
situation in Washington, D.C., on the other hand, diametrically contrasts the one 
observed in the suburb—especially, in the Maryland portion: No Latino had ever 
been elected to an office above the school board in the District. 
 Some of these elected officials in suburban areas had held positions of a 
leadership in the community, and others had been active members of community 
organizations. A couple of elected officials in Maryland, for example, had in the past 
been members of the board of directors of Casa de Maryland. This indicates the 
existence of a synergy between Casa de Maryland and leaders in some public offices, 
which would, in turn, be reflected in the impulse of different projects. 
 
These are people who have been in the organization, they have toughened up 
here, they have fought with us and now they are assuming serious 
responsibilities in key positions in the state and in the county. For us this is 
something definitely historical and in some ways we played a role. (Gonzalo 
Diaz, a leader from Casa) 
 
 
Although having Latinos represented in public offices by their peers appeared 
to be a strong desire within some sectors in the community, many also recognized 
that it is equally as important to have allies from other ethnicities that would favor 
                                                 
47 On the support of blacks to Latino candidates see Lazo, Luz. 2006. “MD Latinos Gain Politically 
Aided by Black Votes, Allies.” The Washington Post, August 18, 2006, final edition. 
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pro-Latino policies. This is especially important when considering that Latinos 
themselves did not have the numbers to influence electing “their own” candidates by 
themselves. They did, however, have sufficient numbers to define an election, and 
that is the reason several non-Latino candidates courted the Latino vote. In sum, they 
needed the votes from other communities to get their candidates elected as well as 
support from public officials from other ethnicities in the formal political arena. One 
idea that some interviewees raised, in this respect, was the need to create alliances 
with progressive sectors of other communities in order to coordinate common 
agendas. 
From the perspective of Latino elected officials, the importance of having 
political representation in public offices is for the community an essential way to gain 
visibility and to effectively impact the decision making process and from a practical 
view, an opportunity for Latinos to have of someone ‘like them’ to go to. The 
following excerpts of interviews I had with some of them are good examples of that 
view. 
 
We don’t have people placed in different positions who can say look, do 
that…. There are many people in this county, staff that constantly tell me…. 
They put obstacles that this, that that… you know what? Do it! Period. It 
sounds difficult. But if necessary you can say that […] In Washington like in 
other places we don’t have the influence of being able to be at the level of 
saying do it! Right? Here in the county, it is possible to say that…. Because I 
am elected by the vote, by the people. And that commands a strong message 
(Sergio Arteaga, a Latino elected official from the suburbs of Washington, 
D.C.) 
 
If you are not there [in elected offices] you remain invisible. But the most 
important phenomenon, I think, is that they have seen me and they have the 
face of someone that is like them, that speaks their language and that is 
something that psychologically has made a great difference in how they feel 




On the other extreme of the spectrum, there were also critical voices that pointed out 
what they saw as a fallacy of thinking; that having Latinos in elected offices is per se 
a positive thing for the Latino community. As one interviewee put it “you have to 
prove yourself.” 
 
I think that this is the Americanization of the community. Have one of us 
representing at the political level, that does not mean that we will get what we 
want […] I believe that establishing the political force is not that. Look at the 
African American communities, when they wanted to have influence in the 
history of this country. When they wanted people to see that they were there 
and would not leave. What did they do? They affected the economy with 
boycotts, they affected the judicial system with legal cases. That’s how they 




Organizing efforts aimed at improving legislations that affect Latinos 
 
Throughout the last decade, the Washington, D.C. area witnessed several 
efforts that led to progressive legislation benefiting Latinos residing in the area. This 
was especially true in Maryland portion of the suburbs, where several initiatives 
spearheaded by advocacy organizations and backed by a notable participation of 
ordinary people led to favorable policies for the community. Examples of these 
initiatives include the continued non-requirement for drivers license applicants to 
prove legal U.S. status, the immigrant in-tuition bill initiative, and the defeat of 
English only legislation in the state of Maryland. In Montgomery County, a good 
illustration of these efforts is the domestic workers’ bill of rights initiative. In 
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Washington, D.C., on, the other hand, the passage of the Language Access Act48 was 
considered one of the most significant recent political victories for the community. 
In Maryland, an integral part of the promotion of these beneficial legislations 
(or the ability to stop harmful legislations) was the mobilization of the community to 
the state legislature or county councils to lobby for different legislation reform 
projects. Another big part was played by advocacy organizations (especially, Casa de 
Maryland) that have acted ‘in tandem’ with some government offices. Some talk 
about partnerships between government and advocacy organizations that have worked 
together to introduce new policies. Some counties in particular, such as Montgomery 
County, have been perceived as especially receptive with respect to immigrants. This 
is usually explained by the fact that they were more eager to support progressive 
legislation and innovative initiatives that would have been rejected in other locales.  
One example that illustrates the type of organizing and mobilization occurring 
before the immigration rallies of 2006 (and which would, in turn, have direct 
consequences in the organization of the rallies) is the case of driver licenses 
legislation in Maryland. The state of Maryland is singular in the fact that it is one of 
the few states in the country in which residents can obtain a drivers’ license 
regardless of their migratory status. The fact that this is still in force has been, in part, 
the result of a political effort led by Casa de Maryland. This effort involved the 
mobilization of the community around an issue broadly considered to be critically 
importance. When asked about the reasons for the success of pro-immigrant 
                                                 
48 The Language Access Act (LAA) is a law signed in 2004 whose purpose is to provide equal access 
and participation to public services, programs and activities for residents of the District of Columbia 
who are Non-English proficient. 
 
 206 
initiatives in Maryland immigrant advocates emphasized the ability of reading the 
needs of the community which, in turn, assured a broad mobilization around the issue. 
 
Around 7, 8 years ago… we had annual meetings with the community and one 
day I had a meeting with the community and I brought my own agenda, right? 
That it was important for us to fight for education, health, and housing and 
that those were key agendas in our community. I remember I gave a 20 minute 
speech, and everybody clapped after. I was taking with some 200 people, 
leaders that we had invited to the meeting when all the sudden one of the 
leaders come and tells me…  Gonzalo, your discourse was beautiful, we loved 
it, but you know that that is not what we want. And I was like… what? What 
we really think is that our priority has to be the driver license. It is not health, 
education, or housing at this point in time. It is the driver license. So we are 
calling you to see if you can redirect… they told me in a very respectful 
way…. Redirect the resources to fight for the driver’s license. I was scared but 
I learned the lesson again. It is to interpret what people are saying. So we 
redirected our resources and focused on the drivers’ license. The result was 
the participation of thousands and thousands in our community in actions, that 
if we called for actions in education, or housing they would not have 
mobilized. Because for them it was a key issue… that allows you to get 
education, health, right? So the mobilizations were incredible (Gonzalo Diaz, 
a political advocate from Casa de Maryland) 
 
While the connection between advocacy organizations and their bases was 
critical in this initiative, so was the connection with public officials that acted as allies 
in the initiative. In fact, the drivers’ licenses initiative was a product of collaboration 
between Casa de Maryland and some public officials. As one elected official asserted, 
“with respect to drivers’ licenses, that was something that we were able to maintain 
open with great effort…. And we have worked a lot in collaboration with Casa”. 
These collaborative experiences between nonprofits and governments have 
been described by Frasure and Jones Correa (2005) as two-sided relationships. 
Specifically, whereas nonprofits receive funding and support from local governments, 
“what governmental actors gain is legitimacy and lower transaction costs as 
government attempts to grapple with new issues and problems, like those brought 
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about by the changing demographics of suburbia.” (Frasure and Jones Correa 2005: 
23).      
The mobilization around the drivers’ license initiative would in time set the 
ground for the massive immigration rallies of 2006. In fact, it created a community 
network readily available for other mobilizations.  
 
I worked in Casa for three years and we were building a capacity to fight in 
Maryland… and we chose and issue which was driver license as a leading 
force to mobilize and organize communities all over Maryland… which went 
really good, we really had a lot of people moving around the driver’s license 
issue… which helped me to also be involved with Virginia and with 
Washington, DC learning about drivers license, because the way they work 
is… the triangle here, right? (Eduardo Gonzalez, a community organizer)49 
 
Another singular case of mobilization is Noche de Acción Latina (Latino 
Action Night), an annual event led by Casa de Maryland which draws hundreds of 
demonstrators to the steps of the Maryland State House. One elected official 
described this action as follows: 
 
We have Noche de Acción Latina, in Annapolis. They take 200 buses with 
people to lobby…It is a very honest Leadership. It is not that someone stands 
there and say these are the four things we are going to fight for and the good 
ones should follow, no? On the contrary, there is a process in which people 
are asked which is the issue they consider most important. And we are not 
going to have 20 issues…. Which are the 2 or 3 issues… For example, last 
year it was the Dream Act, which he have approved in previous years at the 
state level but then it was vetoed…. The driver’s licenses… to keep them 
open… so they choose the agenda… (Graciela Vallejos, an elected official) 
 
I then asked Ms. Vallejos about the process. An element that puzzled me was 
if and how undocumented people participated in a collective effort that would link 
them to the formal political system 
 
                                                 
49 Italics mine. 
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GC: So how is the process? Do they go and talk to different delegates? 
 
GV: They have meetings. They choose the night, no? We have done it in 
different ways. The first time, which I believe was more effective… that 
lobbying is done by the Catholic Church, and tons of people, no? But the first 
time they were small groups that went to visit legislators in their offices. A 
letter was written for them which said we are going to be there (on the Latino 
Action Night) and we would like to meet with you, since you represent us, no? 
And they were workers, workers wearing their chompas (jackets), no? It is 
always cold. So there were thousands and thousands getting into the 
elevators… 
 
GC: And they weren’t afraid… 
 
GV: They weren’t afraid because that is what being with Casa has allowed 
them. Being able to participate in an organized and effective way. 
 
GC: And also feel protected? 
 
GV: And feel protected. Later they changed it because it was too difficult to 
organize. So in the last two years they booked big rooms and invited different 
delegates to go and listen to their constituents. Sophisticated, you understand? 
Because the person needs to know who represents her there, who their three 
representatives are, who their senators are. And that they have a right to come 
and demand me and other gringos because that is how it works. Your 
constituent is somebody that a politician sees as…. 
 
GC: But that happens even with undocumented people? 
 
GV: But people don’t talk about that. Everything is very mixed. And in 
general the one who speak say, ‘I am a US citizen, I wrote it…’ They try to 
emphasize the thing. The important thing is to mix different voices, and I 
think that is what gives strength to Casa. 
 
Another example of progressive legislation proposal initiated in the 
community was the domestic workers bill of rights initiative. Beginning in 2005, an 
unlikely but profound series of events aimed at providing legal protection to domestic 
workers unfolded in Montgomery County. Against the odds, a group of domestic 
workers, together with local advocacy organisations, pushed forward the Domestic 
Worker’s Bill of Rights (hereafter, the Bill of Rights), an initiative conceived to 
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entitle domestic workers for the first time with the right of a written contract, health 
insurance, sick leave, and paid vacations, among other provisions. Indeed, the sole 
preparation and presentation of the Bill of Rights in the County Council has 
demonstrated innovative characteristics over the course of its development. In 
particular, the initiative is significant as an illustration of an unprecedented type of 
legislation introduced by a group (domestic workers) that rarely constitute a political 
actor50. This is even more significant if we consider the fact that the majority of the 
women workers involved in the campaign, as well as the population that the bill 
would ultimately affect are immigrants and in great proportions undocumented. 
Additionally, the pioneer nature of this legislation could inform other efforts in other 
locales.  
In the project’s formulation, negotiation, and, ultimately, approval, it was 
essential the capacity that intervening organizations (especially, advocacy 
organizations such as Casa de Maryland) showed in appropriating sufficient numbers 
and, most importantly, a social-organisational base. Such capacity was reflected in a 
clear participatory role of the workers themselves, multilateral support of 
organisations with a strong presence in the area, and the adoption of successful 
models from other contexts. It was also critical the attribution of an opportunity of 
effective intervention at the local level, in a County appreciated as politically 
receptive.  
                                                 
50 Although a varied body of research tend to emphasize the manifold existing difficulties that hinder 
the organisation and mobilisation of domestic workers, several studies have shed light on efforts of 
organisation in different locales in industrialized countries (see, for example, Schwenken 2003; 
Stasiulis and Bakan 1997, Anderson 2001, Poo and Tang 2005, and Hondagneu-Sotelo 2001). 
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The initiative has also opened up an opportunity for the politicization of the 
domestic workers in the area. Throughout the process of this initiative, some 
workers—many of whom are not formal members of the political community because 
of their immigration status—have constituted themselves as a political actor with an 
active role in the local political system. On the one hand, they have significantly 
affected instances of formulation of public policy. On the other hand, their actions 
have been seen and heard publicly and broadcasted by the media. An example of the 
increase in the public visibility of the domestic workers was their noticeable role in 
the massive rally for immigration reform that took place in Washington, DC on April 
10, 2006, where members of the Committee of Women came up to the stage.   
Whereas in Maryland these ‘victories’ are more evident, the situation in the 
other districts is quite different. In the District, for example, one of the scarce political 
conquests attained by the Latino community in the last decade was the equal access 
bill.  
 
I believe that one of the few victories that have been is that they got to 
persuade the administration, the government, of something called equal 
access. They passed a law whereby all the instances have to give equal access 
to all groups regardless of their language. So, as a result of that victory, you 
now go to any government agency and you will find information in at least 
four languages… And they have a system where they send you an interpreter 
to give you the services (Tadeo Ramirez) 
In the case of northern Virginia, a series of mobilizing initiatives including 
mainly but not exclusively Latinos around housing and labor issues have been 
deployed by Tenants and Workers United during the last couple of decades.  
 In sum, prior to the mass rallies of 2006 in Washington, D.C., several 
experiences of organizing/political mobilization of Latinos have taken place in the 
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area, mostly in the suburbs. Most of these cases were part of issue-related campaigns 
and the majority targeted local or state governments. These episodes of social 
mobilization have been to a great extent organized and planned by community-based 
organizations. In addition, the informal partnerships between governments and 
community-based organizations played a significant part in the successful cases in 
which pro-immigrant pieces of legislation were approved. As opposed to these cases 
of organized mobilization, however, spontaneous episodes of protest were rare. 
 
Anti-immigrant atmosphere 
In the few years that immediately preceded the immigration rallies of 2006, an 
anti-immigrant atmosphere seemed to surface in the U.S. In the Washington, D.C. 
area this anti-immigrant feeling was rooted in some sectors of the population became 
it became clear in several actions aimed at seriously limiting immigrants’ 
participation in the community. In other words, anti-immigrant forces became pro-
active in trying to ban immigrants’ participation in any aspect of public life, including 
from work, to driving, to getting an education. Examples of anti-immigrant actions go 
from proposals of “English only” legislations, to attempts to deny drivers licenses to 
undocumented immigrants, to efforts to close day labor centers in some localities, to 
proposals to refuse to admit children of undocumented immigrants in public schools. 
 Because the establishment of work centers has been one of the most 
prominent arenas of dispute, it is a good illustration of the growing anti-immigrant 
atmosphere. Conflict around day labor regulation and, in particular, regarding pick up 
sites has been a persistent issue in the Washington-DC metropolitan area during the 
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last few years (see Frasure and Jones-Correa 2005). Specifically, the conflicts around 
day labor sites’ locations affected several localities in the area, including Herndon, 
Silver Spring, Tacoma Park, and Gaithersburg. Day labor, on the other hand, is one of 
the principal sectors of employment for Latino men in the lower income groups. 
According to the U.S. Census Bureau, in the year 2000 36 percent of Latin American 
immigrant men in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area were employed in 
construction, making up the single most important industry for this group. Given that 
many construction workers are day laborers, issues regarding day labor are of critical 
importance. 
 In Herndon, Virginia, whose population according to the 2000 Census was 
about 26 percent Latino, the conflict around the opening of a day labor site in 2005 
led to a very singular conflict scenario.  In an effort to organize and formalize the 
pick-up and drop-off of day laborers in the town, the local government approved the 
creation of a day labor center, which was largely resisted by part of the neighbors, 
some elected officials, and a few organizations. This decision, in turn, opened the 
field for a series of debates around critical issues regarding political inclusion, such as 
tax-payment, jurisdiction, immigration, rights and entitlements. The conflict 
intensified after an offshoot of the Minutemen Project—an organization whose 
explicit goal is to prosecute illegal aliens—became involved, attempting to patrol day 
labor sites and report illegal immigrants to authorities. This issue resulted in the 
formation of a pro-labor organization called HEART (Herndon Embraces all in 
Respect and Tolerance). In this case, the involvement of Latin American immigrants 
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in the public sphere seemed to come after both the initiative of the state at the local 
level, and the prosecution of other actors. 
 The event in Herndon was also, in some ways, an antecedent of some of the 
events that would occur in 2006 regarding immigration. 
 
Remember that all this [the debate on immigration] started earlier, in 2005, 
with all the issue in Herndon, around the day labor center. Then is where the 
debate on illegal immigration started... that it started being in the media and 
then all that polemic began in a town as small as Herndon, and then came 
Sensenbrenner, the rallies, the articles on the division of the Latino 
leadership…. (Zulma Pizarro, journalist) 
 
  According to many voices in the community, the anti-immigrant feeling was 
particularly aggravated after the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001. In the eyes of 
many people in the community, being an immigrant became synonymous with being 
a terrorist, of which everyone was suspicious.  
 
Everything came together. Now people are more afraid of undocumented 
immigrants than they are afraid of terrorism. Before undocumented 
immigrants were not a main concern. Now everyone thinks in that they are 
mistaken. (Gerardo Cejas) 
 
Since September 11th, the immigrant community has been attacked from the 
left and the right… (Ruben Portaluppi, union leader) 
 
 All in all, this increased anti-immigrant feeling led to a series of negative 
outcomes for Latinos, ranging from episodes of violence like the one that transpired 
in Herndon, to unfriendly public policies. This sentiment partly explains both the 
hardening of immigration policy (the Sensenbrenner bill being one clear example) 





5.3. Planning a mass mobilization event 
 
As mentioned in the previous section, the Sensenbrenner Bill constituted the 
starting point of a national movement in the Latino community that represented one 
of the largest demonstrations led by a singular group in American history. However, 
although the bill was approved by the House of Representative in December 2005, it 
was not until March and April 2006 that the community reacted in mass through vast 
demonstrations. The purpose of this section is to uncover the dynamics that took 
place during this period both in terms of threat and opportunity attribution by the 
community (looking at both organized actors and unorganized subjects), and social 
appropriation and organization led by community leaders and collective actors that 
made possible the massive demonstrations of march and April 2006 in Washington, 
D.C. 
It is important to point out that although the rallies of 2006 in Washington, 
DC were part of a national effort, in this dissertation I am going to focus exclusively 
on the conditions and actions developed at a the local level. In other words, I will 
particularly examine the local forces that made possible a massive mobilization in 
Washington DC as well as the impact these demonstrations had for the Latino 
community locally. 
 




In this section I will review the main components that informed the local 
community actors’ attribution of threat and political opportunities in the months 
preceding the rallies of 2006. In particular, I will examine the factors present in the 
framing of the threat (the Sensenbrenner Bill passed by the House of Representatives 
in December 2005) as well as in the construction of an opportunity to act collectively 
through a mass rally.  
Unlike other reactions such as the Mount Pleasant Riots in 1991 in which the 
reaction from the community is immediate and spontaneous, there was a gap of 
almost three months between the approval of HR 4037 and the realization of the 
massive street response. Disentangling what happened in this period is, then, critical 
in order to understand the occurrence of the unprecedented rallies later on. 
In my research I found that the combination of the interpretation of HR4037 
as a direct attack against the Latino community and the reading of an existing 
“community readiness” by local activists were the two main elements that account for 
the framing of threat and opportunity that contributed to the deployment of the 
collective action. 
 
Reading the Sensenbrenner Bill as a community threat 
 
In December 2005 the House of Representative passed legislation known as the 
Sensenbrenner Bill, a bill that would in a few short months become the target of a 
massive Latino mobilization throughout the country. But, before the Latino 
community would engage in such unprecedented public activism, the community 
 
 216 
needed to become aware of the bill and read it as a threat. This framing required 
active work by community leaders, heads of organizations and community organizers, 
and that took time.  
 
Criminalization: Our church, our kids, and our teachers 
 
In the framing of the bill, some organizers involved advocated for the need to 
frame the bill in such a way so that it would resonate with valued elements in the 
Latino community. The following quote illustrates clearly in what way the content of 
the bill was synthesized in order to be presented to the public: 
 
It’s the experience, you know? To tell you the truth for me it’s this… when 
you take a look at our communities there are three things you don’t fuck 
around with: “nuestra iglesia jajaja, nuestros niños y los maestros, verdad? 
Jajajajaja Sagrado corazón de Jesús, verdad?” (our Church hahaha, our 
children, and our teachers, right? Ha ha ha sacred heart of Jesus, right?) So 
when I read the bill, I said shit! So this is how it’s attacking the church, this is 
how it’s attacking the teachers, and this is how they are attacking our children. 
So when you got to tell the people in the street, say your children are not 
going to be able to go to school, you’re not going to be able to go to church, 
the priests can go to jail, the teachers can go to jail… they say shit! So then 
you do that… then people would react. And that’s what we did. Right now we 
can react and we can cut the issue in a very strategic way… the whole thing 
around the deportations and incarcerations and stuff… you know what we 
need to come out and say this is what happening… people are ready to step 
up… even when there’s a lot of fear, they are ready to stand up. The question 
is how you do it. And how we sustain…So that’s like an art… It’s how you 
cut it, how you present it. And the other thing is a lot of people get so busy 
and so hung up in language… and we didn’t think of how to maintain it 
(Eduardo Gonzalez, a community organizer) 
 
 The campaign, then, would be mounted on the notion of the criminalization 
contained in the bill. When I asked Eduardo Gonzalez, a community organizer active 
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in the planning of the rallies, how organizers came up with the framing utilized, he 
referred to the use of a bottom-up approach: 
 
You just know through experience, man. I kind of taste, test it when I am on 
the streets, talking in the churches, talking to the people because…you see a 
lot of people in DC, here, that are trying to do legislation from their offices. 
Those of us who are organizers, we are on the streets, I am in the morning 
with the day laborers, talking to them, feeling how they feel and based on that 
you make decisions. Also experience, organizing… (Eduardo Gonzalez, 
community organizer). 
 
 Along similar lines, the idea of “reading” what the community did not want 
was also considered as key by other of my interviewees. 
 
Churches, institutions, schools, hospitals, community organizations, all of us 
were considered criminals under that legislation. That made our community 
angry to an extent that it felt physically and morally assaulted. So that was the 
historical moment that we had the virtue of reading correctly. Again, we are 
always behind the community, the community is always ahead of us. We have 
to be reading what the community feel and think in order to go out (Gonzalo 
Diaz, a leader from Casa de Maryland). 
 
Although many times we said participate, come here, go to a school meeting, 
go there… there was a lack of participation. But when they put you and say 
we are going to make you a criminal if you are in this country and help illegal 
persons… that puts you… I’ll go to jail! How can that be possible… if you are 
a kid and you think… they are going to send my mom to jail! Or my dad, 
because he is undocumented… that hurts… and we all react to that… (Sergio 
Arteaga, public official). 
 
In sum, the deployment of an effective interpretive construction of the 
problem by organizers, in which several highly socially valued symbols, such as 
family, church, and teachers were at the fore, was key in the way ordinary people 
would position themselves against the bill.   
 




 Aside from seeing the approval of the Sensenbrener bill in the House of 
Representatives as a direct threat toward the immigrant community and, specifically, 
toward the Latino community, leaders of local community-based organization viewed 
signs of the readiness of the community to ‘go public’. In particular, the growing anti-
immigrant environment had created increasing tension and energy in immigrant 
communities around the country. With respect to local groups, an organizer 
mentioned that they were ‘ready to act’. Thus, there was a widespread feeling of 
anger in the community that married well to a network of local organizations that had 
the infrastructure to mobilize people and was eager to do it.  
 
So Sensenbrenner passed, HR4437, and that’s what really said… what we are 
doing is not enough and we need to figure out how to do something bigger, 
think bolder, and how do we use this moment in time where the community, 
the Latino community and the immigrant community in the country saw like 
outrage by the fact that this thing got out of the hands. So, you know, before 
the bill passed, it passed on the 12th of December 05, the 11th we had about 
500 people in front of the Republican headquarters, same thing in front of the 
Democratic headquarters the next day, the bill passed anyway. So you know, 
we said, it’s December, it’s gonna be hard to do anything so really the 
beginning of 2006 and the coalition figured out that we needed to do 
something much bolder. And that’s when we hired an organizer to help lead 
that effort because all of the people in the coalition we have full time jobs. 
(Rubén Portaluppi, a labor union leader) 
 
 Because the critical place that immigration held in the Latino population, the 
Sensenbrenner Bill touched a nerve in the community that spurred them into action, 
In fact, among all the issues of particular concern for the Latino community, 
immigration tended to rank first. As one of my interviewees asserted, “Immigration 
unifies all of us”. Even for those in the community who would not be  directly 
affected by the toughening of immigration laws, the immigration issue was critical. 
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“Each of us knows someone, a family member, a relative, a friend, who is here 
illegally” 
Combined, the attribution of a threat in the advancement of what was seen as 
an anti-immigrant bill and the interpretation of a community readiness to engage in 
public demonstrations triggered a series of organizing efforts that would deal to one 
of the most massive political demonstrations that existed in recent history in the area. 
 
 
The need to take the fight to the streets 
 
One point critical to the strategy to defeat the Sensenbrenner Bill was the 
definition of the best field where to combat the legislation. The plan was to use a 
highly-visible location that would put the community on stage for the mass public. 
That rationale, therefore, inspired the decision to take to the streets. In other words, 
instead of utilizing traditional lobbying mechanisms through the intervention of 
lawyers and legal experts, the thought behind the strategy designed was to turn the 
anti-immigration bill into a subject of public debate and, most importantly, to show 
the power in numbers of the Latino community. This, in turn, required creating a 
message to back the rallies that would appeal both the Latino community (which was 
expected to turn to the streets), and the community at large.   
 
[Sensenbrenner] had the control and nobody… the fight that they were doing 
to him was from lobbyists and stuff light that. And… (pause) if you are going 
to fight a politician in creating the law based on the regulations there that you 
don’t know, they will screw you up. Because they know how. We don’t know 
how. So my thinking was we’ll take you to the streets. I know how to fight the 
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streets jajaja I’ll take you there… I know how to work the media, I know how 
send this out there… no problem. And we calculated how to move it. The first 
one was ‘we are not criminals’… nothing about legalizations… ‘We are not 
criminals’, that was our first movement. That… how we move and you see the 
first march… ‘we are not criminals’ and children’s shirts, ‘we are not 
criminals’…That’s the message, you know… The message is ‘we are not 
criminals’. Then the second message after that ‘we are not criminals’ is ‘we 
are all together, we are immigrants, we are together fighting for…. at the end 
was legalization for all. So we elevated… if we go from legalization for all at 
the beginning we will be bad. We are not criminals was appealing to 
mainstream America. The politicians do not want to be seen criminalizing 
children. So that’s how we started the whole piece. (Eduardo Gonzalez, 
community organizer). 
 
 Traditional channels of political negotiation where then considered 
insufficient to stop legislation of this type. In a sense, one assumption was, although 
many Latinos were in many ways politically invisible—they could not vote, they 
could not be elected for office, and they were excluded from many rights derived 
from legal residency or citizenship- and, for that reason, had limited access to 
instances of political decision making, they did have the power of the number and 
they were physically present. The most appropriate territory for their fight could then 
hardly be the institutions of political representation but the street and the public 
opinion.  
 This notion underlies the narrative of a Latino organization leader from the 
area when she mentioned “the issue wasn’t gonna be resolved because an elite group 
was gonna meet with the mayor or with the governor. It really was we think that the 
possible solution involves massive mobilization so let’s do that… which really hadn’t 




 The message was simple and clear: Because the Sensenbrenner bill is a clear 
attack to what the Latinos considered to be “our community”, a community largely 
composed of immigrants and families of immigrants, “we”, as a community, need to 
stop it. And, as some interviewees asserted, “it is a lot easier to organize people 
against something than it is for something”. 
 
 
Latino media effectiveness in the delivery of the message 
 
 In order to transition from the recognition of a threat to the construction of an 
opportunity for action, the diffusion of the message was critical. In that sense, the 
local media played a crucial role. This was especially the case with local Spanish 
language radios that have a broad reach in the community. 
 
I think because there was a popular message. I think that the role of the Latino 
media and the phonation is really important. That there really were the DJ’s, 
there really was a process in newspapers and that kind of thing. (Elizabeth 
Mederos) 
 
 The repeated reference that my interviewees made to the critical role the 
media played in delivering the message made me raise questions about what 
motivated the different media outlets to become deeply involved in this case. Gregory 
Lopez a community leader and organizer explained this media involvement by 
referring to previous experiences of collaboration with local organizations. 
 
GL: The media, even if it’s corporate media or not was like moving with the 
people, and was out there… you know, was pushing, you know, pushing the 
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march. And that really made a huge difference in terms of ‘get out in the 
street, get out in the street, get out in the street’…Whether there was 
merengue or regaeton it was pushing down the streets… really important… 
 
GC: How did the media get involved in this?  
 
JL: There was a connection between all these little groups and the media. 
There’s always been a history in terms of looking for articles, looking for 
stories… so we got tons of press clippings over the 20 years… lots of groups 
do because there’s not that much… there’s not that many groups, relatively 
small groups, there is  a relatively good relationship. I think the Latino press is 
also… identifies with his audience in a good way. So it felt like it was living 
the same thing and it was proud to see this stuff going out there. 
 
 
A message for outside: an attempt to humanize the debate 
 
In planning La Marcha, organizers placed particular attention to the message 
that the community at large would receive. The conversations I had with leaders and 
community organizers involved in the planning of the rallies revealed the presence of 
a particular effort leading to gain the favor of average voters while trying to engage 
the immigrant community in general, and the Latino community in particular.  
 
And we had something that was burnt into the public consciousness, these 
rallies around the country that were a national phenomenon but also very 
local, where average voters got the opportunity to see… to see Spanish-
speaking people who lived differently from them, waving an American flag, 
having children, having families. We through these events… really 
humanizing the immigrant community in a way that was shamefully not 
happening before. So discussions about undocumented communities were 
done in numbers as opposed to in people, and they were done in terms of 
budget dollars but not in terms of people. And so when the event happened, as 
I said, it raised the volume, it provided a news making event, so we were able 
to lead the news a little bit, and push it from our perspective. And then what 
happened as a sort of spill out from that is that reporters came and covered the 
event so… and then the spill out is that then they do the personal interest 
stories. . So you have the story of the faith community in a certain city who 
has voted on part of the whole community to be a sanctuary, a place of 
sanctuary. You have stories about the high school valedictorian who is 
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undocumented, came here at the age of two, and now can’t get financial aid. 
You have different stories like that that were starting to appear really in mass 
around the country, definitely here in the Washington area, about people… 




5.3.2. Social/organizational appropriation 
 
This section will address the factors that aided or hindered the process through 
which Latinos constituted themselves in a challenger group through the work of pre-
existing and new organizations. Unlike what happened in Mount Pleasant in 1991, 
where ordinary people took to the streets as soon as they heard about the attack on a 
Latino worker from a police officer, La Marcha took considerable planning. The 
period between the approval of HR 4037 by the House of Representatives and the 
massive rallies in March and April of 2006, was characterized by intense organizing 
and a massive mobilizing effort by community-based organizations. 
 The day before the Sensenbrenner Bill was voted on in the House of 
Representatives in December 2005, Latino organizations gathered a small number of 
people in front of the Republican headquarters and a similar number in front of the 
Democratic headquarters to express their disapproval of this legislation. As we now 
know, the bill was approved over their protest. It was at that point that leaders of local 
Latino organizations, grouped under the NCIC, assessed what happened and 
determined that it was necessary “to do something much bolder”. They also noted that 
something on that much of a larger scale would require considerable planning. In this 
section I will examine the combination of factors that led to the unprecedented 
massive mobilization of 2006 in Washington, D.C.  I will focus on the series of 
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conditions present and decisions made in the period between December 2005 and 
March 2006 that led to the success of La Marcha. Although critical to understand the 
outcome of the effort, these organizing movements rarely appear in the press and, as a 
consequence, the reconstruction of these factors could only be analyzed from data 
gained through interviews with key actors. 
In most of my interviews, the media, churches, and unions, were depicted as 
the trinity necessary to make such a political event possible. Adding to that critical 
combination, community-based organizations, both Latino and non-Latino, with their 
rich tradition of mobilizing the community for other political endeavors, would 
provide an infrastructure that was comparably crucial. With respect to the 
collaboration with non-Latino organizations, it is worth noting that although it was 
effective and there were other voices, faces, and languages present at the 
mobilization, the rallies were clearly led by the Latino community. 
The April 10th mobilization on Washington was the flagship in a major series 
of rallies throughout the entire country. The synchronization of these nationwide 
demonstrations required considerable planning and coordination. The NCIC, the 
coalition that led the effort in D.C. took the lead in coordinating with other coalitions 
and unions across the United States. In spite of the fact that the mobilization in 
Washington, D.C. was part of a national effort, I will focus exclusively on the factors 
and dynamics that took place at the local level, in the D.C. area, purposely leaving out 
from the analysis the nationwide coordination efforts.  
Even at the local level, the mobilization represented not only a Latino struggle 
but a effort involving the immigrant community at large as well as immigration 
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supporters from various backgrounds. In the District in particular, other communities 
were also actively engaged in the effort not only by attending the rallies but also 
helping with logistics (for example, African taxi drivers that are numerous in the area 
provided transportation for people attending the rallies). However, in this dissertation 
I exclusively look at the Latino community, which headed the organization of the 
event. 
 
Profile of organizations leading the effort 
The rallies were formally organized by the NCIC, the National Capital 
Immigration Coalition, a group formed by a number of organizations in the District 
(including community based organizations, service-providing organizations, labor 
unions, and churches) with the aim of coordinating strategies regarding immigration 
issues. The existence of an umbrella organization such as the NCIC was crucial for 
the coordination of the efforts in the metropolitan D.C. area. The NCIC centralized 
the strategy discussions and political negotiations. It was also the tool utilized to 
reach out to other immigrant communities.  
From an organizational point of view, the NCIC had a Board of Directors that 
represented the three different main jurisdictions in the metropolitan region (with 
three representatives each from Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia 
respectively). Its executive board also contained one person from each region.. 
According to some, however, the coalition only existed “on paper” and was only 
brought to life through the mobilization effort around the Sensenbrenner bill. 
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While the NCIC provided the umbrella organization, it is important to note 
that this was a coalition. Within the coalition, not all organizations contributed 
equally. The unions and local organizations proved to have a strong capacity for 
mobilization/organization. Such capacity had been evident in a series of mobilizing 
efforts in the past. Casa de Maryland, for example, which was one of the most visible 
organizations in the mobilizing efforts of 2006, had utilized the infrastructure already 
developed in previous campaigns. 
 
Each year anti-immigrant sectors try to pass legislation to take away our 
driver licenses. So the creation of the committees in support of the driver 
licenses had maintained our community active and ready for the struggle. The 
reason why I mention this is that those committees are the ones in which we 
supported our effort to mobilize people in 2006. It was those committees the 
ones that actively mobilize to invite and summon other members of the 
community to participate in the rallies […] It was incredible…. Thousands, I 
don’t know how many…. Thousands and thousands of phone calls we made. 
A hundred thousand calls, I don’t recall any longer. Voluntaries from our 
office every day calling, day and night. From their houses, we passed the 
directories to them because we had the lists with all the people who 
participated in the drivers licenses. With all the phone numbers, thousands, 
calling all of them. That was something… a very beautiful organizing process 
we had. The announcements in churches. Those committees went to all 
churches to share, and not only in Maryland…. In Virginia, in Washington, to 
share, to invite, the radios…. (Gonzalo Diaz, a leader of Casa de Maryland) 
 
 The role that the infrastructure of these grassroots agencies played in the 
mobilization of people was described by the leader of one of these organizations as a 
skeleton: 
 
You had a bunch of sort of groups like us, Casa… different sizes, I mean, 
Casa is much bigger. But… enough groups to form a skeleton… a skeleton of 
communication, a skeleton that could run buses, a skeleton that could do 
mobilizing, a skeleton that can… you had infrastructure… emerging 
infrastructure, emerging political leadership, a backbone. It wasn’t just a 
spontaneous thing. You had somebody to help make it happen. (Gregory 




 All in all, the nearly all organizations with a history of work with the Latino 
community participated in La Marcha. Although the leadership of the effort was 
concentrated in the more grassroots, politically-oriented organizations, the service-
oriented nonprofits were also highly supportive of the march. The service-oriented 
organization staff went to the rallies; the directors distributed the informational 
literature to their clients. At affiliated schools, entire student bodies were invited to 
go.  
 
This thing with immigration has been very interesting because it is not any 
more in the hands of “agencieros” (heads of agencies). This is a different 
process. And although many of the agencies are lending their people, or 
resources, or whatever, they are not guiding the process any longer. (Blanca 
Galindez, head of a service providing agency) 
 
 This quote highlights the transition in community leadership because of this 
immigration issue. I will return to this point later, when I assess the implications that 
the massive entry of the immigrant community (especially, the Latino community) in 
the public sphere in March-April 2006. 
 
The involvement of churches 
 
 It is widely known that churches generally play a critical role in the lives of 
Latinos, both as civic associations51 and as service providers. As mentioned earlier, 
within the Washington, D.C. metropolitan region, congregations of different 
denominations (though overwhelmingly Christian) are spread out all over the map. 
All together, this network of churches has the capacity to reach nearly the Latino 
                                                 
51 See Jones-Correa and Leal (2001). 
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population quite effectively. Also mentioned earlier, many congregations in the area 
engage in a range of political activities, including encouraging people to attend to 
rallies, asking members to sign petitions, and talking about policy issues during 
sermons. Moreover, most congregations work with advocacy organizations on a 
regular basis. During the planning of the immigration rallies in 2006, not surprisingly, 
churches played a key role in mobilizing their members. 
 
Yes, you know, the Catholic Church… we worked with them very closely. So 
for April 10th we really organized April 10th the day after Palm Sunday 
because the idea was, in L.A., and here, and in Baltimore and other major 
markets, the unions and the coalitions really had a good relationship with the 
archdioceses. So Palm Sunday we were at all the churches in the region. Or 
almost all the churches that we could cover, passing out flyers, speaking from 
the pulpit saying, you know, this is happening, we need to come out and… 
you know, the next day we had 300,000 people on the street. So the churches 
played a big role. (Rubén Portaluppi, a labor union leader) 
 
 In the case of the Catholic Church, this support was the result of a political 
stance the Church had taken in the U.S. in support of immigration. This stance is 
understandable if we take into account that a significant part of the Catholic Church 
membership in this country is Latino, which, in turn, constitutes the largest immigrant 
community in the country. In the Washington metropolitan area alone, the Catholic 
Church has approximately 250,000 Latino members. 
 
Catholic churches have played a role and will continue to play a role because 
they have clearly said that they will not do anything that would harm a human 
being, right. In the legislature I work very closely with the Catholic Church on 
immigration issues, work issues, licenses… they are the ones who support me. 
(Graciela Vallejos, an elected official)  
 
 Although the Catholic Church holds a special position of power in the Latino 
community, other religious denominations also have significant influence. The 
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following testimony by a local priest is illustrative of how the Latino constituency has 
become a key for the subsistence of those congregations. 
 
Thank to Hispanics churches have been injected with new blood. They have 
pushed a movement through the churches. Through the churches new voices 
have emerged and we have seen it for example in the big demonstrations we 
have had in the Capitol where the churches have moved all those people to 
participate. The [Catholic] Church has become a “spokesman”, no? So it has 
been important. Those who have moved this are Salvadorans that are 
committed with the Church. Other non catholic churches have also grown… 
evangelicals… they have also been benefited. So this has been for 
everybody…. There has been everything for everyone. (Father Cesar Recalde, 
a local priest) 
 
  While the direct and indirect participation of the Catholic Church in the 
organizing effort was crucial, groups from many other Christian denominations--
including Methodists, Lutherans, Episcopal, and different evangelical 
congregations—as well as Jewish and Muslim groups also supported the effort. What 
is even more interesting is that this interdenominational collaboration triggered by the 
immigration cause. The same priest described this cooperation in these terms: 
 
We got together not only as Catholic church but we also invited other 
churches… with all of them, with all, we don’t look at where you come from, 
or what you are, or anything. Immigration has no religion. Immigration has no 
political belief or anything. (Father Cesar Recalde) 
 
 When I asked how Churches helped mobilize people, one of the organizers 
asserted “from the pulpit, people were encouraged to go from there”. Other 
informant, pointed out that organizers together with religious leaders framed the 
invitation to participate using such terms as “welcoming the stranger”, or “I am 
hungry, you feed me”. A common mission of many religions, acting neighborly 
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towards all, united the various denominations in the face of the anti-immigration 
Sensenbrenner Bill.  
 
The key role of unions 
 
Among the key pieces in the mobilization effort was the work of the unions and, in 
particular, of the capital area district of the Service Employees International Union 
(SEIU), the largest property service workers union in the country.  Like in the case of 
the Catholic Church and other churches, SEIU bases its pro-immigrant commitment 
in the composition of its membership. 
 
You know, in SEIU I would dare say… we have 1.9 million members in the 
union. So it’s a very large union. Very powerful. Nationally I would say about 
15 to 20 percent of the membership of the union is immigrant. So with large 
numbers in New York, Chicago and California. So a lot of the… you know, 
naturally the union would be involved in issues that matter to the immigrant 
community because, you know, we have, whether you are documented or not 
our members would be affected by issues that are passed at the federal level 
or the local level. […] And then, our local 32BJ is the local that represents 
people in the property service division from Northern Virginia to Connecticut. 
So it covers 6 states and the District of Columbia and our local has about 
85,000 members of which I would say about 65 to 70 percent is immigrant or 
of immigrant descent. So out of 85,000 members in the largest property 
service local in the union, about 70 percent are immigrants so that’s why we 
do this work. . (Rubén Portaluppi, a labor union leader) 
 
 What appeared clearly in both the unions and the churches was a motivation 
to support pro-immigrant and pro-immigration initiatives; those organizations would 
not have been able to keep their membership if they had not taken their side on as 





The unions used to be against the immigrant movement, because it was 
competition for them. But they have learned now that it is not competition. 
They have lost so many members because the corporation have been gained so 
much territory that they have had to include immigrants in their organizing 
work. It is not so much that they buy it but it is beneficial for them. (Julio 
Cruz) 
 
The position of unions with respect to immigration is not and has not ever 
been unified. On July 25, 2005, SEIU (one of the unions that most decisively 
supported the pro-immigration actions in 2006) broke from the national federation of 
unions AFL-CIO, alleging irreconcilable disagreements with the conduction of the 
national organization. SEIU, with 1.8 million members and was the largest and fastest 
growing union in the AFL-CIO, had a more inclusive approach, consisting of helping 
low wage people of color, working women, and especially immigrants join the 
union.52 This fact would ultimately be key in the leading role that SEIU would adopt 
in the planning of immigrant rallies in 2006. The difference between SEIU and AFL-
CIO became evident once again after the rallies, when they held diametrically 
opposed positions in regard to the guest workers proposal. Whereas SEIU explicitly 
supported such proposal, the AFL-CIO believed that it would “flood the U.S. job 
market and further undercut American workers with cheap labor.” (Washington 
Times, April 14 2006) The elusive support of immigration and immigrant workers by 
AFL-CIO is usually explained by the dislike among manufacturing unions and others 
who attribute the displacement of their members to the influx of cheaper workers who 
are not protected by labor rights in the country. 
                                                 




The posture of organized labor regarding immigration has not been consistent 
over time. A shift in a number of progressive locals occurred in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s when a number of union leaders realized that without embracing 
immigrants the labor movement in low wage service industries would be seriously 
damaged (Varsanyi 2005). Although historically unions actually favored restrictive 
immigration policies, their position change when such measures favor organization of 
foreign-born workers (see Haus 1995). The rationale of this argument is that unions 
would attempt to organize immigrant workers in order to improve the interests of 
American workers. 
 In any event, and regardless of the multiple motivations for engaging in the 
support of immigration, the contribution of SEIU-32BJ to the success of the march 
was clear and decisive. It crystallized in not only its leadership in the planning of the 
marches, but also in its financial support—sources I consulted confirmed to me that 
SEIU-32 BJ contributed 200,000 dollars. In addition, leaders of the union directly 
encouraged their members to attend the rally as well as negotiated with employers to 
have them allow their workers to go to the demonstration. 
  
The role of media 
As mentioned in an earlier section, the media played a central role in the 
success of La Marcha by disseminating the news. The involvement of the media, 
however, occurred through an active effort to engage them led by grassroots 




The mass media was strategic as soon as they saw the political moment. We, 
the members of the coalition, had massive meetings with the directors of the 
means of communication in Spanish, and some other languages. Especially in 
Spanish… they played a determinant role. Inviting, accepting that they 
interview us, that they interview our community, and it was something 
massive… the result of all that. In the first rally that we had on March 7th last 
year… I remember that according to our analysis we expected between 10 and 
15 thousand people and suddenly we had around 60 thousand (Gonzalo Diaz, 
a leader of a community-based organization) 
 
 Of all the Spanish language media outlets, radios stations had the most impact 
in the mobilization. However, Latino newspapers and mainstream television and 
newspapers53 also became engaged in the diffusion of the message summoning 
community members to the marches.  
 
We could not have done the mobilization without especially the radios. 
Because people listen to the radio on their way home, they listen to the radio 
on their way to work, on their way to pick up the kids and so… in this region, 
we have el Zol which is, you know, 99.1 FM, they are very powerful. They 
have a huge reaching. (…) I mean, they were as fed up as we were, to be 
honest with you. And some stations more than others. But el Zol was and has 
been and is totally on board and we could not have done some of this stuff 
without them, or Vivo 900? and some of the other smaller stations but… I 
mean, yeah, media played a huge role. DJs played a huge role in this 
mobilization. They… we got on the air for free all the time, to tell people to 
come out. Newspapers, some people read newspapers, and they also played a 
big role. (Rubén Portaluppi, a labor union leader) 
 
 The next obvious question is: why did the media get so fully involved in the 
summoning of the community for the marches? On the one hand, there was a rich 
history of informal partnerships between community-based organizations in the area 
and the local media—especially, yet not exclusively, with the Latino media. Over the 
years, those organizations had a tradition of working together with local mediums of 
communication. Organizations regularly need the media to share relevant information 
                                                 
53 El Tiempo Latino, for example, one of the most important local newspapers in Spanish has a 
circulation of about 65,000 and 100,000 actual readers. 
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with the community or, more importantly, as an outlet to rally public opinion around 
problematic issues the media needs news to cover. In this case in particular, the 
greater the magnitude of the rallies (especially the second one that was part of a 
national movement), the more news coverage they would have in the days to come.  
And that was exactly what happened. Several days after the rally of April 10th, 
different articles on the implications of the march filled the pages of newspapers and 
occupied significant space on TV news programs. As one of my interviewees put it, 
“Newspapers, radio stations and the television all of the sudden have news, they have 
a hot piece of news and people want to watch the program or listen to the program or 
see the newspaper to see what is going on” (José Bendicente). 
 According to the organizers, having media support before, and after the event 
was one of the explicit goals of the whole organizing effort. Before La Marcha, media 
coverage was needed to get the people to the streets. After La Marcha, organizers 
needed the media and its stories to keep the issue alive. One of the graphic 
assessments on how the media served the purpose established is the following 
assortment by one organizer: “We moved the media the way we wanted them to 
move. The media didn’t move us”. 
 
5.4. La Marcha and its immediate aftermath 
 
La Marcha took place on April 10th, 2006. Hundreds of thousands of pro-
immigration demonstrators gathered at the Washington Monument to oppose the the 
Sensenbrenner Bill, the Border Protection, Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration 
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Control Act, as we as bring to light the situation of millions of immigrants claiming 
for inclusion, in Washington, D.C. Although estimates on crowd size vary—with 
more conservative sources estimating it at 300,000 and some organizers calculating it 
at around 500,000—there was common agreement about the unprecedented 
magnitude of the event. In fact, many see the occurrence of La Marcha as the most 
significant public expression on political issues by the Latino community. 
On April 10th, I had the opportunity to attend the rally in the Washington 
Monument, which allowed me to observe the organizing apparatus in action. I started 
my observation in the Silver Spring location of Casa de Maryland, where people were 
gathering to go together down to the Washington Mall. Parking arrangements were 
made with a nearby Latino market, where volunteers with flags invited me to park. 
Then, at the premises of CASA, several people were standing in line, waiting for a 
bus that would take them to the Metro station, where they could take the Metro to the 
Mall. Participants to the event were given a prepaid Metro pass. Once on the Mall, I 
saw people slowly arriving from different directions. Although some of them arrived 
in groups, carrying signs made by event organizers, several people also arrived by 
themselves, with flags or simple looking homemade signs. Some of the signs read as 
follows: “Immigrant Nation” , “I’m an immigrant, and I vote”, “Brown and proud”, 
“Immigrants built this country”, “We vote and pay taxes”, “We are Americans, too” 
“Bring us out of the shadows”, “Working is not a crime”, “Stop 4437”, “El pueblo 
unido jamas sera vencido”, “A gente veio para trabalhar”, “Si, se puede”. Although 
some attendants brought flags with them, others picked them up on site. one 
interaction caught my attention: A seller of flags approached a young man who was 
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sitting on the ground close to me asked the flag seller how much the flags cost, to 
which the latter answered: ‘American flags are 15 dollars, the others (referring to 
flags from a few Latin American countries), 10’. It was not surprising to me, then, 
when the following day a debate about flags in the rallies and their meaning flooded 
different media outlets. 
Once again, as the 1991riots in Mount Pleasant, references to the Civil Rights 
movement popped up all over. They appeared in the media, emphasizing the 
similarities of this inchoate Latino movement with the broad African American 
mobilizations of the sixties.  
One of the organizers I interviewed a few months later told me: “I remember 
that in Washington… people from the Metro was saying that after the march of 
Martin Luther King Jr. this had been the second largest in the history… that they had 
had the greatest number of people that rode the metros to attend the rally. And it was 
massive.” 
On all accounts, La Marcha was recognized as a milestone in the history of 
the Latino community. It did shake things up in the community at different levels, 
including its visibility, its ability to join the public debate, and to move issues into the 
public arena. Before evaluating the transformations that the demonstration triggered, I 
will briefly examine one key divide that existed within the local Latino leadership 






5.5. The aftermath: Organizational appropriation (Phase 2) 
 
 How did actors and leaders involved in the planning of the mass public 
demonstration on April 10th take advantage of the moment created by it? After the 
event, one element that became clear was the existence of differing strategies and 
agendas among those who had been involved in the planning.   
 One of the key points that revealed such division in the leadership was the 
contrasting attitude with respect to the proposed national economic boycott for May 
1st, 2006. The split was clear within NCIC. Although the majority in NCIC did not 
support the boycott, a few more radicalized groups not only supported the initiative 
but actually engaged in community mobilization to entice people to participate. The 
prevailing position of the local leadership was to abstain from participating in such 
event, arguing that it would trigger a wave of backlash that the community could not 
afford to face. 
 
So when there was a national call for boycott a lot of us thought, shit that 
would be powerful but is this the right time to do it? Right? Because at this 
time, if we had a boycott in May 1st, it was a month, a little before a month 
April 10th where we had a huge mobilization. Congress was just getting back 
into town. If we had a national boycott, you know, I think it would have had a 
huge negative backlash. Because, people would say, well shit, you just 
mobilized your people, you didn’t give us time to work and now you are 
boycotting us, right? (One key planner of the 2006 rallies in Washington, 
D.C.). 
 
One of the leaders, who advocated for the adoption of a more aggressive line, 
justified her position arguing that “people are ready, when people are ready in a cause 
you need to march!” The more moderate members of the group advocated lobbying 
government officials at different levels and encouraging Latinos to vote in the 2006 
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mid-term election. One of the arguments that was brought to my attention was that 
most of the groups in favor of the boycott “don’t really have a base”. A tough point in 
the conversations, moreover, was about how to move from an oppositional strategy 
aimed at stopping the bill to a constructive agenda of reforms. 
This division was broadly characterized as sending contradictory messages to 
the population and, consequently, harming the high motivation achieved with the 
performance of the rallies. 
The actions adopted were, to a great extent, aimed at how to push for the 
immigration agenda at the national level. However, the events that preceded and 
succeeded the April 10th demonstration had a significant impact in the 
formation/transformation of Latinos into a political actor. The following section is 
devoted to the examination of some aspects of this innovation. 
 
5.6. Innovation in the public sphere: the formation or redefinition of a political 
actor 
 
This section will be dedicated to the examination of the impact and limitations 
in the formation of a new identity-based political actor within the local Latino 
community as a result of the collective interactions launched before, during, and 
immediately after the immigration rally of April 10th, 2006, in Washington, D.C. In 
order to be consistent with my treatment of the Mount Pleasant riots, the main 
questions that I address in this section are as follows: Did a new political actor 
emerge within the local Latino community as a result of the political interactions 
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triggered by the immigration rally of April 10th, 2006? If so, what were its features? 
What factors limited its scope and sustainability? 
Based on the definition of political actor that this research relies on, I will 
analyze the extent to which Latinos residing in D.C. were able to organize themselves 
in a single entity, in a way that would allow them to speak with one voice (despite 
internal differences), maintaining a relatively stable structure, and being conceived as 
an interlocutor in local politics by other constituted actors. A caveat of this 
examination is that, because the occurrence of the rally was relatively recent, we do 
not have sufficient perspective to judge whether the emerging patterns will have a 
substantial continuity over time. 
 The section is organized as follows. First, I analyze internal aspects of the 
constitution/re-constitution of Latinos as a political actor—in particular, I examine 
the changes and continuities in leadership; the community unification and the 
increase in political engagement; and the increase in Latinos electoral participation, as 
well as the organizational strengthening and patterns of collaboration among 
community organizations. Following that, I review the actor from outside, focusing 
on the increase in visibility of Latinos as a political actor and some signs of backlash. 
 
Local leadership: changes and continuities 
Although a number of high profile organization leaders working with the 
Latino community in the area gained a very strong presence in the media immediately 
after the rally, one observation that came up during my interviews was that the 
demonstration of April 10th did not bring about a new “unified leadership”. 
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Surprisingly, this expression did not allude to the split in the group of leaders that 
were involved in the immigration movement, but to the inexistence of a broadly 
recognized single leadership crystallized in one person.  
 
We don’t have Jessie Jackson, we don’t have Barack Obama, we don’t have a 
national leader of our people really. And that is really kicking us in the ass 
because we don’t have a person that people follow or a couple of people that 
people follow in the West or in the East. You know, we have activists like 
myself and other people. And so we don’t have an organized national leader, 
so our leaders really is the local activists like us… (Ruben Portaluppi) 
 
What is interesting is that what was described to me as a problem (the absence 
of a national or regional leader) was actually the strength of this movement: the 
existence of decentralized centers of decision-making, with locally-grounded widely 
respected leaders in the community. Instead of having just a symbolic presence, most 
of these leaders, in fact, had a direct contact and knowledge of local realities. These 
local activists and leaders, in fact, had also been able to coordinate efforts at a 
national level. In other words, the collective action was the result of a coordination of 
local efforts.  
Another remarkable element is the difference with respect to the aftermath of 
the 1991 riots, in which a new leader emerged (or was selected) and represented, for a 
while, “the face” of the community. The strong symbolic meaning of the presence of 
such leader, as we saw in chapter 4, did not directly translate into material power. 
Behind the scenes, other established actors had the capacity to conduct the political 




Two main trends could be observed within and immediately after the rallies 
within the leadership in the Washington, D.C. metropolitan area. On the one hand, the 
deployment of the rallies clarified the already existing division between the leaders of 
organizations primarily devoted to providing services and those organizations which 
do devote themselves to community empowerment and political action. Whereas the 
former accompanied the demonstrations of March and April of 2006 in full, the latter 
were visibly in the lead of the political actions developed. The profile of this divide 
suggests a distribution of tasks within the organizational tissue of the community that, 
in turn, reflects different understandings of what it means “to serve” the community. 
 
This immigration thing is to me very interesting because it is not anymore in 
the hands of agencieros (heads of service oriented Latino agencies). It is a 
whole different process. And although many agencies are lending their 
people, or resources, or whatever, they are not guiding the process. So you 
have to give it time […] At the same moment this is happening it is also 
occurring a change in leadership, and both things cannot occur at once. It has 
to take place, form, and start doing the political part. The demonstrative part 
has been done. But from there you have to do a long term work, which is the 
political work. What we have to see is if there is the power to be able to do it, 
because that is what is required…. Because this is not question of two days. It 
is question of whether you decide that you are going to be in the struggle in 
the next twenty years. (Blanca Galindez, head of a local organization)54 
 
On the other hand, within the group of organizations principally devoted to 
community empowerment and advocacy, there was some division between the more 
radical ones and those more prudent, who had been successful in organizing efforts 
throughout the years and had relationships with authorities and founders they need to 
preserve. The question then is, was this division central of peripheral? For many, this 
division affected the momentum of the community. In fact, many attributed this 
broadly broadcasted split among leaders of the “immigration movement”—
                                                 
54 Italics mine. 
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specifically reflected in their different positions with respect to the boycott of May 
1st—as the main cause of the downfall of the movement. Along these lines, one local 
organizer asserted “unfortunately we didn’t have the capacity to maintain that 
movement… because it is a land in which many people thought they were Gods 
because they moved a lot of people, so they believed they were the leaders and thus 
had to guide the immigrant movement”.  It is important to note, however, that this 
split happened at a national level. In the Washington area, it could be said that 
although some organizations claimed a more aggressive stance in the aftermath of the 
massive demonstration of April 10th, the core of the coalition was basically intact and 
united in the decision of opting for a more cautious approach. 
Another element worth noting is, as said before, the type of involvement of 
the service union and churches in the effort. In the case of the union, SEIU emerged 
as a clear leading actor with a decisive involvement in the local political process and, 
given the continuity of its involvement in the events that followed, it was expected to 
have significance in the local political scene concerning the Latino community. 
Churches of different denominations had also gotten engaged in the Latino cause on 
immigration. The involvement of churches in partnerships with local Latino 
community-based organizations, however, was not entirely new. It showed the 
continuity of patterns of collaboration already established among them, and with 
Latino nonprofits, established with the goal of providing services, mutual referrals, 
and coordination of specific campaigns (e.g., the domestic workers bill of rights). 
 One aspect that deserves consideration is the fact that, unlike what happened 
in 1991, there was no conflict within leadership framed in terms of nationality. The 
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reality is that the Sensenbrenner Bill was conceived of and collectively viewed as a 
threat to the immigrant community as a whole, and in particular to the Latino 
community. At the same time that the community was engaged in the actions as a 
whole, showing a degree of unity “never seen in the past”, no serious attempts of 
contestation of authority based on nationality legitimacy was posed to the visible 
heads of the mobilization efforts. In fact, the leadership of the effort, crystallized in 
the Latino component of the conduction of NCIC was varied and no clear nationality 
patterns can be attributed.  
 Although, as we mentioned earlier, new actors emerged in the scene, it is still 
early to anticipate whether these changes will be sustained overtime: 
I think [a new leadership] is emerging… very slowly… of young people that 
are attempting to change, but I think it is going to take time. The development 
of leadership and the birth of a new leadership come many times as a reaction 
to a crisis, not in anticipation. There is no need to sit down and plan, ‘let’s 
start to develop a leadership’, when?... that just appears, no? (Blanca 
Galindez, leader of a Latino organization) 
 
 
Community unity and increase in community political engagement 
 
 As someone told me in one interview, it is easy to organize people against 
something. Following the same logic, unification is more likely to occur when there is 
a powerful enemy to fight against. Earlier in this dissertation I mentioned the 
effective role that organizations played in identifying of threat and opportunity 
around the Sensenbrenner Bill. The organizing efforts around the rallies of 2006 led 
to the building of stronger cohesion in the community. One journalist who covered La 
Marcha told me “The community to certain extent got united then… in a way that 
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was never seen before. So that set a precedent of what can be accomplished with a 
good organization, without divisions in the leadership”. 
 Interestingly enough, as the quote above shows, not only did the community 
unite but so did the leadership. The cohesive leadership that contributed to the 
mobilization effort in April found itself divided soon after. 
 As opposed to what happened in the Mount Pleasant Riots, when nationality 
emerged as a divisive element in the Latino community, nationality was basically 
absent as an issue in the immigration rallies of 2006. In fact, no claims were made 
based on nationality. The claims presented in the public sphere were in the name of a 
larger category that even exceeded the category of Latinos. It was an issue of 
immigrants, who made a statement as residents of the U.S., emphasizing this new 
belonging instead of their previous ones. This was an issue largely debated in the 
media in the aftermath of the rallies, and an element that was carefully addressed by 
organizers of the rallies. 
 Also different from what happened in 1991 was the dynamics and divisions 
within the leadership that followed the rallies. Whereas in 1991 the post-event split 
was framed in terms of nationality and generations—namely, the old guard versus the 
new leadership and Puerto Ricans versus Salvadorans--, in the aftermath of the 2006 
immigration rallies the splits were framed almost purely in terms of political vision, 
ideology and strategy—specifically, radicals versus moderate. I will address these 
divisions in the following subsection. 
Additionally, the widespread motivation observed in the community was 
evidenced in a number of ordinary people, especially youths, many of them with no 
 
 245 
previous political experience, actively soliciting room for participation. In other 
words, instead of the traditional efforts of political outreach from the community-
organizations to ordinary people in the Latino community, after the rallies people 
would come to the organizations with the hope they would find room for 
participation. 
 
At a local level I think that we have a big opportunity to continue organizing 
our community, to continue creating leaders, because many leaders emerged 
and we did not have the capacity to channel them. Because we did not have 
the capacity or the resources… quantities that you would not even imagine, 
people calling, ‘I want to participate, I want to participate…’ And that has 
questioned us, it has questioned the structure we have. And we are analyzing a 
change of structure…. So, in sum, that great quantity of leaders that emerged, 
that big quantity of people ready to fight, ready to say here we are, we could 
retain many of them, they are with us, but the great majority, we did not have 
an internal structure, and neither did the coalition because the coalition is still 
a baby… it hasn’t developed yet (Gonzalo Diaz, leader of Casa de Maryland) 
 
 This reinvigoration of the community that occurred in the aftermath of the big 
rally was captured in expressions such as “we accomplished making the community 
realize that they have power both in numbers and economically”, “we knew the mass 
of people wanted to go out and march [again]” “in terms of pan-Latino, pro-
immigrant consciousness that was a big leap”,  “there is a lot [gained] about 
leadership… self-esteem, claiming political space, all that stuff that is qualitative and 
hard to measure”. This sudden high degree of political enthusiasm was particularly 







The 2006 mid-term election: a boost in Latino electoral participation 
 There is consensus among most of the informants interviewed about the 
increase and intensification of political engagement within the local Latino 
community as a result of the rally of April 10th.  
 
I would say that [the major gain of these rallies was] a very strong 
politicization, very big in our community… in this case in a massive level. 
And that is the importance of these rallies and that people be in the streets. 
People get politicized. And for us that was very important: the politicization 
of our community. The fact of understanding that if weren’t united as a 
community we wouldn’t be able to do anything. A result of that was that 
people [in our community] voted massively in the elections of 2006. And they 
voted largely for pro-immigrants candidates. Not only in the metropolitan area 
but in the whole country… (A leader of a community-based organization) 
  
  
This idea that the rallies directly impacted Latinos participation in the 2006 
legislative elections appeared in the interviews few times, which is not surprising 
given the exceptional increases in both voter registration and voting rates observed 
for Latinos in the area. In the Baltimore-Washington, D.C. metropolitan area, census 
data55 shows a substantial increase in registration and participation rates among 
Latinos between 2002 (when the previous mid-term election took place) and 2006. 
Non-Hispanic Whites and Non-Hispanic Blacks, on the contrary, experienced a 
considerably lower gain in both registration and voting. About 60 percent of Latino 
eligible voters registered in 2006, up from 50 percent in 2002. About 78 percent of 
these registered voters said they actually voted in 2006, up from 61 percent in 2002. 
By contrast, 75 percent of white eligible voters registered in 2006, four percentage 
points higher than in 2002. About 78 percent of these registered voters said they 
voted in last year’s mid-term elections, six percentage points higher than in 2002. 
                                                 
55 Source: 2006 Current Population Survey voting registration supplement. 
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Registration rates for Blacks increased from 2002 to 2006 by only one percentage 
points, to 66 percent, and voting by four percentage points, to 50 percent (See Figures 
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These numbers contrast significantly with the distributions observed in the 
country at large. According to the Pew Hispanic Center (2007), nationally, the 
increase in registration and participation rates among Latinos between 2002 and 2006 
was marginal. Specifically, about 54 percent of Latino eligible voters registered to 
vote in 2006, up from 53 percent in 2002. In addition, 60 percent of these registered 
voters claimed they actually casted ballots in 2006, up from 58 percent in 2002. This 
increase in registration and turnout is not exclusive to Latinos though. Among whites, 
the registration rate went from 69 percent in 2002 to 71 percent in 2006 and the 
proportion of registered voters who actually voted increased from 71 to 72 percent in 
the same period. The shares of blacks who registered and voted, on the other hand, 
declined. Registration rates decreased from 63 to 61 percent, and voting increased by 
one percentage point, to 67%. 
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 Looking at voting preferences, evidence shows that in the 2006 mid-term 
election Latinos leaned strongly in favor of Democrats, taking back part of the 
support they had provided to the Republican Party in the previous two elections. 
Based on national exit polls, another report by the Pew Hispanic Center (2006) shows 
that Latino vote went from 61-37 in favor of Democrats in 2002 to 69-30 in favor of 
Democrats in 2006. That is, there was a Democratic gain of 8% points among Latinos 
between these two mid-term elections. This increase, however, is also similar to the 
gain in Democratic preference among white voters (9%). 
 Did the rallies really impact Latinos’ behavior in the 2006 election? The 
answer is mixed. On the one hand, as I mentioned earlier, evidence suggests not only 
that nationally Latinos registration and participation rates in 2006 showed an increase 
with respect to 2002 but also that their rate of support for Democratic candidates also 
grew. In the Washington area, in particular, the increase in Latino political 
participation was quantitatively very important. On the other hand, in order to impute 
an impact of the rallies on the electoral behavior of Latinos in 2006 it important to 
look at the roles and actions of different actors involved in the process.  
 In this regard, some scholars have paid particular attention to the role of 
political parties in the mobilization of Latino voters. With respect to this, Leal et al. 
(2008) assert that while several Republican candidates who campaigned on “get 
tough” proposals did not win re-election bids or open seat contests, Democrats 
addressed the immigration issue cautiously during the campaign. Additionally, 
according to Ayón (2006), candidates and leaders from both parties sent ambiguous 
messages about their immigration views, which, in turn meant that no mandate for a 
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particular immigration policy was produced by the election. From these works, it is 
difficult to impute a clear impact of partisan politics on Latinos’ electoral 
participation in the 2006 election. 
 On the other hand, it is critical to look at the efforts deployed by local 
organizations to encourage registration and voting among Latinos. In the Washington, 
D.C. metropolitan area, voter mobilization of Latino citizens emerged as the chief 
strategic line among organizers in the aftermath of the rally. Thus, a considerable 
amount of the organizing efforts performed by Latino community-based 
organizations in the area were focused on the encouragement of electoral 
participation among Latinos. As mentioned earlier, whereas a few organizations 
suggested getting tougher in the aftermath of the riots, and encouraged people to 
engage in a boycott on May 1st, this line of action was not supported by the majority 
and ended up having marginal impact. On the contrary, a number of community-
based advocacy-oriented organizations in the area set up a campaign to encourage 
political participation in elections as a way to capitalize the degree of motivation 
existent in the community after the event. Looking at the numbers, all these efforts 
paid off. And this was perceived by several community activists and leaders as one of 
the most positive consequences of the April 10th rally. 
 
Organizational strengthening and patterns of collaboration  
 
 Although it will take more time to get sufficient perspective on the effects of 
La Marcha to assess whether organizations working with the Latino community were 
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strengthened and how (in the same way we assessed the organizational changes after 
the Mount Pleasant Riots), there are some patterns in place that emerged immediately 
after the rallies. One of which is the consolidation of an existing network of Latino 
agencies and organizations of different type. Another is the increase in visibility of 
some organizations previously little known—such as Mexicanos Sin Fronteras—
which after the rallies became slightly more visible. 
 One of the issues I was interested in investigating is whether the participation 
in this collective effort that resulted in the massive immigration rally of April 10th led 
to greater collaboration among local organizations. The answers I found can be 
synthesized by saying that, on the one hand, their participation in this collective effort 
did enhance the communication among them to a certain extent, and, on the other 
hand, it was merely the deepening of patterns of collaboration already in place. The 
first trend is graphically revealed in the following statement by the head of a local 
community based organization: 
 
Over the last year particularly around the immigration stuff… the New 
Virginia and New Maryland initiatives, we developed a much closer 
relationship with Casa. I mean… one of the beauties of the screwed up 
Sensenbrenner stuff is that it brings a number of us together. So now… you 
know, Casa knew about us, we knew of Casa. They would come by one thing 
or whatever; we’d go there every now and then. But now I think there is much 
more… it created a structure for much more regular conversation. […] It’s 
like… it’s created… just the whole absurd from last year I think helped 
advance the whole struggle by creating more interactions. So I feel like there’s 
much more possibility of that […] we share a lot about like… how they do 
services, how we do personnel policy, you know, how to get the word out, 
communications, they’ve done trainings and we send people there, etcetera, 




 Part of the synergy achieved by the working together, especially for those 
organizations that were active members of NCIC, was a product of informal 
interactions.  
 
If you attended 20 planning meetings with the same people then you actually 
say hi, how are your kids, and you get to know one another… and something 
that happened in the Washington area was… not just keep your relationship 
with coalition partners but… the interest in the stronger organizations of 
strengthening the weaker organizations. So the African Resource Center was 
seen as very…. As an important ally to build up in the part of the Latino 
organizations. And some of the other weaker organizations… you know, they 
were weak because they were either new or… whatever the case might be. 
There were more kind of the sense of… we all do better when we are all 
stronger. So… and that has really had spill over effects on a more 
collaborative approach when it comes to fund raising, when it comes to media 
outreach, you know all kinds of things. In terms of the size of one 
organization to another, Abdul in the African Resource Center, had he been 
put upfront with the media compared to the other bigger organizations?, 
probably not. But some of the biggest organizations saw the importance of 
strengthening his role and some of the other groups. (Cristian Barbero, a local 
community organizer) 
 
 Although the quote above describes an example of collaboration between 
more established Latino organizations and newer African counterparts, this type of 
collaboration existed across the board. An interesting element signaled there is that 
the style of collaboration aimed at fixing perceived imbalances by strategically 
building a stronger legitimacy base to the movement. 
For some, though, the collaboration among organizations is not something 
new but the continuity of a pattern of joint work that already existed:  
 
I think it’s happening that a couple organizations like Mexicanos Sin 
Fronteras grew… and then the working among themselves among the local 
groups is happening… have increased the percentage of collaboration. People 
can say yeah, huge collaboration. But you have to be realistic. There was 
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some collaboration before… I think it created some awakening… (Eduardo 
Gonzalez, a community organizer) 
  
 Earlier I mentioned that although the organizational infrastructure of NCIC 
was in place a considerable time before the rallies, it was invigorated throughout the 
planning of the rallies. After the rallies, however, the NCIC became a communication 
hub among the politically-oriented Latino organizations—even when many of them 
continued to have multiples lines of communication among themselves. This was the 
case at least in the first year after the rallies. In particular, the NCIC became a tool for 
fundraising and coordination of communication campaigns. Most importantly, after 
the rally, NCIC became primarily involved with local issues. In other words, although 
the rallies were mounted to produce an effect at the federal level, after the 
demonstration, NCIC was used as a vehicle to coordinate actions with respect to 
attacks or perceived attacks on immigrant communities in different localities in the 
area. Specifically, some of these activities consisted of campaigns to counteract or 
respond to raids occurring in the area or to stop anti-immigrant legislation proposals. 
 All in all, one of the most visible results of the rallies can be read in what Tilly 
and Tarrow (2007) call coalition formation. In this case, although some coordination 
of claims existed between the distinct actors grouped under NCIC, this cooperation 
became strengthened and more visible after the rallies. 
  
The actor seen from outside: Gain of visibility and backlash 
 
 The rallies of March and April (especially the one on April 10th) clearly put 
the Latino community directly in the public eye. Both as a cultural formation and as a 
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demographic group, Latinos emerged in the public sphere as a group with a very 
strong presence, evidenced quantitatively and qualitatively; quantitatively, because of 
the thousands of people who were willing to go to the streets to make claims and 
qualitatively, because of the turn to visibility and overcoming the fear of becoming 
coming out from the invisibility that their immigration status condemns them to on a 
regular basis.  
 The April 10th demonstration received extensive media coverage, not only 
during the day, but also before and after. 
 
After all that, all the headlines of mainstream media, that at least that was also 
achieved, that mediums such as the Washington Post and the New York 
Times put a little more interest in the Hispanic community and the fight of the 
undocumented, no? There started to be headlines everywhere… (Zulma 
Pizarro, a local journalist) 
 
 This media attention meant, in turn, using an expression of one local activist 
“that that was the issue to deal with”. An indication of the impact of the immigration 
rallies nationally is a speech given by President Bush on May 15th, in which he 
addressed the nation on immigration reform. In that speech, he specifically mentioned 
the magnitude of the immigration rallies around the country: 
The issue of immigration stirs intense emotions, and in recent weeks, Americans 
have seen those emotions on display. On the streets of major cities, crowds have 
rallied in support of those in our country illegally. At our southern border, others 
have organized to stop illegal immigrants from coming in. Across the country, 
Americans are trying to reconcile these contrasting images. And in Washington, 
the debate over immigration reform has reached a time of decision. Tonight, I will 
make it clear where I stand, and where I want to lead our country on this vital 
issue. We must begin by recognizing the problems with our immigration system.56 
(President Bush) 
                                                 
56 http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060515-8.html; italics mine. 
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 With respect to ordinary people in the community at large, the massive rally 
also raised awareness about the presence of a category of people—namely, the 
undocumented—that was coming out to the streets. In the words of one key person 
involved in the planning, “we generated the debate of immigration very strongly, we 
were able to educate a lot of people, a lot of politicians”. In fact, through the rallies 
the issue of immigration was fully placed in the public agenda. In other words, the 
discussion of how to regulate the flow of people into the country as well as how to 
deal with those already living in the country but without legal permission was 
displaced from the formal institutions of politics—such as the national Congress, the 
presidency, the state legislatures, and even local governments—to an arena of public 
debate. It was not the case that so far immigration was a theme that was not of public 
concern. However, with the rallies, the theme of immigration was all of the sudden 
moved into the center of the public agenda of public issues. The nation at large was 
prompted to consider the issue. In many cases, this also implied taking sides. 
 On the one hand, according to some interpretations, pushing the issue into the 
center of public discussion allowed the immigrant community, as a challenger group, 
to affect the tone of the debate: 
 
The other thing that those mobilizations accomplished was the fact that this 
year [2007] the tone of the debate was different. The tone of the debate was 
not about passing Sensenbrenner, it was about passing a comprehensive 
immigration reform bill. So it wasn’t about you know, let’s send everybody 
back to their countries, you know the antis who have that in their head were 
always saying that. But really we changed the tone of the debate. From a total 
anti-immigrant to a okay, this is an urgent matter, you know, a top priority in 
terms of domestic policy. We need to fix it. You know, and we got really 




 On the other hand, one of the results for this demonstration was that “many 
gringos got frightened to see that the elephant that was asleep woke up”. The visual 
image of the huge quantitative weight of the Latino community revealed the potential 
political strength that this group could have. According to one of the local leaders “all 
you need is one more generation”, meaning that the children of the undocumented 
will become full politically-active citizens with a critical influence in the political 
system.  
This fear, in turn, led to a backlash. In particular, some anti-immigrant sectors 
got better organized and expanded. Several informants interviewed pointed out that 
“we expect increasing attacks on our community”. The attacks that eventually 
occurred, took the form of raids, deliberately anti-immigrant local ordinances, or even 
anti-immigrant protests, as well as the hardening of anti-immigrant positions in some 
mediums of communication. 
After the rallies, several local governments started to consider –and eventually 
pass—legislation with a clear anti-immigrant focus. The case of Prince William’s 
County is maybe one of the more emblematic. In 2007, its Board of Supervisors 
approved an anti-immigrant resolution that gave local police the authority to 
interrogate detainees regarding their immigration status and approved a plan to deny 
certain county services to undocumented immigrants. 
In different local governments in the area the issue of immigration was 
expected to be more central to the discussions and proposals to come. One public 




I think that we are going to have several [anti-immigrant positions in the 
legislature]. Because it is like a domino effect, if it is happening in Virginia 
and other places. Many of my colleagues do not understand and will try to 
replicate… And we have to be united to gather the community and bring them 
to the audiences so they can fill those committees and give testimony so we 
can put a face to the issue. (Monica Diaz, elected official) 
 
In sum, the rallies of 2006 put both the immigrant community (and especially 
the Latino community) and immigration as a theme, in the center of the public 
agenda. This exposure had the ability to force a discussion that was already taking 
place in a relatively fragmented way. It was also capable of taking the debate from the 
bosom of formal political institutions to a variety of public spaces: from the media to 
coffee shops, and from academic settings to neighborhood associations. The debate 




Although La Marcha was part of a nationwide series of related episodes, the 
demonstration in Washington, D.C. had significant unique local implications 
extending both before and after the march that are worth noting. In the former sense, 
a specific combination of local conditions made the event possible, and in the latter 
sense, the modes of power and the features of a Latino-based political actor were 
transformed. 
La Marcha precipitated a series of noticeable changes in the internal political 
organization of Latinos as a collective actor. In regard to the leadership, the 
demonstration confirmed the centrality of community-based organizations in the 
political landscape of the community. However, the leadership of these groups were 
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somewhat divided along ideological lines. This division in the leadership stood out 
against what happened at the grassroots level. Specifically, La Marcha prompted 
strong unity and increased political engagement among ordinary people in the 
community. Although this burst of community activism could not be sustained over 
time, in large part because organizations were overwhelmed by the sudden 
mobilization of people wanting to participate, the prevailing political strategies 
adopted after the rallies did lead to a noticeable increase in registration and voting 
among Latinos in the 2006 mid-term election. La Marcha also facilitated the 
consolidation of a network among Latino community-based organizations. In 
particular, the NCIC, whose role had been pivotal in the organization and planning of 
the rallies, was re-invigorated as a network that helped share efforts and coordinate 
activities among organizations in the local level. 
The political impact that the immigrant community, and primarily Latinos, 
achieved in the public sphere through their participation in La Marcha can also be 
noted in the increased public visibility acquired by Latinos after the demonstration. 
Through their engagement in the mass public demonstration, Latinos as a group could 
be seen and heard. Furthermore, according to a widespread interpretation, their large 
numbers on the streets showed the potential political strength of the group. Of 
particular importance was the fact that the undocumented, who usually remain hidden 
from a political point of view, came out and had a say in the political process. More 
importantly, through their involvement, they made the issue of immigration become a 
more central public issue.  
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These indicators of impact in the public sphere were the result of both the 
initial conditions that made the event possible and the actions that different central 
actors deployed before, during, and after La Marcha. Preexisting collaborative 
arrangements among Latino organizations across jurisdictions, the previous 
mobilizing structure developed by the work a few community-based organizations, 
and a deliberate pro-immigrant focus in churches and unions and to a certain extent in 
the media, were necessary yet not sufficient conditions for the organization of La 
Marcha. The interpretation of a threat in the House approval of the Sensenbrenner 
Bill and the construction of an opportunity for collective action—through the 
coordinated planning of the rally—were as critical. The direction of the political 
space opened by the rally, on the other hand, was the result of a prevailing strategy 
within the immigration coalition, which prioritized a moderate line of electoral 
mobilization and lobbying rather than boycotting and escalating in the level of 
protest. It is not surprising, then, that one of the clearest political consequences of La 
Marcha and the political work that followed was the increased level of participation 







Chapter 6: Conclusions 
 
The two major events analyzed in this dissertation, the Mount Pleasant riots of 
1991 and La Marcha in 2006, constitute the most significant turning points in the 
local Latino community history from a political point of view. Each of them 
uncovered dynamics rooted in the community at the same time that they opened the 
door for substantial changes. It is not my purpose to advance a general theory of 
political mobilization in immigrant communities, but, rather, to understand each of 
the cases in its singularity, by disentangling crucial mechanisms that led to their entry 
in their public sphere and which, in turn, account for the scope of innovations 
achieved.  
In these closing remarks I will go back to the questions around which I 
organized this research. First, I will look at how the organizational-political context 
shaped the actions adopted by leaders and, therefore, affected the political path 
adopted in each case. Following, I will look at the significance that spontaneity or 
planning of ordinary people mobilization with respect to their control over the course 
of the events and their outcomes. 
 
Organizational-political context and types of leadership involvement 
 
As seen in previous chapters, each of these major events stemmed from a 
particular organizational and political context, which, in turn, affected the resources 
available for mobilization.  
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The Mount Pleasant riots, in particular, occurred in a context of abrupt 
demographic change, with Central Americans arriving in large numbers to the area as 
a result of wars and political instability in their countries of origin. The organizational 
capital of the community was mainly characterized by the presence of established 
service providing agencies whose leaders were the visible face of the community. In 
fact, the heads of these organizations, known in the community as the old guard, 
emerged as intermediaries between the Latino population and the government. The 
political representation of the community was, then, mainly channeled through these 
agencieros/as who operated to a large extent as political brokers. This representation 
was de facto, based on the agencieros’ access to government agents gained through 
the years, the significance that the services their organizations provided had for the 
community, and the ties they had with Latino figures appointed to government 
positions. The main shortcoming of this type of de facto representation was, 
according to a prevailing view in the community, that in some cases it was not 
necessarily exerted on behalf of the community but on behalf of their own agencies 
which they tried to consolidate. It is important to note, however, that since a large 
proportion of Latinos in the area were noncitizens they could not vote or become 
formally engaged in the political system. For that reason, service-providing agencies 
and agencieros became so critical not only for the community but also for the 
government as a way to reach out to the community. 
During the 1990s and well into the mid 2000s the Latino population in the 
metropolitan area experienced extraordinary growth, mainly as a result of an 
economically-driven immigration wave.  While escalating housing costs forced a 
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number of Latino residents from the District and with newcomers increasingly 
settling in the suburbs, the community suffered a process of suburbanization during 
this period. Conversely, the structure of service-providing Latino agencies continued 
to be concentrated in the district. One of the most interesting phenomena, though, was 
the emergence or consolidation of a few politically oriented Latino organizations in 
the suburbs, whose missions were chiefly oriented to community empowerment and 
advocacy. At the same time, a few regional associations of local organizations were 
established in the early 2000s. One of them in particular, the NCIC, would eventually 
become the leading force (as an umbrella institution) in the organization of the rallies. 
Of special significance was the active engagement of some unions and churches in 
issues and campaigns affecting the Latino community. During this period, as opposed 
to what happened in the district, the community showed notable political 
achievements in the suburbs. In particular, several Latinos were elected for public 
positions at different levels (including local, county, and state level). In addition, due 
to informal partnerships with governments, advocacy groups were able to promote 
several political initiatives that benefited the community (such as driver licenses, 
domestic workers bill of rights). It is also important to address, though, that after the 
terrorist attacks of September 11th, 2001, an anti-immigrant atmosphere was palpable 
in the area, with several attacks registered against immigrants. 
Politically, one significant contrast between the pre-riots and the pre-rallies 
contexts was marked by the change from a model of political representation centered 
in the role of service-providing agencies and the figure of agencieros, and locally 
appointed leaders, to a more complex one in which agencieros still played an 
 
 263 
important role but other actors such as advocacy groups, community organizers, and 
elected officials also emerged as critical players.  
The differential organizational-political capital present in the community at 
both times had a decisive impact on the type of politicization achieved in the 
community in 1991 and 2006 respectively. However, although the above described 
contexts are key to understanding the trajectory and transformations achieved in each 
of the events analyzed; it is not the structure of political organization of the 
community per se that explained its the entry into the public sphere or the innovation 
that such entry led to. In this dissertation I argue that the profile and structural 
location57 of leading organizations involved in the event have a decisive impact on 
the actions adopted by community leaders which, in turn, affects the direction of the 
political path taken. I am far from claiming here any kind of structural determinism. 
However, throughout my research I did find that, in the view of participants of each 
of the events, the type of organizational arrangement prevailing at each point in time 
lent itself to particular uses that would ultimately affect the political path that the 
community would take. 
During the Mount Pleasant riots the Latino community surfaced at the center 
of the public sphere making the “Latino problem” an issue of major concern for local 
authorities, the media, and the population at large, through the massive presence of 
people in the streets and the engagement of some youths in acts of violence. 
However, the community political elite—that is, the set of agencieros/as and Latinos 
appointed in the local government—rapidly got involved taking advantage of the 
                                                 
57 By structural location I mean mainly the organizations’ dependency on government contracts and 




momentum reached through the continuing violence in the Mount Pleasant 
neighborhood. The members of this elite were able to do so because they had at hand 
extraordinary resources. First, they had already developed an agenda with a series of 
demands for the government in terms of services for the community which gave them 
the framework to act and frame the problematic of the community. Second, they had 
this pivotal relationship between the community and government as described above. 
Third, they had access to the media. Fourth, they had already developed the network 
of connections among themselves which permitted them to meet and coordinate 
decisions quickly. 
It is important to note, however, that the central role acquired by the 
community elite was not only a result of their own action but also a product of the 
place others assigned to them in the process. Examples of this are the role of the 
mayor who summoned these “leaders” in order to find ways to resolve the “Latino 
issue”; or the place that the media gave to these leaders or the ones designated by 
them. Thus, the community elite had a privileged location that favored its 
involvement in the scene as an influential actor. The set of actions adopted by these 
agencieros or elite leaders, as we saw, would be aimed at reducing conflict (in 
particular by becoming the mediators with government authorities and avoiding a 
confrontational strategy) and strengthening their own structural capacity (by 
capturing more resources and expanding their programs). The dependency with 
respect to government contracts and also private foundations funding, according to 
many testimonies, played a significant part in constraining the range of actions that 
these leaders would be willing to adopt. As one of the interviewees asserted in this 
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regard, “you cannot go against the government when your money comes from them”. 
Through their actions, in fact, this elite leadership ending up minimizing the 
challenging quality of the Latino presence in the public sphere. 
In sum, these elite leadership of agencieros not only had the resources to 
become tactically involved in the process opened by the riots of Mount Pleasant, but 
also had some constraints that shapes the type of involvement they had. 
 In the 2006 rallies, on the other hand, the involvement of organizations was 
critical from the beginning. In fact, the event itself was the product of a sophisticated 
and broad planning effort by different organizations, including the NCIC (which was 
actually the umbrella organization where the tactical decisions were made), different 
religious congregations, unions, immigrant organizations working with other 
communities, and the media. The interpretive construction of the House approval of 
the Sensenbrenner Bill as a threat to the community—which was done around valued 
elements in the community that were at risk—was the product of an active work by 
these organizations. Among all the actors involved, the participation of community-
based organizations was key in the sense that it provided feedback from what was 
perceived as a need by ordinary people in the community. As mentioned earlier, it 
was within these groups that the decision to take the political fight to the streets and 
“produce” an event that will put the voice of immigrants into the debate was made.  
 The structural relations of dependency that constrained the actors intervening 
in the mobilization effort were largely different from those shaping the actions of 
agencieros in the aftermath of the 1991 riots. In fact, different actors had different 
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constraints that, as revealed in this research, shaped the types of actions they engaged 
in.  
 The social and organizational appropriation that followed the approval of the 
Sensenbrenner Bill in the Washington area can be divided in two stages—namely, 
before and after the April 10th rally. Whereas the planning before the rally showed a 
broad consensus and support from all the groups working with the Latino population 
in the area, a rift occurred in the aftermath of the rally around how to continue the 
efforts. Whereas the majority of the groups opted for a “prudent” line of action, 
consisting of giving the government to react to the event, and mounting a campaign to 
increase registration and voting among members of the community, another more 
radical line was sustained by a few groups. In particular, the latter group attempted to 
adopt a more aggressive approach in an attempt to take advantage of the momentum 
of political motivation in the community.  
 As we mentioned earlier, churches, unions, and the media contributed 
significantly to the extremely high turnout of people in the April 10th rally. In the case 
of churches (especially the Catholic Church) and unions (in particular SEIU), their 
participation was, to a great extent, related to an approach they had already adopted 
on immigration. This approach was a consequence of their membership composition: 
in both cases, a large proportion of their members were Latinos. So for them, this line 
was at the very least a matter of survival—and, in many cases, it also coincided with 
their philosophical approaches. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the media had 
also a great interest in contributing to the production of a news making event. 
Community-based organizations, on the other hand, had already demonstrated a 
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tradition working on pro-immigration or pro-Latino legislations and campaigns. So 
for them, working on these types of initiatives was part of their missions. In addition, 
it is important to note that the target of their claims was the federal government. 
Although many of these organizations had multiple partnerships and rely on contracts 
from local governments, this was not at all at issue with these types of efforts. 
 A rift did occur though with respect to the steps to follow after the 
extraordinary turnout at the April 10th rally. The point of divergence was clearly 
observed around a planned boycott planned for May 1st. This split occurred in 
immigrant communities across the country. In the Washington, D.C. area, however, 
the majority of the leadership did not support such measure. For some of them, such 
an escalation of aggressiveness in the strategies would clearly jeopardize their 
relationships with relevant actors. For example, this was clear with one of the unions, 
which had to protect their members from eventual retaliations by employers, and 
simultaneously maintain a harmonious coexistence with employers themselves. On 
the other hand, one of the arguments posed by some of the organizers to justify their 
lack of support to the boycott or any “aggressive” line of action was that this could 
eventually create backlash—both by triggering raids from the governments or by 
activating anti-immigrant groups. As opposed to what happened in 1991, though, 
dependency from government contracts did not come up as an issue. In fact, a factor 
to consider is that two of the most active community-organizing groups in the area 
received government funding explicitly to develop community organizing and 
political empowerment among low-income immigrants. 
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 In sum, the structural location of the organizations leading the immigration 
movement in the D.C. area shaped their involvement in the development of the event 
and its aftermath. In particular, in the adoption of a “moderate” line of action, the 
reasons encountered for the support of such position referred to potential 
manifestations of backlash. Thus, this approach sustained by the majority of local 
organizations can be characterized as protective of their membership and shielding of 
an incipient immigration movement. In this latter attitude was reflected in the 
following idea: “we made our point, now we have to wait before striking back.”  
 
Spontaneity versus planning 
 
The two cases under analysis are, as we have seen, distinct on many different 
levels. The most evident aspect is perhaps the sequence in which ordinary people and 
the elite in the Latino community got involved. In the riots, the community elite 
irrupted in the public sphere and dominated the political process only after Latino 
neighbors had come out to the streets spontaneously following the attack of a Latino 
worker by a police officer. Conversely, the 2006 immigration rallies were to great 
extent the product of an active and careful process of organization led by community-
based organizations. In other words, whereas in the riots the interpretation of a threat 
in the police attack by ordinary people in the Latino neighborhood took place without 
mediation and channeled through informal networks, the attribution of threat in the 
Sensenbrenner Bill required a relatively long and painstaking effort by organizations 
planning the immigration rallies. 
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Does it matter whether the reaction to the threat is spontaneous and immediate 
or is the product of planned organization and mobilization? Does spontaneity in the 
deployment of the mobilization give the community (ordinary people) more control 
over the course of the event and its outcomes?  
Based on path dependence theory’s assumptions (see, e.g. Aminzade 1992) I 
expected to find that the early and active involvement in the public sphere by Latino 
ordinary people led to their greater capacity to introduce innovation. In other words, 
the assumption was that the intense deployment of occurrences located at the initial 
moments of the event has a significant explanatory capacity of the way in which the 
political process evolves. For that reason, it also informs the understanding of the 
ability of the group of interest (in this case Latino immigrants) to generate structural 
modifications in the public sphere. 
In the Mount Pleasant riots the diffusion throughout the neighborhood of a 
story about the shooting of a working man was the determining factor in opening a 
gap to allow for some type of inclusion of the Latino community in the political 
process. In addition, the initial minimization of the occurrences by public officials—
especially by the mayor—also contributed to create the conditions for the eruption of 
more violence and consequently for the subsequent entry of Latino immigrants into 
the public sphere. Mayor Dixon justified the reason for her absence on the scene 
during the first night of disturbances, arguing that at that time it seemed little more 
than “criminal activity.” Only when it became clear that the problem was more 
serious that originally thought did the Mayor and her administration change their 
approach. Thus, the sustained presence of the residents in the street, and the 
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engagement of some of them in violent actions, forced public authorities to address 
the existence of the “Latino problem”, which resulted in a series of measures adopted 
there after. 
As seen in Chapter 4, the initial naming and conceptual definition of the 
problem at the core of the event by Latino neighbors was critical in the following 
mobilization of the community. However, the appropriation, reframing, and 
immediate utilization of this story by the Latino elite in their negotiation of a political 
agenda was critical for the gains achieved by the group. In particular, the Latino 
leadership intervened in the event, moving the claim from “we are being attacked” to 
an argument that could be synthesized as “the community is underserved and 
ignored”. 
I maintain that that move was key in the shape taken by the political process 
opened by the riots. In particular, although a new identity-based actor was 
constituted—reflected in organizational transformations, such as the creation of the 
DC Latino Civil Task Force and some new figures emerged as speaking on behalf of 
the community--, there was a widespread agreement, as seen throughout the 
dissertation, that the main political line adopted consisted of strengthening the service 
apparatus.  
If the framing of the conflict had continued to be “we are being unfairly 
attacked,” it is probable that a more aggressive line would have prevailed, especially 
considering that one alternative strategy included “suing the government”. As we 
mentioned earlier, this line of action was vetoed by the elite agencieros, who 
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considered such tactic against the main funding source for their organizations and 
programs to be unviable.  
Going back to the question about the spontaneity of ordinary people irruption 
in the public sphere, I could argue that although their initial presence in the scene was 
critical in order to create an opening to give the Latino agenda a place, they did not 
control the contents of such agenda. In fact, the way in which such an agenda was 
crystallized clearly reflects the impetus of the existing leadership elite. Specifically, 
the prevailing line adopted favored service expansion and government attention, 
which, in turn reflects the way in which this leadership elite read the problem 
underlying the event immediately after the riots got started. Thus, although the 
disturbances got started with the spontaneous presence of ordinary people in the 
streets, the community leadership entered the scene immediately. In their entry, these 
leaders had the capacity (and they put it into practice) to reframe, and control the way 
in which the further actions on behalf of the community would be adopted.  
 
The 2006 immigration rallies, on the other hand, were, as I mentioned earlier, 
the result of an initiative generated from an array of community-based organizations 
and their allies. Given the everyday contact that community organizers and other key 
planners of the rallies had with ordinary people, some argue that the planning was 
inspired by these organizers’ first-hand understanding of people’s needs and feelings. 
However, the rallies were clearly the result of a coordinating effort led by those 
organizations. Reversing the question posed earlier, I could then ask: did the lack of 
spontaneity in ordinary people’s appearance in the streets imply that those people had 
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little control over the way in which the political process opened by the rally was 
deployed? 
Looking at some of the occurrences following the April 10th rally, I would be 
inclined to maintain that the answer is mixed. One of the main findings in the 
research was that as a result of the symbolic effect of the massive April 10th rally, an 
increase and intensification of political enthusiasm was registered within the Latino 
community. In fact, according to some of the leaders of community-based 
organizations, the rally “woke up an elephant that was asleep.” In other words, many 
Latinos, especially youths, who had never been engaged in political activities in the 
past became motivated and developed an interest to participate in other activities. 
Right after the rally of April 10th many people approached community based 
organizations asking for opportunities of participation and offering to volunteer. This 
posed a challenge to the structural capacity of some of these organizations. In fact, 
some of the heads of these organizations asserted that they felt overwhelmed by the 
increased demands for participation and could not respond to them. In addition, 
another example of the increased motivation in some sectors in the community was 
the occurrence of some isolated protest efforts led by Latino youths in the suburbs.  
This increase in ordinary people’s motivation to participate was partially 
capitalized by local organizations. Most of the Latino community-based organizations 
in the area, as mentioned earlier, set up a campaign aimed at increasing registration 
and voting in the mid-term election of 2006. These efforts, according to some people 
in the community, paid off. In fact, compared to the 2002 midterm elections, a 
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marginal but symbolically significant increase in the rates of registration and voting 
occurred in the 2006 elections.  
A few more radical groups, on the other hand, also tried to take advantage of 
the political activation of the community, by organizing local rallies. With respect to 
these episodes, even some of the community-based organizations in the area who 
favored a moderate political approach maintained that because many in the 
community wanted to go out they did not want to stop them. 
On the other hand, the message that came from the leadership disagreement 
with respect to the May 1st planned boycott helped to create a decline in the 
motivation of ordinary people in the community. This became evident in the very low 
turnout at the rally organized in September 2006. 
In sum, although the entry into the public sphere in the rallies of 2006 were 
not spontaneous, but planned by a broad and sophisticated organizing effort, people 
did get motivated and there was some “take off” in a community that was usually 
described as politically apathetic. This increased motivation was of such intensity that 
it presented a challenge to the capacity of community-based organizations which 
could not fully take advantage it. Whereas leadership efforts were responsible for the 
achievement of a large scale mobilization, leadership disagreements also sent a 
message that was dissuasive for the continuity of the political availability of the 
community. 
 
In conclusion, in the two cases examined in this dissertation spontaneity—or 
planning—of ordinary people’s entry into the public sphere did not necessarily 
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account for ordinary people’s greater control over subsequent stages of the event. In 
other words, spontaneous politicization of ordinary people in the Latino community 
does not necessarily shape their impact in the political process. There is, instead, a 
twofold process of interaction between symbolic and material actions performed by 
the leadership, and a range of repertoires and attitudes in the community that 
contribute toward the construction of a political path. It does not seem accurate to 
look at whether the leadership follows the community or vice versa. These relations 
vary over time within each of the events and their aftermaths and initiatives on either 
side of this divide (leadership-ordinary people) seem to become prevalent at different 
points in time. 
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Appendix 1: Mount Pleasant Riots: Detailed chronology of 
occurrences  
 
1. Sunday, May 5
th
. Trigger (enabler): Shooting of a Latino worker 
2. Rumor swept throughout the community 
3. First outbreak of violence: Hundreds of angry youths hurling rocks and bottles 
4. D.C. Mayor Sharon Pratt Dixon: from distant monitoring to gradual involvement 
5. Monday, May 6
th
. D.C. Mayor Sharon Pratt Dixon skipped the meeting that Hispanic leaders 
called to discuss the incident 
6. Monday, May 6
th
: Dissatisfaction and anger among Hispanic residents in Mount Pleasant  
7. Evening of Monday, May 6
th
. Mayor Dixon visited the area 
8. Monday, May 6
th
. Second night of rioting  
9. Imposition of a curfew 
10. Success in pacification of the area 
11. Morning of Tuesday, May 7
th
. Mayor Dixon, D.C. police chief and other city officials met 
with Hispanic community leaders  
12. Tuesday, May 7
th
. Conformation of a task force aimed at improving relations between city 
government and Hispanic residents (multicultural task force) 
13. Meetings between Hispanic community leaders and youths 
14. Dixon and her aides fought with the area’s news media, in an effort to limit their coverage of 
the disturbance area during the curfew 
15. Night of Tuesday, May 7
th
. Imposition of curfew from 7:00 pm to 5:00 am (May 8
th
)  
16. Mayor Dixon achieved a broad support for her actions 
17. Wednesday, May 8
th
. Mayor Dixon met with multicultural task force of Hispanic community 
leaders 
18. Hispanic leaders expressed concerns that officials from the US Immigration and 
Naturalization Service (INS) were helping local courts process those arrested 
19. D.C. Police Chief denied having requested any assistance from INS 
20. INS authorities recognize involvement in an informational role only  
21. Night of May 8
th
. Third night of curfew 
22. Rumors that Gomez had died became so pervasive in the area’s Hispanic community that the 
police convinced Gomez’s sister to announce publicly that he was still being treated. 
23. Thursday, May 9
th
.City offers jobs to Hispanic youths 
24. News about Mount Pleasant disturbances spread out all over the world 
25. Thursday, May 9
th
. Mayor Dixon decided to lift the curfew 
26. Thursday, May 9
th
. Dixon extended a formal state of emergency in the city indefinitely 
27. Thursday, May 9
th
. Businesses along Mount Pleasant Street (heart of Mount Pleasant 
neighborhood) planned a celebration for Saturday afternoon 
28. Thursday, May 9
th
. Formation of the D.C. Latino Civil Rights Task Force (D.C. Latino) 
29. Night of May 9
th
. Life starts to return to normal in the area 
30. Friday, May 10
th
. Mount Pleasant merchants announced plans for outdoor party for 
customers they expect to come back 
31. Saturday, May 11
th
. Outdoor party in Mount Pleasant 
32. The sudden increased attention to the Hispanic community has irritated some black leaders 
33. Sunday, May 12
th
. Proclaiming a day of reconciliation, D.C. Mayor Dixon, city officials and 
religious leaders from Mount Pleasant gathered at the Shrine of the Sacred Heart. 
34. Tuesday, May 14
th
. The City’s Civilian Review Complaint Board (CRCB), which investigates 
complaints of police misconduct, held a forum for residents of Adams Morgan and Mount 
Pleasant 
35. Tuesday, May 14
th
. D.C. Latino task force chairman requested a commission to start 
intensive hearings on the city’s treatment of Hispanics 
36. Wednesday, May 16
th
. City officials are asking businesses, churches and civic groups to hire 
several thousand teenagers who may not be able to get jobs because of budget cuts 





. The US CCRB is reviewing complaints that police have regularly harassed and 
physically abused Hispanics and that the city has ignored them in hiring and budgeting 
39. May 22
nd
. Diffusion. A Governor’s commission was recommended that the Montgomery 
County police force improve its training, hire more Hispanic officers and increase its sensitivity 
to the county's rapidly growing Hispanic community, as a necessary step to avoid incidents like 
the ones that took place in MP. 
40. May 24
th
. Mayor Dixon picks acting Latino Affairs Chief: Mara Lopez 
41. May 24
th
. D.C. Latino approves of Mayor’s choice for the OLA 
42. May 28
th
. The US CRC announced it will investigate the economic and social status of 
Hispanics in the District 
43. May 30
th
. D.C. Latino began meeting with top city officials to discuss how to improve the life 
quality of Hispanic residents 
44. May 30
th
. In the meeting, Aviles and the D.C. Latino task force took a step toward 
legitimating themselves by asking the mayor to recognize the task force as “the body 
representing the interests of the Latino community” 
45. June 15
th
. D.C. police had receptions at two precinct houses in an effort to improve the 
Department’s image among Hispanics 
46. June 27
th
. Coalition of Hispanic and other community groups announced initiatives to 
improve life for minorities in D.C. 
47. July 12
th 
(approx.). A group of merchants discontented with the official efforts to arrest 
looters and vandals from the Mount Pleasant disturbances, has begun soliciting videotapes and 
photographs of the violence in order to identify the subjects and report them to the police 
48. July 25
th
. Mayor Dixon and Metro Police Chief restated their plan to step up police programs 
in the Hispanic communities of Mount Pleasant and Adams Morgan 
49. Leaders in the Hispanic community said the problems that triggered the riots were still 
present for many immigrants in Mount Pleasant and Adams Morgan 
50. July 27
th
. Diffusion. Arlington County community leaders warned that unless the county 
provided more jobs, and housing incidents could “explode” 
51. September 11
th
. The D.C. Latino Task Force sent a report to Mayor Dixon requesting parity 
in jobs, city services, city contracts and education 
52. September 11
th
. The leader of D.C. Latino Task force threatened with mobilization 
53. September 13
th
. Mayor Dixon endorsed key goals sketched in the report issued by the D.C. 
Latino task force 
54. D.C. Latino task force questioned the mayor’s proposal that all initiatives concerning 
Hispanic community be handled by the city’s OLA 
55. Aviles and the D.C. Latino task force have been seeking support from several members of 










1. December 16, 2005. The United States House of Representatives passes the Border Protection, 
Anti-terrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act (H.R. 4437, also known as the 
Sensenbrenner bill).  
2. Immigrant advocacy organizations plan and coordinate actions 
• Activation of an already existing (in latency) group: the National Capital Immigration 
Coalition 
3. March 8, 2006. Near Capitol, thousands protest against Sensenbrenner bill.  
• First experiment: (the March rally)—expectations exceeded 
• The demonstration, organized by the National Capital Immigration Coalition, drew 
people from across the region, many of them carrying small US flags.  
• Organizers of the protest had predicted a turnout of 20,000, but a spokesman for the 
coalition said the crowd far exceeded that. 
4. Different organizations coordinate actions to organize a national rally to oppose the bill. In the 
Washington area, Intense and aggressive coordination of efforts for the April 10
th
 rally: 
• Use of radios 
• Active utilization of networks of community organization 
• Street work 
• Unions involvement 
• Churches involvement 
• Social clubs and community service organizations involvement 
• Resources invested 
• Coordination across the country 




, 2006. Massive demonstration in the Washington Monument (part of the massive 
demonstrations by Hispanics across the country).  
• Hundreds of thousands of pro-immigration demonstrators mobilized in the Mall 
• Most significant public expression on political issues by the Hispanic community 
(leading a movement that also included other groups) 
• Some of the signs seen: “Immigrant nation” , “I’m an immigrant, and I vote”, “Brown 
and proud”, “Immigrants built this country”, “We vote and pay taxes”, “We are 
Americans too” “Bring us out of the shadows”, “Working is not a crime”, “Stop 4437”, 
“El pueblo unido jamas sera vencido”, “A gente veio para trabalhar”, “Si, se puede” 
6. April 14th, 2006. The coalition of grass-roots that staged the huge rallies in March and April 
torn over an ambitious next step: a massive job and economic boycott that some called “A 
Day without immigrants” 
7. Division in leadership over May 1st protest 
• Some community groups support a general boycott on May 1st 
• A panel of immigration activists said it would not encourage workers and families to 
walk off the job and keep their children from school as part of a May 1 boycott, but 
would hold voter recruitment and petition drives instead (April 20
th
)  
• A group cautioned immigrants that it might put their jobs at risk (April 27th) 
8. Some groups use momentum for new fights: 
• Housing activists enlist energized immigrants 
• Vote registration campaigns 
• Organizations encourage people to sign petitions 
9. Backlash: arrests of undocumented immigrants after high profile federal investigations in 
other states spark rampant rumors that law enforcement officials are randomly targeting 
the Latino community in the Washington region. 
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10. May 1st. Many leaders of the April 10th immigration rally on the Mall cautioned against 
participation in the boycott, and some activists from the Washington region and elsewhere 
encouraged immigrants to stay away from work, school and stores. 
11. Tensions in the leadership. Disputes over “who owned the movement”. 
12. President Bush’s growing confidence that he will secure a victory on immigration runs in 
direct contrast to the House Republican leadership, which is prepared to block legislation 
that offers illegal immigrants a path to citizenship without sending them home. 
13. May 1st, 2006. Rallies and boycotts of schools and businesses take place across the nation. 
• Illegal immigrants and their supporters seek to present a case to the American people 
that they are vital to the country’s economy and should not be subject to deportation. 
• Although the protests caught the nation’s attention, the economic impact was mixed. 
• In the District, more than 1,000 people rallied at Meridian Park in the Mount Pleasant 
neighborhood, and smaller rallies were held in Herndon, Alexandria and Baileys 
Crossroads. 
• The action may have been stronger had the coalition of grass-roots organizations that 
advises immigrants not been deeply conflicted over whether to endorse the boycott. 
• Some supported the effort to demonstrate immigrant power, but others discouraged it, 
saying it was premature because Congress has not taken action since the first 
demonstrations an because the strike might induce a backlash by those born in the 
United States. 
14. May 3rd, 2006. After protests, backlash grows. Opponents of illegal immigration are 
increasingly vocal. 
15. May 3rd, 2006. Labor site backlash felt at polls in Herndon. Three who supported immigrant 
center ousted. 
16. May 18th, 2006. Immigrant advocates take their case to Capitol Hill. Activists lobby 
members of congress. 
17. May 19th, 2006. Immigrants keep close watch on Congress 
• Immense hope has been created among some immigrants by the launch of a national 
immigrant rights movement, huge protest rallies across the country and the perception, 
largely fueled by the Spanish-language media, that the Bush administration backs their 
cause. 
18. June 9th, 2006. Applications for US citizenship surge. Immigrants nationwide responding to 
threat of congressional crackdown. 
19. June 30th, 2006. By pushing English-only policies and tough measures against illegal 
immigrants, House conservatives endanger President Bush’s goal of drawing millions of 
Latino voters to the Republican Party and helping realign ethnic politics for years to come. 
20. July 14th, 2006. Hispanics cite rise in discrimination since the start of the congressional 
debate over illegal immigration, according to a survey. 
21. August 31st, 2006. After four months of relative quiet, immigration reform advocates are 
mobilizing a new round of protests in Washington and other cities to put pressure on a 
returning Congress and reinvigorate a Latino movement that awakened in massive 
demonstrations this spring. 
• In the Washington region, activists are distributing leaflets, and Spanish-language radio 
is buzzing about a Sept. 7 rally that organizers hope will be the biggest yet.  
• Organizers say their goal is 1 million protesters from up and down the East Coast for a 
rally on the Mall and a march to the White House. 
• In media interviews and on fliers organizers simplify their focus to key demands: 
legalization for the unauthorized and an end to stepped-up arrests of illegal immigrants 
• The return to street protest, a tactic that galvanized millions this spring, comes after 
public discord among activists over a May 1 work boycott and a summer when their 
focus turned to immigrant voter registration drives. At the same time, new immigration 
legislation grew even more elusive in Congress, which is deadlocked on the issue. 
• The immigrant movement is still developing. Regional coalitions are trying to figure out 
how to work together nationally, and no clear leader has emerged. Locally, the National 
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Capital Immigration Coalition -- a network of about 60 organizations that has existed 
for four years -- is just now defining the qualifications for formal membership. 
• Organizers estimation: Organizers say the movement has not lost steam. Immigrants, 
they said, are enthusiastic about the coming protests, believing the demonstrations 
empower them and weaken support for an enforcement-only House proposal. 
• Other observers are uncertain. Carlos Aragon, general manager of Radio Fiesta (1480 
AM), a Woodbridge station that has been broadcasting information about the Sept. 7 
rally, said the event is a hot topic among listeners -- but they now sound more cautious. 
• Unlike previous rallies that drew people from the Washington region, the Sept. 7 event 
will include participants from along the East Coast. Organizers said at least 100 
busloads of marchers will roll in. 
• To encourage local turnout, organizers are intensifying the strategies they used in the 
spring. They are playing radio promotional spots each hour on some Spanish-language 
stations. Volunteers are distributing fliers at churches, soccer fields, Metro stations and 
construction sites. 
22. September 7th, 2006. Immigration activists mass in front of the Capitol, renewing their 
appeal for legislative reform as Congress reconvenes after a recess in which many members 
experienced a backlash against illegal immigration back home. 
• Local organizers say they expect hundreds of thousands of demonstrators from the East 
Coast, although protests the same week in Phoenix and Chicago drew disappointing 
crowds. 
• Organizers express little hope that Congress would act on immigration that election 
year. 
• Organizers see the new round of protests—and voter registration drives that started 
slowly in the summer—as part of a still-nascent pro-immigration movement 
• “It’s obviously really important that we get good numbers but also that the message gets 
across to Congress”, said Contreras, the Chairman of the National Capital Immigration 
Coalition, organizing the rally. 
• Immigrant activists are seeking legal status for all immigrants and a halt to increased 
raids and deportations. 
• Organizers initially predicted a turnout of 1 million, but are now projecting a crowd 
similar to the one at a rally of April 10. A police official estimated that the demonstrated 
drew at least 100,000 people; organized pegged attendance about 500,000. 
• About 200 buses—half from Eastern states outside the Washington region—are 
scheduled to stream into the District for the rally. (Local organizers have contracted 
fewer buses than for previous protests and have encouraged local demonstrators to take 
public transportation. 
• Organizers printed fliers in Arabic, Swahili, Korean, Amharic, French and Chinese, 
among other languages. African and Asian community organizations publicized the 
demonstration in news conferences with local ethnic media. In each, they emphasized 
that the effect of immigration reform would stretch beyond Latinos, by potentially 
cracking down on the 200,000 estimated illegal Korean immigrants, for example, or by 
influencing the backlog for relatives' immigration applications. 
 
23. September 7, 2006. Immigration rally's low turnout disappoints advocates; fear of backlash, 
mixed messages, timing are cited. 
• A pro-immigration rally that promised to bring tens of thousands of marchers from 
across the nation to Washington yesterday managed to draw only a paltry number of 
demonstrators, raising questions about the movement's tactics and staying power. 
• With fewer than 5,000 people attending, organizers from other localities expressed two 
worries about the turnout: that they were losing the momentum built up by the huge 
marches in the spring, and that the movement's national organizers in Washington have 
lost touch with the people. 
• But, in contrast to spring's huge rallies -- which brought an estimated 100,000 to 300,000 
people to the streets of Washington, and even larger turnouts in Los Angeles, Dallas, 
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Phoenix and Chicago -- yesterday's march was the latest in a string of protests that drew 
paltry crowds in the past week. 
24. In the four months since the first marches, competing immigration bills have stalled in the 
House and the Senate. 
• The House bill, favored by opponents of illegal immigration, would force undocumented 
workers currently in the country to return home before being allowed to work.  
• The Senate bill would permit illegal immigrants to pay a fine and gain permission to 
work. 
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